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4Abstract
This thesis examines the concepts of identity and individuality via 
scientifically-informed philosophical analysis. It has two parts.
The first part deals with metaphysical claims that turn out to be, in effect, 
very general empirical claims extracted from our (supposed, but rationally- 
accredited) knowledge of the world. I here compare two approaches:
a) the Leibniz-Quine view of identity as a derivative relation, and,
relatedly, of individuality as dependent on the qualities of things;
and
b) the view that identity is a non-analysable primitive, and, relatedly, that
the individuality of things is not reducible to anything else.
The former position, based on the Principle of the Identity of the 
Indiscemibles as a criterion of individuation, might appear prima facie more 
plausible. However, I argue that it runs into difficulties both at the level of a 
priori analysis and in terms of ‘fit’ with the evidence described by our best 
science. It is, in fact, not even as compelling from the empiricist point of view 
as is commonly believed. I therefore argue that the position that identity and 
individuality are primitive may be preferred.
In the second part of the thesis - under the assumption that the proper role 
of metaphysics is to characterise the best solutions to issues that are left open by 
current science -  I deal with the question regarding whether and how the 
ultimate constituents of reality can actually be conceived of as primitive 
individuals. I argue in favour of an ontology of tropes, develop the view in 
detail and defend it against various criticisms. The fundamental tropes that 
constitute the basic ‘building blocks’ of reality are identified with the state- 
independent properties of elementary particles. The way in which these 
constitute complex particulars is described, and certain peculiarities having to 
do with quantum statistics are accounted for.
I conclude by suggesting possible avenues for further research.
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7Chapter 1 
Introduction
This chapter introduces the topic of the thesis and, in particular, the 
notions of identity and individuality. Following a consideration - and 
rejection - of other views regarding whether and how individuality can 
be analysed, two alternatives are identified: the conception according to 
which individuality is primitive and non-analysable, and the 
‘reductionist’ view, which equates individuality with uniqueness of 
properties. The latter approach leads to the acceptance of what is known 
as the Principle of the Identity of the Indiscemibles. These two 
alternatives, it is also explained, correspond to two possibilities as regards 
the identity relation. With respect to such a relation, the Quinean 
suggestion that it can be substituted without loss with conjunctions of 
non-identity-involving formulas is opposed to the idea that it must be 
posited as a logical constant. An outline of the chapters to follow 
concludes this introduction.
1. Individuality
The notions of identity and individuality are essential in philosophy. 
At least some philosophical problems surely have a metaphysical basis; 
and Lowe is unquestionably right that identity and individuality are
“the two most important of all metaphysical notions [..., as 
they possess an undeniable] centrality [.. .and play a] pervasive 
role” [1998; 28].
8The connection between these two concepts is the following: it seems 
plausible to claim that an individual is something that is such that 
statements regarding its identity always have a determinate truth-value. 
That is - looking at the other direction of the bi-conditional that 
constitutes the basic definition of individuality - that whatever is 
determinately identical to itself (i.e., possesses self-identity) and also 
determinately distinct from everything else (i.e., possesses numerical 
distinctness) is an individual.1
The important philosophical debate with which this thesis is 
concerned regards whether this is all we can say about individuality, or 
some degree of philosophical analysis is instead possible.
Various attempts have been made in the history of philosophy to 
show that the latter is in fact the case, and the intension of the concept of 
individuality is the same as that of some other, more ‘down-to-earth’ 
concept.
The idea that an entity is an individual if and only if it is indivisible, 
for instance, was defended by Saint Thomas Aquinas in his Summa 
Theologica ([Part I, Question 11, Article 2]). This view was later refined 
by Suarez, who argued that individuality is indivisibility into entities o f 
the same specific kind  as the original one [1572(1861); Disputatio V, Sec. 
1, § 3]. Further specifications can be added, as illustrated, for example, by 
Gracia, who considers the possibility that individuality is indivisibility 
into entities of the same quantity as the initial one [1988; 29-32]. The 
view is in any case inadequate, however, as whether or not an entity 
possesses the identity conditions defined above for individuals is logically
1 This immediately suggests a subdivision internal to a larger set of entities. Barcan Marcus 
[1993; 25], for instance, differentiates between ‘objects’ and ‘things’, the latter being 
objects provided with specific features - in particular, determinate self-identity -  which are 
not essential to object-hood. It seems to me correct to consider ‘object’ as a synonym of 
‘particular’, and consequently distinguish individual objects and non-individual objects as 
two distinct types of particulars.
9independent of whether or not it has parts (of a certain type). At best, 
this view manages to identify a subset of the set of possible individuals.
Another suggestion is that something is an individual if and only if 
the word that denotes it in the language is impredicable. This view was 
put forward in Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, and re-emerged in the 
Middle Ages via the commentary on Aristotle’s work written by Boethius. 
It amounts to the claim that something is an individual if and only if the 
word(s) that we use to refer to it can only appear as the subject of a 
phrase. Many medieval philosophers maintained that this is a satisfactory 
definition, and that the fact that something necessarily corresponds to 
the subject of a grammatical sentence is necessary and sufficient for it to 
count as an individual. However, this is mistaken. One might respond 
that what counts as the subject of a sentence is a purely conventional 
matter, and so -  while there indeed are individuals - nothing is 
absolutely impredicable. As argued by Ramsey [1925]2, being subject or 
predicate at the level of language is a relative notion, for we can always 
reformulate our expressions in such a way that what appears as a 
predicate in one expression appears as the subject in another, equivalent 
one, and vice versa. Of course, there still exists an ontological difference 
between a particular located in space and time that is attributed a quality 
that it shares with other things, and something that is exemplified by 
specific particulars and can be common to many things in different 
places and at different times. However, this ontological asymmetry 
cannot be brought to bear on a definition of individuality that is 
presented as exclusivelybased on features of language.
Another definition is proposed by Gracia, who emphasises the notion 
of non-instantiability. Gracia contends that:
2 Ramsey’s argument will be examined in more detail in a later section (see chapter 4).
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“There is no great advantage in making a distinction 
between particularity and individuality [...because...] unlike 
singularity, which has plurality as its own opposite, 
particularity has no appropriate opposite of its own context, 
allowing us to use it as a synonym of ‘individuality’, and to 
oppose it to universality” [1988; 53].
His reasoning, then, goes as follows. From the identification of 
particularity and individuality, he derives that individuality is the 
opposite of non-particularity. Since whatever is not a particular is a 
universal, it follows that instantiability (the defining feature of 
universals) is what individuals lack. Hence Gracia’s view that universals 
are singular (they are not plural in the sense of being aggregates) but not 
individual (as they can be instantiated); and that every singular thing 
that is not a universal, i.e., is not multiply instantiable, is an individual.
This view is in itself consistent, for once individuality is equated with 
particularity no contradiction arises. However, I see reasons not to 
equate the two concepts, and to claim that they refer to different types of 
things. In particular (introducing certain differentiations and definitions 
that will become relevant at a later stage), it is possible to claim that self- 
iden tity  and numerical distinctness from  other entities (that is, 
countability) do not necessarily go together; and accordingly to take 
particularity as defining the general category of non-instantiables; and 
then distinguish -  within the class of particulars - between individuals 
and non-individuals, depending on whether or not they have both 
determinate self-identity and numerical distinctness.
This discrimination appears not only natural but also advisable once 
one considers the possibility of vague objects, often discussed in the 
philosophical literature. Of course, Gracia might just reject such a 
possibility, and consequently continue to deny the usefulness of the
11
particular/individual distinction. Yet, besides being of independent 
philosophical interest, the concept of vagueness appears to have a clear - 
and far from ‘abstract’ -  import, as it is intimately connected with issues 
regarding the interpretation of physical theory: in particular, with 
problems revolving around the metaphysical status of quantum entities.3 
Therefore, the differentiation between particularity and individuality 
appears indeed relevant, at least under the assumption that philosophical 
analysis cannot remain abstract from actual evidence, and from a 
consideration of our knowledge of the world. In the light of this, it is fair 
to claim that non-instantiability is necessary but not sufficient for 
individuation.4
We have thus seen that indivisibility, impredicability and non- 
instantiability are all insufficient for a ‘reductionist’ definition of 
individuality. A further suggestion, and one that cannot be dismissed as 
easily as those considered so far, is that the individuality of an entity 
supervenes on the entity’s qualities: something, the idea is, is an 
individual - self-identical and numerically distinct from other entities - 
because its properties are not the same as those o f any other en tity (and 
only i f  this is the case). According to this line of argument, dating back at 
least to Leibniz, individuality is in fact a derivative concept, and talk of 
individuality could be in principle entirely replaced with claims
31 will deal with this issue in detail in the present thesis (see chapters 3 and 6).
4 But if self-identity and countability are distinct, one might at this point reply, then there 
should exist four ontological categories, corresponding to die four possible combinations, 
and not just two (individuals and non-individuals). Lowe [1998] suggests that this is in fact 
the case, as parts (or ‘portions’, or ‘quantities’) of homogeneous stuff (think about a jug of 
water) are ‘quasi-individuals’ with self-identity but not determinate numerical distinctness; 
and particular qualities are ‘non-individuals’ lacking both determinate self-identity and 
determinate numerical distinctness. I believe that Lowe is wrong on both counts: in the first 
case, he seems to conflate the epistemic arbitrariness o f the identification of parts of 
homogeneous stuff (how many molecules count as a ‘portion’ or ‘quantity’ is not uniquely 
fixed) with lack of numerical distinctness in the ontological sense (it is not the case that 
there is no objective number of molecules in an amount of homogeneous stuff); in the 
second, he simply endorses a view of particularized properties different from mine.
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regarding the properties of things. The alternative, to be discussed in 
much of what follows, is thus that between:
a) The view according to which the world is, at root, entirely 
constituted by qualitative facts (i.e., facts other than those 
concerning identity and number), and individuality is 
reducible to properties -  a conception defended by Leibniz, 
Russell and Ayer among others; and
b) The idea that the individuality of things is something over and 
above their qualitative aspects and there exist - as believed, for 
example, by Scotus, Kant and Peirce - brute, primitive 
metaphysical facts of self-identity and numerical distinctness 
without any fact of qualitative difference corresponding to 
them.
In the terminology introduced by Adams [1979], the former approach 
takes the things’ suchnesses as the only components of individuals, while 
the latter maintains that some form of primitive, purely quantitative, 
thisness also exists and is the source of individuality.
2. Approaches to Iden tity
The above discussion made it clear that the question of individuality 
can only be answered by addressing another question. If an entity’s 
individuality consists of certain identity conditions holding for that 
entity, then in order to clarify the notion of individuality we must 
analyse that of identity.
The canonical account of identity can be given in terms of first-order 
logic. In this context, it can be presented as a peculiar binary relation 
(expressed by the symbol *=’) that satisfies the following two axioms:
Reflexivity. Vx(x=x)
13
Leibniz’s Law. VxVy((j£=^)-»VF(Fx<->Fy))
(where ‘at" and ty* denote individual entities and F is an open formula 
in the language).
The reflexivity axiom states that every individual is identical to itself. 
Leibniz’s Law amounts to the claim that if two individuals are identical, 
then any formula satisfied by one of them is also satisfied by the other.5
Reflexivity and Leibniz’s Law together imply three other features of 
the identity relation: sym m etry,; transitivity and what is known as 
Euclid’s Erst axiom , which states that any two things both identical to a 
third thing are identical to each other. Consider symmetry: if identity is 
not symmetric, then there must exist two entities for which it is not the 
case that (a=b)-^(b=a). This entails that {a=b) and —>(b=a) can be both true 
at the same time. But this in turn implies that —>(a=a); for the formula 
—i (x=a) is satisfied substituting x  with b but, since a is equal to b, by 
Leibniz’s Law this must also be the case if x  is substituted with a. This, 
however, is made impossible by reflexivity and so the initial negation of 
symmetry is - once the two fundamental axioms are assumed -  proven
5 The supporters of so-called relative identity (see Geach [1967]) suggest that it is possible 
for two tilings x and^ to be the same under one concept but not under another (for instance, 
to be the same book, but not the same copy of the book). This allegedly allows one to solve 
certain problems such as, for instance, the so-called paradox of constitution: if the clay c is 
shaped on day 1 in the form of statue s, it looks like c is identical to s; but what happens if, 
on day 2, c is moulded in such a way that it constitutes a statue t which is qualitatively 
different from s i  Is s identical to t, as Leibniz’s Law would imply; or is it distinct, as the 
differences among statue s and statue t suggest? Perhaps one has the same piece of clay on 
day 2 as in day 1, but not the same statue. Relative identity thus entails that only restricted 
instances of Leibniz’s Law apply, made relative to concepts. It is debated whether this view 
captures the true nature of identity; or, instead, Leibniz’s Law in its unrestricted version 
represents the distinctive mark of identity and relative identity theorists derive too much 
from the sortal dependency of identity -  namely, the fact that whenever it is possible to 
claim that x is an individual, it must also be possible to answer the question ‘What kind of 
individual is xT. See Wiggins [2001; 53-54] for the proof that, if one adopts the 
unrestricted Leibniz’s Law, then sortal dependency entails the impossibility of relative 
identity. As far as I am concerned, I believe that Leibniz’s Law should not be restricted, and 
that the idea of relative identity stems exclusively from the fact that the same, unique 
physical object (obeying well-defined identity criteria) can be considered from different 
perspectives and in different functions. At any rate, whether identity is relative or absolute 
does not really matter for the issue we are concerned with, namely, whether it is reducible 
or not.
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contradictory. As for transitivity, consider the case in which (allegedly) 
(a=b), (b=c) and -■ (a=c). Again by Leibniz’s Law, the first two equalities 
entail (a=c), and so the initial assumption is inconsistent. That Euclid’s 
first axiom must also be accepted as a logical truth in the theory of 
identity is shown along similar lines, by assuming that (a=b), (c=b) and 
-i(a=c) can be all true at the same time and noticing that, via Leibniz’s 
Law, this entails a contradiction.6
In short, identity is the equivalence relation satisfying Leibniz’s Law.
Such a relation is often taken as a primitive. First-order logic with 
identity, for example, takes the identity sign as part of one’s logical 
vocabulary, along with the usual individual constants, variables, 
quantifiers and predicate and relation symbols.
The alternative view exists, however, according to which it is 
possible to analyze the identity relation and conceive of it as a non- 
logical notion. This view is usually associated to the name of Quine.
Quine’s idea (stemming from an elaboration of the work of Hilbert 
and Bemays [1934]) was essentially that, in a first-order language with a 
finite vocabulary, it is possible to eliminate the identity sign altogether, 
effectively reducing it, for each individual, to the conjunction of 
formulas that the latter satisfies in the language. As Quine puts it, in a 
first-order language
*“=’ will in effect be present, whether as an unanalyzed 
general term or in a complex paraphrase, at least provided that 
the vocabulary of unanalyzed general terms is finite. For, 
write ‘if Fx then Fy’ and vice-versa with each of the absolute 
general terms of the vocabulary in place of *F’; also write ‘(z)(if 
Fxz then Fyz)’ and ‘(z)(if Fzx then Fzy)’ and vice-versa, with 
each of the dyadic relative terms in place of F; and so on [...].
6 For more on this, see Tarski [1941; Ch. 3] and Howson [2003; Ch. 9, esp. 119-120].
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The conjunction of all these formulae is coextensive with ‘x=y’ 
[...and] we can without conflict adopt that conjunction as our 
version of identity” [1960; 230].
But why should we believe that this is the case? We know that if two 
individual constants in a language denote the same entity, then they also 
satisfy the same formulas in that language (this is Leibniz’s Law). 
However, it is possible that two distinct individuals -  call them a and b - 
exist such that a and b satisfy all the same formulas in the language. Or so 
first-order logic with identity tells us. The possibility of unintended 
interpretations ignoring this has indeed been repeatedly identified as an 
unacceptable consequence of the Quinean perspective. It was first 
emphasised by Wallace [1964]. Williamson [2006] provides the example 
of a language with only two monadic atomic predicates F and G: in an 
interpretation on which 1000 members of the domain are both F and G, 
1 is only F, 1000000 are only G, and 1 is neither F nor G, the 1000 (FaG)s 
and the 1000000 Gs are -  on a Quinean construal of identity - necessarily 
collapsed into two single objects. Scenarios such as this one supposedly 
expose the limited expressive powers of languages without identity as a 
primitive (limited with respect to what -  allegedly -  ‘is actually the case’).
It is in effect undeniable that at the abstract level of conceptual 
analysis the positing of identity as a primitive provides more expressive 
power than in a language without the identity relation as a primitive. 
Quineans, however, may well deny that this additional potential is ever 
put to use, on the basis of the idea that it is never required by the 
characteristics of the domain being talked about (of course, unless the 
domain is constructed ad hoc}.7
1 They would thus argue that the reduction of the identity relation can always be carried out 
in a given context without epistemic loss, in the sense that, to the extent to which the
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It therefore seems that sense can be made of Quine’s proposal, and of 
the whole dispute about the status of the notion of identity, only by 
avoiding the consideration of artificial contexts and taking ontology 
more explicitly into account.
3. Individuality as a Qualitative Notion: the Reductionist View and 
the Principle o f the Iden tity  o f the Indiscem ibles
Quine’s claims can be summarized in the form of the following 
definition:
(A?=j^ =defVF (Fx<->Fy)
That is,
VaVj ((a?=^<->VF(Fj«->>F^) (Quinean definition of identity)
Everybody agrees on the truth of 
^jNy{(x=y)—^y¥(¥x(rJ>¥y))
which is nothing but the abovementioned Leibniz’s Law.
The distinctive feature of Quinean identity is, therefore, the right-to- 
left direction of the above bi-conditional, namely,
VWy(VF(Fx<-»Fy)^(A^y)) (A)
However, I argued, the status of (A) cannot be evaluated in  abstractor 
and must necessarily be determined on the basis of the properties of the 
entities constituting the domain which (A) is applied to. What this 
entails is immediately seen once one makes a correspondence between 
formulas in the language and properties ‘in the world’ explicit. If there is 
a property P in the domain for every formula F in the language, then the 
truth of A in the language is due to the truth of 
\f jN y{\fP(Px<r^'Py)-:>(x=y))
language mirrors its domain when identity is posited as a primitive, such a 
‘correspondence’ is not affected by the proposed reduction.
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in the world.
But this means that the justification of the Quinean view of identity 
must rest on the metaphysical assumption that no two numerically 
distinct things can have all the same properties.
The principle in question is, of course, Leibniz’s well-known 
Principle o f the Iden tity o f the Indiscem ibles (PII).8 I t is therefore P II 
that m ust be carefully assessed in  order to critically evaluate the Quinean 
position as regards identity.
It is here that, after a tour through the logical and linguistic issues 
surrounding identity, we get back to the initial question regarding 
individuality. Since individuality consists of the holding of well-defined 
identity conditions (as regards both self-identity and numerical 
distinctness from other entities), and since PII plays a crucial part in 
supporting the Quinean definition of identity, PII now becomes a 
candidate for counting as a valid criterion o f individuation from a 
perspective that denies the primitiveness of individuality. That is, it 
becomes what the position that I will call the reductionist position from 
now on presents as a ‘rule’ for finding out what counts as an individual, 
and which individuals exist in a given domain.
With respect to this, two possibilities arise.
On a strong reading of the Quinean-Leibnizian view, PII is 
necessarily true; that is, it is a metaphysical truth  that no two individuals
8 Leibniz formulated PII in many occasions and on different ways. See, for an example, his 
[1704(1981)]. Here (and in what follows) second-order logic is used, but bear in mind that 
Quine does not do this and only uses first-order formulas (of a language with a finite 
vocabulary). As we will see in more detail later, the second-order formulation of PII is a 
theorem of second-order logic whenever self-identity is considered as a genuine property 
(see Ketland [2006; 313] and Howson [2003; 147-148]). However, as we will see, there are 
arguments to the effect that one should ignore this property - and related ones -  when 
employing PII for purposes of individuation; and this is customarily done. Since no other 
relevant consequence seems to follow from the switch to second-order logic, there is no 
particular reason for objecting to the identification of Quine’s claims about the reducibility 
of the identity relation with an endorsement of PII (see, for example, Saunders [2006]).
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have all the same properties, and this justifies the reductionist approach 
to identity and individuality. On a weak reading of the reductionist 
perspective, instead, as far as we know  there is good reason to believe 
that numerically distinct but indiscernible individuals do not exist.
It is important to emphasise a crucial difference. The strong reading 
is based on the idea that the truth of PII as a metaphysical claim can be 
established, and that this has consequences for our knowledge of, and 
claims about, things in the world. The weak reading, instead, reverses the 
order: in looking at what we know about the world with a view to 
formulating principles of general validity, it suggests a priority (at least as 
long as the present issues are concerned) of epistemology over 
metaphysics. Much more on this will have to be said later.
W ith the foregoing discussion, for the time being, I have made the 
need for a consideration of ontology explicit, while speaking rather 
vaguely of a ‘world’ of entities with properties. What about the specific 
domain, and consequently language, that need to be considered? Insofar 
as the identity and individuality of m aterial objects is concerned (and not 
that, say, of numbers, or angels or any other ‘otherworldly’ thing), it 
seems that an assessment of the reductionist view must necessarily 
involve the entities and properties that are described by physical theory. 
Since the present work is indeed intended as a study of identity and 
individuality in the tangible world we five in, physics is therefore the 
discipline that (in parallel to PII as a metaphysical principle) will be 
considered in detail in what follows. As a matter of fact, one of the aims 
of this thesis is to formulate a plausible ontological interpretation of the 
physical world as it is described by our best current scientific theory 
about it.
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4. Summary and O utline o f the Subsequent Chapters
The individuality of an entity has been identified with the 
metaphysical condition in virtue of which the entity possesses 
determinate self-identity and numerical distinctness from every other 
entity. This definition connects the strictly metaphysical issue regarding 
the nature of individuality to the logico-linguistic debate concerning the 
identity relation. A clear opposition has emerged between a reductionist 
perspective which denies that the identity relation is part of one’s logical 
vocabulary, and is committed to PII; and the view that facts of identity 
and individuality are primitive and not further analysable, and PII is false.
The issue concerning the nature of individuality thus boils down to 
that regarding the status of PII. The essential question is: Does PII truly 
capture the nature of individuality? That is, is PII true? If so, is it 
necessarily or just contingently so? If it is merely contingently true, what 
is the real force of the Leibniz-Quine view of identity and individuality? 
That is, generalizing, to what extent are we allowed to make metaphysics 
dependent on epistemology? These are the key questions that will be 
dealt with in the first part of the thesis, devoted to a critical analysis of 
the reductionist view of identity and individuality and of the relationship 
between metaphysics and empirical science.9
The next chapter begins the analysis of the Quinean-Leibnizian 
reductionist position by ascertaining whether or not PII is necessarily 
true. If this turned out to be the case, then the reductionist 
understanding of identity and individuality would be compelling 
independently of the development of a specific position as regards the 
connection between empirical evidence and metaphysical claims, and of 
an assessment of what the available evidence tells us about identity and
9 Up to section 2 of chapter 4.
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individuality. However, since -  as we will see - this is not the case (i.e., 
PII cannot be convincingly argued to be a necessary truth), the Quine- 
Leibniz reductionist perspective can only be based on the claim that such 
a view is to be preferred in the light of our actual knowledge of the 
world. This requires one to take into account science, which is without 
doubt the best candidate for defining our non-logical vocabulary, with a 
view to establishing at least the contingent truth of PII. The latter, in the 
meantime, reduces to a very general empirical, rather than metaphysical, 
claim.
Chapter 3 moves on to the critical analysis of the claim that the 
reductionist view of identity and individuality, although not inescapable, 
is supported by the available evidence. To this purpose, a careful 
examination of the properties of those that count, according to our best 
current physical theory about the fundamental structure of matter - that 
is, quantum mechanics-, as the basic constituents of reality is offered. 
First, and in most of the chapter, the dominant interpretation of 
quantum theory is considered. It is shown that, under this interpretation, 
quantum many-particle systems constitute actual counterexamples to PII, 
regardless of recent attempts to ‘refine’ PII by letting it range over 
irreflexive relations. Against the suggestion that, in spite of this, we 
should stick to PII and re-describe reality in terms of an ontology that 
allows for the existence of non-individuals, I argue that any attempt to 
do so incurs inconsistency. This entails that the reductionist view is 
incompatible with the available evidence, once the latter is interpreted 
according to the canonical quantum theory. A (more brief) consideration 
of Bohmian mechanics follows, which leads to quite different 
conclusions. Bohmian mechanics, it is explained, preserves an essentially 
classical ontology, with individual particles that are always discernible
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from each other. It is argued, however, that - there not being grounds to 
prefer Bohmian mechanics over orthodox quantum mechanics as the true 
description of microphysical reality -  even if one takes Bohmian 
mechanics seriously it does not follow that the reductionist perspective is 
justified. All that one obtains is a sort of underdetermination of 
metaphysics by physics which is clearly less than what is required for a 
defence of the reductionist position.
Therefore, I suggest that the view that -  contrary to the Leibniz- 
Quine line of argument - individuality is primitive may legitimately be 
preferred on purely methodological grounds.
The second part of the thesis10 is devoted to articulating and 
defending this latter claim, and shifts to the level of what may be called 
‘real’ metaphysics. I conceive of the latter as the discipline that deals not 
with very general empirical claims derived from science, but rather with 
pure conjectures about the ultimate nature of reality (albeit formulated 
in agreement with science). This means that the second part of the thesis 
is of a rather different nature with respect to the first, and should be 
understood as a ‘positive’ attempt to define an entirely metaphysically 
motivated account (that can then be shown -  I will argue - to mesh well 
with the relevant physics).
In chapter 4, I examine whether empiricism truly demands, or 
strongly pushes us towards, the endorsement of the reductionist view. By 
establishing what a key methodological principle - known as the 
Principle of Acquaintance - truly amounts to once aptly re-formulated 
for today’s needs, I end up answering in the negative. A key ambiguity 
exists between the sensible idea of looking at the empirical evidence with 
a view to justifying  the reductionist approach to identity and
10 Chapters 4 to 6.
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individuality; and many actual cases in which the latter approach is 
taken for granted and consequently interpreted as imposing a (re-) 
description of one’s empirical domain of inquiry in reductionist terms.
In search for an ontological account consistent with the assumption 
that prim itive thisnesses must be acknowledged as real metaphysical 
factors determining the individuality of things, I then argue in favour of 
two theses: first, even though it is not necessarily inconsistent or 
methodologically unacceptable to hypothesise ‘bare particulars’ over and 
above the things’ qualities, the traditional notion of a substratum  should 
nevertheless be avoided if possible because of some undesirable 
characteristics it is bound to possess; secondly, similarity facts can 
perfectly be accounted for without having recourse to realism about 
universals.
In chapter 5, I analyse the resulting nominalism, and suggest that 
tropes (irreducibly individual -  that is, neither instantiated nor 
instantiable - properties) provide the basis for a consistent ontology in 
which identity and individuality are explicitly posited as primitives and 
that, at the same time, satisfies the demands that come from a sensible 
empiricism. First, trope ontology is shown to be preferable with respect 
to what is known as resemblance nominalism. Answers are then 
provided to criticisms traditionally raised against such an ontology.
In chapter 6, I show that trope theory allows one to conclude that 
quantum particles can consistently be regarded as individuals. The basic 
tropes constituting individual particles -  and, ultimately, the whole of 
reality - are identified (of course, fallibly) with the state-independent 
properties of elementary particles as these are described by the Standard 
Model. These properties can be the same for many particles, but this does 
not prevent the latter from being numerically distinct, as their
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individuality is rooted in the numerical uniqueness of their component 
tropes. The alleged problem of explaining the peculiar features of 
quantum statistics from an individuality-based perspective is also solved. 
This is done by formulating a specific ontological hypothesis with respect 
to the nature of the state-dependent properties of many-particle 
quantum systems of indistinguishable particles: these, it is suggested, are 
invariably emergent relations (of course, to be understood as tropes).
I conclude by pointing out the relevance of the results of the present 
work in relation to other areas, and possible further developments.
Chapter 2  
The Principle o f the Identity o f the 
Indiscemibles
This chapter analyses whether a justification exists for the claim that 
the Principle of the Identity of the Indiscemibles is necessarily true. It 
does this by addressing the time-honoured issue of whether 
counterexamples to it are possible. I conclude that counterexamples are 
conceivable to all versions of PII that do not presuppose identity, 
including those taking into account relations determining so-called ‘weak 
discemibility’; and that all the existing arguments intended to neutralize 
these counterexamples are not compelling. Therefore, there is no reason 
to regard the principle as a necessary truth. This leads to a consideration 
of the empirical evidence and of the description of reality provided by 
our best accredited scientific theories aimed to establishing whether PII 
is at least true in the actual world. This appears to entail that the 
investigation into the nature of identity and individuality becomes a 
subject to be treated from the perspective of what is known as 
‘experimental metaphysics’. The status of the latter discipline, and the 
actual boundaries between science and metaphysics, are discussed.
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1. H ow to Formulate the Principle o f the Iden tity  o f the 
Indiscem ibles
The fact that there have been heated discussions about the status of 
PII in analytic philosophy throughout the 20th century suggests that it 
cannot be straightforwardly regarded as self-evidently true.
PII is, in fact, analytically true if predicates involving identity are 
included in the scope of the relevant universal quantifier.11 For example, 
considering ‘is distinct from’ as denoting a genuine property, one obtains 
the following:
1) x£ y (assumption)
2) (reflexivity of identity)
3) 3P(P*a-,Py) (from 1 and 2)
4) (x ty )—>3 P(PAA-iPy) (from 1, 2 and 3)
5) VxVy((A3*y)—»3P(Px\-iPy)) (universal generalisation on 4)
Conclusion 5) entails the truth of PII, as it is equivalent to 
VWy(-i3P(PxA-iPj^—>(x=y)) 
and thus to
VAVy( V P(Pato-P^)->(a?=^) .
However, it is obvious that this amounts to cheating in the context of 
the present discussion. Especially in view of the fact that the 
endorsement of PII, as we have seen, appears subordinated to Quine’s 
conception of '=’ as a non-logical sign12, PII cannot be used for 
metaphysical purposes (i.e., as a criterion of individuation) if identity is 
presupposed at the level of properties. In order to make PII an
11 For PII as an analytical truth, see Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica [1925; 
57], Church [1956; 302] and Brody [1980; 6-9].
12 Remember that, putting it succinctly, the Quine-Hilbert-Bemays conception of identity 
makes the ‘=’ sign a mere shortcut for a conjunction of other formulas in which it does not 
appear.
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informative metaphysical principle (that is, to use it for ascribing 
individuality in any domain in which individuals are no t already 
defined), every reference to (non-reducible) identities must therefore be 
eliminated.
Black [1952] makes this requirement explicit. He has one of the 
fictional characters of his dialogue assert that if
“you want to have an interesting principle to defend, you 
must interpret “property” more narrowly -  enough so, at any 
rate, for “identity” and “difference” not to count as properties” 
[1952; 155].13
This hints at the fact that identity-involving properties must be 
excluded altogether, and not just as long as they refer to the entities 
being talked about. Define an im pure property as a relational property 
whose content depends on the identity of the ‘other relatum’, such as, for 
example, that denoted by the predicate ‘close to the Moon’. Two things 
might be made discernible by one impure property defined with respect 
to a third entity and nothing else. This would allow one to avoid 
circularly referring to the identity of one entity when attempting to 
determine that of the other (as it happens in 1) - 5) above); and yet a 
question would arise as to the nature of the third entity. As an example, 
think of two identical twins A and B (ignoring, for the time being, their 
different locations), only differing over the fact that A knows a third 
person C and B does not. Obviously, this entails that it is impossible, 
according to PII, for A and B to be one and the same person, since there
13 Similarly, Ayer remarks that “if no restriction is placed upon the type of predicate to be 
admitted, our rule very easily becomes trivial. Thus if A is allowed to have the property of 
being identical with itself, it is clear that there will be at least one predicate which will not 
be included in any set of predicates applying to something other than A, namely the 
predicate of being identical with A” [1954; 29]. Later authors (for example, Katz [1983], 
and Rodriguez-Pereyra [2006]) refined these early claims without modifying the basic point.
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is a property which makes them discernible; but the problem remains of 
what determines the individuality of C, which should equally be 
established exclusively on the basis of the thing’s qualities, via PII.
To distinguish impure properties that necessarily involve identity 
from impure properties that can be ‘translated into’ a pure property or a 
conjunction of pure properties (if such properties exist at all)14, the 
notion of a trivialising property can be usefully introduced. A trivialising 
property is a property differing with respect to which (while not 
differing with respect to anything else) would amount either to differing 
only  numerically; or with respect to some relational property involving 
the non-fiirther-analysable identity of some other entity.
To sum up: in order to be metaphysically interesting, PII must be 
formulated in a way in which it does not let the universal quantifier over 
properties range over trivialising properties too. The precise question 
that needs to be addressed is, therefore, whether a non-trivial version of 
PII can be defended as a metaphysical truth.
Katz [1983] suggests that an affirmative answer is readily found under 
the assumption that things may have modal properties. If this is the case, 
he claims, we can reason as follow:
1) Since substances (i.e., “familiar concrete objects such as 
material bodies, plants, animals and persons” [lb.; 39]) are 
contingent entities, then for any two substances it is possible 
for one to exist while the other does not;
2) Therefore, if the fact that -  for every possible world w  - a 
substance x  exists at w  entails that another substance y  also 
exists at w, and vice versa, then necessarily x=y
14 That such properties could exist is suggested by Casullo [1984], who hypothesises that 
the universe is constituted by a limited number of privileged particulars uniquely 
individuated by their properties, and all other particulars are individuated by their relations 
with such privileged particulars.
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3) Since the property of inhabiting a possible world is not a 
trivialising property, then equality of all non-trivialising 
properties necessarily entails identity, i.e., PII is necessarily 
true.
At a first glance, Katz’s argument appears compelling. It, however, 
faces some difficulties. First, even granting Katz’s key assumption 
regarding modal properties, there is the well-known (at least since Kant’s 
rejection of the ontological proof for the existence of God) dispute 
regarding whether existence is a genuine property. One might have 
recourse to other modal properties: for instance, it could be the case that 
two objects x  and j^are indiscernible, but x is  white contingently, while y  
cannot possibly be of any colour other than white. However, only 
existence seems to guarantee the degree of generality that Katz needs; for, 
at least for substances defined as in 1), contingent existence appears to be 
the only feature that all individuals share.15 Besides this, it is not clear 
why it should not be possible that in all worlds in which x  exists y  also 
does, and vice versa, without x  being identical to y  (as claimed in 2)): it 
seems in fact conceivable that two numerically distinct substances are 
mutually dependent on each other for their existence. Moreover, it does 
in fact not seem to be the case that existence in a world individuates 
without trivialising PII (3)). For, consider the following. According to 
Katz, this is a possible scenario: two substances a t  and y  have all the same 
properties in the actual world w, but they are made discernible by the 
fact that x  exists in another possible world w ’ while y  does not. The 
discerning predicate is thus ‘exists in world w ’\ which denotes a property 
of x  but not of y. The essential fact about x, however, can be expressed,
15 On the other hand, it appears rather ad hoc to assume that for any two distinct individuals 
(sharing all their non-modal properties) there always is some modal property which they do 
not share.
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in the language of trans-world identity that Katz must accept, via the 
predicate ‘a t  in w ’is identical to a t  in w ’. But the latter is clearly an impure 
predicate. In particular, Katz’s suggestion renders identities in a world 
circularly dependent on identities across worlds that presuppose them, so 
turning out to rely upon doubly unacceptable trivialising predicates.
In the light of these problems, the version of PII proposed by Katz 
will be ignored in what follows, and modal properties excluded from the 
range of properties the principle must quantify over (if it is to be an 
informative metaphysical criterion of individuation).
2. Leibnizian M etaphysics
Leibniz was, as we have seen, the first explicitly to formulate PII. He 
took it for granted that different individuals exist at different space-time 
locations and have different relations with other entities, but denied that 
their monadic intrinsic properties can all be equal. This is commonly 
defined as the strong version of PII. A classic statement of this view is in 
Leibniz’s correspondence with Clarke:
“There is no such thing as two individuals indiscernible 
from each other. An ingenious gentleman of my acquaintance, 
discoursing with me, in the presence of her Electoral Highness 
the Princess Sophia, in the garden of Herrenhausen; [sic\ 
thought he could find two leaves perfectly alike. The Princess 
defied him to do it, and he ran all over the garden a long time 
to look for some; but it was to no purpose. Two drops of water, 
or milk, viewed with a microscope, will appear distinguishable 
from each other” (quoted in Wiggins [2001; 62]).
The reason for this, according to Leibniz, is that:
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“It is always necessary that beside the difference of time 
and place there be internal principles of distinction [...;] thus, 
although time and place serve in distinguishing things, [...t]he 
essence of identity and diversity consists [...] not in time and 
space” [lb.].
To support this metaphysical view, Leibniz presented (often 
implicitly within a larger context) several arguments, based on a number 
of different assumptions. The most renowned of these arguments in 
favour of PII unites theology and metaphysics in a way that is analogous 
to Leibniz’s reasoning in favour of a relational view of space-time. In his 
exchange with Clarke, Leibniz states:
“When I deny that there are two drops of water perfectly 
alike, or any two other bodies indiscernible from each other, I 
do not say it is absolutely impossible to suppose them, but that 
it is a thing contrary to the divine wisdom, and which 
consequently does not exist” (see the ‘Fifth Paper’ in 
Alexander [1956; 55-97, Sec. 25]).
The reasoning underlying this conviction can be summarized as 
follows:
1) There is a reason why God creates what he creates {Principle 
o f Sufficient Reasoii);
2) The actual world was created by God because it is the best 
possible world (this is often referred to as the Principle o f the 
Best);
3) Two qualitatively identical worlds are such that neither is 
better than the other;
4) Therefore, there was no possible world qualitatively identical 
to the actual world among the alternatives God could choose 
from;
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5) If a world contains indiscemibles there is another possible 
world which is qualitatively identical to it (by definition of 
indiscemibility and possibility of quality-preserving 
permutations of distinct individuals);
6) Therefore, the created world does not contain indiscemibles.
Looking at this argument one can, first of all, see that it is only valid
if a qualification is made to premise 2), to the effect that being the best 
entails uniqueness. For otherwise premise 4) does not follow and can 
perfectly be replaced with the claim that, if there was a possible world 
qualitatively identical to ours, then that was actualized by God as well. 
This would then entail that, if there are indiscemibles in this world, 
another world qualitatively identical to it has indeed been created by 
God. And so the non-existence of indiscemibles would not be established. 
While it is not obvious what ‘best* means in this context, or even what it 
must be taken to mean in general, if it is understood as ‘richer with 
respect to qualities and their degrees’ (with ‘bad’ properties intended 
only negatively as lack of certain qualities), then surely uniqueness is not 
established. One might suggest that Leibniz is claiming that the existence 
of two distinct but indiscernible entities would violate God’s perfection, 
requiring the above maximum variety with the greatest economy in what 
is created. The best world would, according to this perspective, be the 
one with the widest range of qualities and the smallest amount of ‘stuff. 
However, it is not obvious that, given the degree of variety that obtains 
in a world with a certain number of indiscemibles, an equal amount can 
obtain in a world without indiscemibles; namely, it is impossible to 
exclude a priori that at least certain qualitative features of the world 
entirely depend on facts exclusively regarding the number of certain 
entities. On the other hand, if one understands God’s aiming to have the
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most economical universe as requiring that only one world is created, 
then it is unclear why God could not simply have chosen to create only 
one of two equivalent worlds (with indiscemibles in it). To reply that 
this is because then God would not have had a reason on the basis of 
which to make the choice would only succeed in pointing out a conflict 
between the requirement of economy and the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason.
Another argument in favour of PII that can be traced in Leibniz’s 
writings is based on his idea of a ‘complete notion of individual’. In every 
true affirmative proposition, according to Leibniz, the notion of the 
predicate is contained either explicitly or implicitly in that of the object 
(if it is contained explicitly the proposition is analytic; if only implicitly, 
it is synthetic16). In close connection to this, Leibniz claims that every 
substance has a notion so complete -  it includes everything that is 
needed to establish what is true of it at any point in time - that anyone 
who fully understood it could infer from it all the predicates, down to 
the smallest detail, which belonged, belongs and will ever belong to that 
substance. In section 9 of his Discourse on M etaphysics, Leibniz 
[1686(1992)] derives from this that no two substances are exactly alike in 
all their predicates, arguing that every individual always possesses a ‘core’ 
of predicates sufficient to distinguish it from every other individual, 
actual or possible. This argument, although it seems quite different from 
the previous one, is clearly equally based on questionable metaphysical 
assumptions. First, it rests on the specific Leibnizian view -  clearly 
connected to his idea that all substances are self-contained ‘monads’ - 
that everything tme of an individual, even if it is a contingent tm th
16 However, even though he distinguished truths of reason and truths of fact, Leibniz 
thought that all truths are analytic because reducible to statements of identity, and that the 
only differentiation is between different levels of epistemic access to them.
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about the future, is present in the latter as a sort of ‘eternal’ intrinsic 
property. More importantly, the idea that only one substance 
corresponds to each complete notion is in fact derivative on the ideas 
about God and creation just discussed. Leibniz’s contention is, in 
particular, that every substance is the actualisation of a concept that 
exists complete in the mind of God and, as such, it mirrors the entire 
structure of the world in  a unique (and a-temporal) way. It is obvious, 
though, that the claim of uniqueness once again needs a justification; 
with this, one is led back to the question of why exactly God’s features 
should make the creation of indiscemibles impossible: why, in this case, 
could one complete concept not be actualised twice?17
These considerations are by no means presented as conclusive, nor is 
the description of Leibniz’s arguments intended to be exhaustive. The 
foregoing discussion was exclusively meant to show that Leibniz’s 
reasons in favour of PII are certainly not sufficient for settling the 
dispute this thesis deals with. These reasons are far from compelling, I 
argued, independently of the specific nature of the assumptions they rest 
upon. But, of course, Leibniz’s justification of PII is crucially based upon 
metaphysico-theological principles (some of these explicitly stated by 
Leibniz, others remaining more in the background) that are by no means 
straightforward and uncontroversial.
We therefore need to look elsewhere for a justification of PII as a 
necessary truth.
17 For a discussion of Leibniz’s complete notion of an individual, see Broad [1949].
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3. The Id en tity  o f the Indiscem ibles and the Bundle Theory
A well-known, and much more relevant, argument for the necessary 
truth of PII is based upon a specific ontological conception of reality 
known as the bundle theory. It goes as follows:
a) Things are bundles of properties and nothing else;
b) The properties of things are instances of universals;
c) Universals are multiply instantiable, i.e., they are numerically 
identical across their instances, in the sense that it is literally 
the same entity (the universal) P that exists at each location in 
which the property P is exemplified;
d) Therefore, two things with the same properties are necessarily 
numerically the same: that is, PII is necessarily true.18
Given premises a), b) and c) together, the argument appears valid, 
and conclusion d) follows deductively. Yet, in spite of a widespread belief, 
this is by no means obviously the case.
Rodriguez-Pereyra [2004], for example, contends that the bundle 
theory can be understood as the claim that whenever a property is 
instantiated, two things exist: a universal and one of its instances. This, 
explains Rodriguez-Pereyra, allows one to claim that the bundle theory is 
compatible with the existence of numerically distinct indiscemibles: the 
unique identity of each one of two qualitatively identical bundles might 
be brought about by the instances that exist in them, that are 
ontologically distinct from the corresponding universals. This view, 
although it seems to amount to the endorsement of traditional realism 
along w ith the -  essentially nominalist - idea that property-instances
18 Although it is not necessary to endorse the realist view of universals expressed in b) and 
c), and the latter doctrine is logically independent of the thesis in a) (the bundled properties 
might not be universals), the expression ‘bundle theory’ is commonly intended as referring 
to the combination o f these three assumptions.
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possess their own numerical identity, is no doubt consistent. For nothing 
in the definition of a universal rules out the possibility that, by being 
instantiated, a universal determines the creation of a distinct entity 
endowed with primitive identity.
Loux’s [1978] substance ontology can also be interpreted as a 
rejection of conclusion d) that does not imply a departure from the 
essential tenets of the bundle theory. This is achieved by modifying 
premise c). According to Loux, every individual is a bundle of instances 
of universals, but traditional bundle theories fail to appreciate that -  in 
every substance - one of the bundled universals is a peculiar ‘substance- 
kind’ universal, determining what type of entity the individual is. On the 
basis of some passages in Aristotle’s Categories, Loux claims that, 
contrary to what normally happens for universals,
“in the case of substance-kinds, there is no alternative to 
construing instantiations of each universal as numerically 
diverse” [lb.; 161].
So, for example, each specific instance of the universal ‘manhood’ -  
by being numerically distinct from all other instances of ‘manhood’ -  
makes a person the unique human being s/he is.
There seem to be some difficulties for this position. In particular, 
Loux must explain why substance-kinds are said to be universals and yet 
they are not numerically identical across instances, which is the 
distinctive feature of universals. Moreover, Loux is committed to realism 
about natural kinds. And even granting him this, he must provide a 
reason not to believe that natural kinds are reducible to sets of properties, 
that is, to ‘traditional’ universals. This would allow one to do away with
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substance-kind universals altogether, so leading to the dissolution of 
Loux’s hypothesis concerning the identity of substances.
At any rate, Loux’s substance ontology, whatever its weaknesses, is 
another example of the possibility of endorsing the (basic axioms of) the 
bundle theory without also automatically endorsing PII as a necessary 
consequence of it.
Loux’s concept of a substance-kind universal is related to another 
view that is relevant in this sense: moderate realism.19 According to 
moderate realists, every universal-instance possesses two ontological 
aspects -  one repeatable and one non-repeatable - at the same time. W ith 
this, they claim to account for both individuality - by taking properties as 
particularized instances each one of which is numerically different from 
all other instances - and similarity - by assuming the ontological reality 
of universals. This appears to imply that PII is not true in a moderate 
realist ontology, as the unique identity of each instantiated property 
necessarily ‘propagates’, so to speak, to the bundle it belongs to.
This view also surely meets with problems, as can be shown by 
briefly examining the most fully worked out version of moderate realism, 
namely Mertz’s (see his [1996] and [2003]). Mertz claims that his is a
“realist ontology of unrepeatable unit attributes [...in 
which the existence is postulated of] individuated relation 
(including property) zz-adic instances Rni, Rnj, Rnk,..., together 
with sharable n-adic intensions (universals) Rn, the latter 
being constituent qualitative aspects numerically the same 
across their like instances and separable only in abstraction” 
[2003; 128-129].
19 Moderate realism was initially -  in the Middle Ages - the thesis that universals exist only 
in the mind of God, as patterns by which he creates particular things. St. Thomas Aquinas 
and John of Salisbury were proponents of such a view.
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Setting aside the fact that Mertz takes relations to be basic, and 
monadic properties to be limiting cases of the former, his claim must be 
emphasised that universal natures are real qua intensions that ‘connect’ 
all their instances as actual entities.20 How can this be possible? 
Intensions do not exist ‘out there’. Mertz himself says that every 
property-instance
“is a simple entity with the two abstractable aspects of 
repeatable intension [...] and a particularized unifying agency”
[lb.; 142],
with which he seems to acknowledge that the distinction between 
particular property-instances and unifying intensions is purely 
conceptual. And hence to point towards nominalism. On the other hand, 
if Mertz explicitly ‘reified’ intensions, then moderate realism would 
collapse into traditional realism. It therefore seems that moderate realism 
represents an untenable middle ground between nominalism and full­
blown realism.
At any rate, despite the reservations one may have with respect to 
Mertz’s position and moderate realism about universals in general, the 
view just discussed seems to represent one further conceptual possibility 
showing that PII is not straightforwardly im pliedby the bundle theory.
The Leibnizian-Quinean supporter of the reductionist understanding 
of identity and individuality must therefore endorse the bundle theory in
20 In more detail, Mertz seems to suggest that the unrepeatability of each particularized 
property follows from its being instantiated in a specific bundle rather than another. This, 
however, appears circularly to connect the identity of the bundle being constituted to that of 
the instances of properties constituting it. One possible amendment might be that it is the 
act o f instantiation that gives numerical identity to instances of universals. This would give 
specific identities to all property-instances without violating the spirit of the bundle theory. 
Besides the fact that this interpretation does not appear to be supported by what Mertz 
actually says, it looks as though it would entail that universals exist in a sense different 
from their instances, and ultimately lead to traditional Platonic realism. At any rate, there is 
no need to discuss the details of Mertz’s proposal any further here.
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its traditional formulation, explicitly excluding any variation and/or 
addition to it along the lines just considered (the shortcomings that I 
emphasised in the alternatives - ontological inflation in Rodriguez- 
Pereyra’s proposal; adhoa less in Loux’s; inconsistency in Mertz’s - might 
indeed represent a good reason to do so). In the rest of this chapter, the 
‘canonical’ bundle theory - and PII as a natural consequence of it - will 
indeed be taken for granted. But before assessing whether or not PII (so 
provisionally justified) is a compelling principle, more will be said on its 
exact formulation.
Leibniz, as we have seen, committed himself to the strong version of 
PII, excluding spatial location (and relational properties) from the scope 
of the universal quantifier over properties appearing in the principle. 
Once Leibniz’s peculiar reasons for rejecting the possibility of equality of 
all monadic and intrinsic properties are dropped, however, weak PII 
presents itself as more plausible. That is, a version of the principle that 
also quantifies over locations and relational properties, so allowing (most 
notably) for otherwise qualitatively identical things made numerically 
distinct by the fact that they exist at different places.
O’Leary-Hawthome [1995] interestingly suggests that the bundle 
theorist should instead embrace strong P II w ithout interpreting it  as 
ruling out the possibility o f indiscemibles. O’Leary-Hawthome argues 
that, exactly as one single universal can exist at many places, so can a 
bundle of universals. Hence, the repeatability of universals does not 
prevent, but rather gives rise to the possibility of, indiscemibility. In 
particular, if -  as contended by many realists about universals -
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universals are im m anent (that is, they exist in space and time only)21 and 
are capable of existence in many places at the same time, then:
“The following possibility is a very genuine one: There is a 
bundle F, G, H  five feet from itself and nothing else” [1995;
193].22
In a [1998] paper co-authored with Cover, O’Leary-Hawthorne 
elaborates on this and adds that ordinary people do not count by strict 
metaphysical identity, only based on bundled universal-instances; but by 
what he calls loose -  or fo lk  -  identity, which takes location as an 
individuating factor when, strictly speaking, it is not. He suggests that 
the bundle theorist’s claim that PII is necessarily true is only at odds with 
the latter [lb.; 212-217], but what counts from the ontological point of 
view is the former.23
Presumably, the central assumption about location is made on the 
basis of the fact that the spatial location of a bundle is not a constituent
21 For more on this definition, that of in rebus universals -  to be introduced shortly -  and 
related ones, see chapter 4, section 4.
22 This scenario is O’Leary-Hawthome’s reconstruction of the hypothetical universe that 
Black [1952] presents as a counterexample to PII and that will be discussed in the next 
section. Vallicella [1997] objects to O’Leary-Hawthome that it is, in general, not 
straightforward that what is true of universals is true of bundles of universals (to take this 
for granted would be an instance of the ‘fallacy of composition’). And that in fact, while 
universals get instantiated, bundles cannot, for they are particulars and particulars - by 
definition - do not get instantiated. Moreover, Vallicella adds, a bundle cannot be a 
universal, because being instantiated requires the ability to be “bundled together with other 
universals. But it makes no sense to suppose that [...a bundle...] is bundled together with 
other universals. [...] Since every bundle is complete, no bundle can be bundled together 
with other universals not in the bundle” [lb.; 94]. This is substantially correct, and yet there 
is an easy way round Vallicella’s objection: one can accept that it is universals that get 
instantiated, and add that if, say, a universal A can be instantiated at locations x andy at the 
same time, so can another universal B; and since it can consequently happen that both A 
and B get instantiated at both x andy, the possibility of two indiscernible ‘AB-individuals’ 
(only differing in position) is ipso facto obtained.
23 It seems clear that O’Leary-Hawthome’s strict identity is that defined via strong PII, 
while what he calls loose identity corresponds to weak PII. Of course, it is being assumed 
(contrary, for example, to Teller [1987] and Dieks [2001]) that space-time location is not a 
monadic intrinsic property (according to Teller and Dieks, supervenient on the other 
physical properties of things).
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of that bundle. However, although it is not a component part of the 
entity composed by such-and-such instantiated universals, location 
appears essential for the determination of the bundle of those universals 
as that entity. It is indeed a common claim of realists about universals 
that the instances of a universal are made distinct by their different 
locations. Therefore, contrary to what O’Leary-Hawthome suggests, 
spatial position cannot be ignored when it comes to evaluating the 
entity’s individuality, and especially so in the in  rebus form of realism 
embraced by O’Leary-Hawthorne. Not surprisingly, a distinction 
between proper’ metaphysical counting and ‘folk’ counting has not been 
advocated by anyone else.24
In the light of the discussion in this section, it can thus be concluded 
that the reductionist who intends correctly to account for the dynamics 
of individuation has to endorse the ‘traditional’ bundle theory and weak 
PII. The question arises at this point of whether this form of PII is 
necessarily true.
4. Counterexamples
The reasoning intended to support the Quine-Leibniz reductionist 
view of identity and individuality on the basis of (traditionally intended) 
bundle theory and weak PII can be (and has been) questioned via alleged 
counterexamples. The idea is that if a state of affairs in which PII is not 
true - that is, a state in which numerical distinctness is not accompanied
24 One might object that, if space-time points were individuals primitively, location would 
be a trivialising property and the endorsement of PII illegitimate. Apart from the fact that 
this would not justify O’Leary-Hawthome’s differentiation (for he does not present his 
views on the basis of this consideration, and in fact suggests that space and time themselves 
can be reduced to universals), it seems fair to say that to admit of the primitive identity of 
space-time points is a far ciy from giving up the bundle theory and PII altogether. In fact, it 
only entails that PII cannot be employed to individuate the (bare) space-time points that 
individuate bundles of universal-instances.
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by discemibility with respect to any (non-trivialising) property including 
space-time location - can be consistently conceived, then PII cannot be 
considered as a valid criterion of individuation.
The locus classicus in this respect is Black [1952]. Black constructed a 
thought experiment involving a completely symmetric universe in which 
there are two numerically distinct spheres having all the same monadic 
properties and nothing else. Moreover, whatever can be predicated of 
one sphere which is not an intrinsic property is necessarily a property 
the sphere possesses in relation to the ‘other’ sphere, but if any such 
relation must be expressed -  as required in order to avoid trivialization - 
completely in descriptive terms, then the spheres’ relational properties 
are also equal [lb.; 156]. In particular, spatial position, says Black [lb.; 
157-158], must be defined in relational terms because only the two 
spheres exist, and no absolute space-time has been posited. But both 
spheres have the relational property of being a certain distance away 
from a sphere with such-and-such properties.25 In this hypothetical 
universe, therefore, PII appears to be violated in both its strong and weak 
form, as that one sphere is distinct from the other sphere seems to be a 
primitive fact not grounded in qualitative differences.
Ayer [1954] proposed a similar argument, based on the idea of an 
infinite series of equal sounds succeeding each other at equal intervals. It 
looks as though there exists no non-trivial individuating property in this 
scenario either. In particular, each sound possesses unique relational 
properties describing its distance in time from the other sounds (these 
determine that, for instance, sound a occurs later than sound b with 
respect to sound c, and so a and b are prim a facie distinct sounds). 
However, these properties only individuate trivially, as they presuppose
25 This does not mean that it is arbitrarily assumed that space-time relationalism is true in 
general.
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the identity of at least one sound (in this case, c). It is clear that Ayer’s 
world is the diachronic analogue of Black’s, and equally suggests that in 
fact identities ‘come first’.
Adams [1979] contemplates a slightly different possibility, based 
upon the tiniest qualitative difference (in a non-essential property) 
between numerically distinct individuals. He asks the reader to think 
about two nearly identical individuals, only rendered discernible by a 
minuscule qualitative difference. The latter might be, for example, a 
small chemical impurity in one of the spheres in Black’s world. The 
reductionist will certainly accept that in such nearly symmetric scenarios 
one has two entities. But then, asks Adams, why should we exclude non­
identity in cases of perfectly symmetric universes with indiscemibles? 
After all, it is conceivable that the difference disappears as time goes by. 
Should we think that this would make the two entities become one?
Adams’ argument is useful in that it helps see the counterexamples to 
PII as limiting cases in a continuum of universes whose existence is not 
at any point deemed impossible by the reductionist. However, it is also 
clear that the supporter of PII might legitimately claim that a perfectly 
symmetric universe such as Black’s exhibits a crucial feature that nearly 
symmetric ones such as Adams’ do not have and that makes the former 
impossible: namely, indiscemibility.26
In the remainder of this section, Black’s traditional counterexample, 
considered by some to be a clear demonstration of the failure of PII27, 
will be analysed.
First of all, must one accept Black’s scenario?
26 See also Bergmann [1947], who presents a ‘bundling problem’ allegedly showing the 
inconsistency of Russell’s ‘particular-free’ (that is, only based on universals - as 
corresponding to our sense data -) analysis of reality.
27 See for example Denkel [1991], who claims that “there is good reason for saying that the 
well-known counterexample by Max Black has established the failure of Leibnizian 
principles of individuation conclusively” [lb.; 214].
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Odegard [1964] argues not. Understanding Black’s argument as an 
attempted reductio ad absurdum of PII, Odegard claims that Black 
unwarrantedly assumes the two spheres to be distinct individuals. 
Despite the supposed absolute indiscemibility of the spheres, that is, 
Black refers to them as two. However, this implies that it should be 
possible to distinguish this sphere from that sphere independently of 
their properties; but such ‘labelling’ is, in fact, not allowed due to the 
very indiscemibility condition that must be assumed in order for the 
reductio to be attempted. The
“successful use of different names [or, at any rate, 
demonstratives] in this case presupposes the possibility of 
qualitatively distinguishing the given particulars, i.e., the 
possibility of saying truly ‘A is the particular which...’ and B is 
the particular which...’ And, ex hypothesi, there are no 
possible grounds for so distinguishing them” [lb.; 205].
In a nutshell, the counterexample seems to work only because it is a 
petitio  principii.
However, it is possible to reply to Odegard that Black does not 
present an alleged reductio ad absurdum of PII, but rather constructs ex  
novo a universe the conceivability of which shows that PII is not a 
compelling principle.
Tackling the issue from another perspective, Hacking [1975] (re-) 
interprets Black’s world as one in which there is only one sphere in a 
non-Euclidean space. In a closed and curved universe, he argues, it is 
possible for a sphere to be at some distance from itself (in other words, 
non-zero distance becomes a reflexive relation, as a straight line 
departing from x  could end up getting back to x  itself). Therefore, it 
could be the case that exactly the same qualities as in Black’s universe are
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instantiated, and yet only one sphere exists. Generalizing, it is always an 
option for the reductionist to reject suggested counterexamples to PII and 
systematically claim that the alleged description of a universe with 
indiscemibles is in actual fact a misdescription of a universe without 
them.
In other words, while Odegard questions the legitimacy of Black’s 
hypothesis, Hacking suggests that it can at any rate be reinterpreted in 
agreement with reductionism. Hacking’s argument might appear not 
entirely convincing, as counterexamples to suggested thought 
experiments should not be based upon substantive additional, or at any 
rate dissimilar, assumptions - in the present case, regarding the topology 
of space - with respect to those originally made.28
Even accepting Odegard’s and Hacking’s arguments, at any rate, if the 
only problem with Black’s argument is that it does not force us to reject 
PII, but only identifies ontological constructions in which the principle 
is not true, then Black could indeed be considered successful in showing 
that PII is not necessarily true, but only such that it resists 
counterexamples once it is assumed as a basic truth. The question 
remains unanswered, however, of what should be regarded as more 
fundamental between PII and primitive identity.
At any rate, one does not need to bother with this philosophical 
impasse too much, or at least not yet. For the real issue regards whether 
Black’s counterexample works at all. When presented with it, probably 
everybody has (like Odegard and Hacking) the feeling that something is 
tacitly ‘smuggled in’ in an illegitimate way. And indeed the mentioned 
critics of Black, although not completely successful in their objections,
28 In Hacking’s case, one might say that its space(-time) structure should be taken as part 
and parcel of the identity of a possible world, so that changing it means not to be talking 
about the same world anymore.
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are correct in calling attention to the fact that something other than the 
existence of two spheres is essential for Black’s counterexample to work. 
This something, in particular, has to do with the status of the spatial 
relation holding among the spheres.
Casullo [1982] provides a persuasive way to begin to see what this 
something is, and where the alleged counterexample fails. In order to 
establish the conceivability of some thought-experimental scenario (for 
which there does not exist a justification purely based on logic), Casullo 
claims, one can only apply a ‘psychologistic criterion’ based upon 
visualizability. To visualize something such as Black’s universe as possible, 
he explains, means to picture in one’s mind two spheres as distinct. 
However, this necessarily amounts to picturing the spheres as being 
located in different parts of the visual field, which is already enough to 
reject Black’s argument. In Casullo’s words:
“In order to visualize two spheres, one must visualize them 
as occupying two different positions in the visual field. But if 
they occupy different positions in the visual field, then they 
differ in their positional qualities and, hence, do not have all 
qualities in common. Black’s claim that we can imagine two 
spheres with all qualities in common is mistaken because of 
his failure to notice the difference in positional qualities” [lb.;
600].29
What Casullo claims is, in effect, that the spheres are numerically 
distinct but also discernible, although in a way that we are unable to 
express via the predicates we (normally) consider.
Reflecting on the ‘difference in positional qualities’ that Casullo talks 
about, the doubt arises that there may be other predicates that should be
29 Notice that Casullo is not illegitimately adding ‘symmetry-breaking’ observers to the 
universe envisaged by Black, but rather questioning its conceivability.
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taken into account and that, consequently, perhaps the weak and strong 
formulations o f P II do no t capture all possible qualitative facts about 
things. Is it the case that some other formulation of PII is available, 
capable of accounting for Black’s universe as a universe with two entities 
in it?
5. Weak D iscem ibility, and a Further Version o f the Principle o f the 
Iden tity  o f the Indiscem ibles
A positive answer to the question concluding the previous section can 
be given if one follows certain Quinean reflections on discemibility that 
have been (re-)discovered only very recently (thanks to Simon Saunders).
Quine [1976] explains that what he calls strong and moderate 
discrim inability are not in fact the only possibilities, and one must also 
contemplate one further alternative, namely, weak discriminability.30
Strong discriminability, Quine explains, holds of an entity when it is 
the only object that satisfies a conjunction of open sentences in a given 
interpreted formal language. Moderate discriminability amounts, instead, 
to there being an open sentence in two variables that is satisfied by two 
objects in one order but not in the other. Taking every formula satisfied 
by one entity as denoting a monadic property of that entity, strong 
discriminability entails identifiability via strong PII. Regarding instead 
sentences in two variables as corresponding to relational properties, one 
can claim that if two entities are moderately discriminable then they 
differ in some relational -  perhaps spatio-temporal - property, so 
requiring weak PII for their individuation. For example, in a very simple
30 Quine uses the word ‘discriminability’ rather than ‘discemibility’. Since Quine deals with 
formulas in a language rather than properties in a world, one might see the former as 
applying to individuals at the linguistic level, and the latter as referring to real entities.
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world with two entities a and b and two properties P and Q_only, and in 
which it is the case that Pa, Pb, Qa and -iQb, a and b are strongly 
discriminable. For, a uniquely satisfies the conjunction Px a Q xt, and b the 
conjunction Pa a -.Qx  A  case of moderate discriminability is, instead, the 
holding of an asymmetric relation R between two entities. If aRb but 
-ibRa, the open sentence j*Ry is satisfied by a and b in one order only.31 In 
both cases, the antecedent of PII is false.
However, says Quine, it is also possible that two objects satisfy a 
sentence that has xand yas
“sole free variables and yet [...is not equivalent to...] the 
conjunction of two sentences that have [...x and y...] 
respectively as sole free variables” [lb.; 114].
This is what Quine calls weak discriminability. Quine explains that it 
occurs when the relevant sentence is reflexively false o f one o f the 
objects. In his general and abstract treatment, Quine does not enter into a 
detailed discussion of predicates. However, it seems fair to ask how it can 
be possible that a predicate that does not apply reflexively to an object 
does apply reflexively to another object. It is, instead, easy to see that 
Quine’s notion of weak discriminability applies in the case of sentences 
expressing irreflexive relations, such as, for instance, ‘...goes in the 
opposite direction to ...’. For relations of this type, Quine’s condition for 
weak discemibility clearly applies, as the open sentences in two variables
31 Of course, if the asymmetric relation is supervenient on intrinsic properties, the open 
formula in two variables is in effect derivative on two open formulas in one variable only 
that are already sufficient for strong discriminability. However, relations need not 
necessarily be supervenient, so moderate discriminability must be distinguished from 
strong discriminability. Also, the connection between moderate discriminability and weak 
PII requires one to change the discriminating asymmetric relations into relational 
properties. This is readily achieved by making the reference to the relatum ‘internal’ to the 
predicate so that, for instance, xKy is expressed as Px. This appears to be an unproblematic 
move here, but is connected to an important ontological distinction to be made explicit 
shortly.
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that express them are not satisfied by two objects only in one order; and 
they are not the conjunction of two sentences that have one of the two 
variables as their sole free variable; and yet it seems obvious that there 
must be two distinct objects. Indeed, although in a way that is not 
entirely faithful to Quine’s original w ork,32 weak discemibility is 
generally regarded as based on the holding of irreflexive relations.
Since irreflexive relations are the sort of properties that (as we will 
see) turn out to be relevant for our discussion, for simplicity’s sake (and 
without any explanatory loss) weak discernibility will indeed be 
understood in what follows as consisting of the fact that an irreflexive 
relation holds among two entities a t  and y in  such a way that the sentence 
in two variables corresponding to it is satisfied by x  and y  together but 
not by either a t  and a : or by y  and y.
With this definition in mind, we can now look back at the alleged 
counterexamples to PII. As regards Black’s spheres, we have seen that 
they are neither strongly nor moderately discernible, as they have all the 
same monadic and relational properties. However, they are weakly 
discernible, as there exists a discerning relation holding between them: as 
explained by Saunders ([2003] and [2006]), the latter is an irreflexive 
spatial relation, determining that each one of the spheres is at a certain 
distance from the other but no t from  itself?3 It thus turns out that the 
notion of weak discemibility makes PII immune to the traditional 
counterexamples to the principle.
32 In his paper, Quine himself clarifies that the holding of an irreflexive relation is not 
equivalent to the more general condition he defines.
33 One might object that Hacking’s criticism still holds: if the universe is curved and closed 
then relations of distance in space-time are (or, at least, can be) reflexive. Generalizing, 
irreflexivity may be said to be context-dependent. The point, however, is that if  an 
irreflexive relation holds, then some form of PII applies; and that, in Black’s case, if the 
spheres are two as presented, then an irreflexive relation does hold between them.
49
Quine’s notion of weak discriminability allows us, more specifically, 
to formulate a version of PII that is weaker than both strong and weak 
PII as it individuates certain entities that the other forms of PII fail to 
individuate. What I will call very weak PII can be formulated as follows: 
VjKV^((VP(PAT<-^P^)AVR-i(R(^f,J^AVz-i(R(z,z))))^(A?=j)).
Before moving on to a consideration of whether counterexamples can 
be devised against this version of PII, it is necessary to say something 
more about the ontological significance of weak discemibility. In 
particular, why is the holding of an irreflexive relation sufficient for 
discemibility, while the possession of a relational property expressing the 
same fact is not? After all, in Black’s case we seem to point to exactly the 
same states of affairs when we attribute to a sphere the relational 
property of being, say, two miles away from a sphere with such-and-such 
properties; and when we claim that the relation of being two miles away 
from holds between one sphere and ‘another’ sphere. The key difference 
has to do with ontological dependence, the attribution of a relational 
property requires the presupposition of a specific entity exemplifying 
that property (or, in bundle-theoretic terms, that is constituted by that 
property -  together with others) and of another relatum.34 A relation, 
instead, does not ‘belong to’ any specific entity. As a consequence, it can 
be regarded as ontologically prior to its relata and, if irreflexive, as 
determ ining them  as numerically distinct entities.
Indeed, it is exactly the idea that relations (can) determine\ rather 
than depend on, the existence of their relata as numerically distinct 
entities that sidesteps the objection to PII that Black’s spheres must be 
assumed as distinct in spite of their indiscemibility. More generally, it is 
this specific ontological presupposition as to the nature of relations that
34 This is why, as pointed out in footnote 31, the relation can be reduced to a relational 
property if the individuals (the bundles acting as relata) are already there.
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makes weak discemibility possible and distinct from other forms of 
discemibility.
The bundle theorist who wants to claim that entities can be merely 
weakly discernible is therefore committed to a specific ontological thesis 
about existential dependence. Similarly to what happens in the context 
of structuralism, s/he must deny that the fact that -  at the level of 
semantics -  we define 77-place relations as particular sets of ordered 77-  
tuples of individual entities has any ontological import (to the effect that 
individuals are more basic than relations). Instead, s/he holds that (at 
least in some cases) individual objects are wholly determined by relations, 
in the sense that the latter are prior to the former, and individuals are 
‘created’ as those entities which occupy unique positions in relational 
structures.35
These claims are notoriously far from unproblematic.
Russell, for one, argued (against Moore) that particulars must exist 
over and above universals because there are certain relations entities 
cannot have to themselves [1911; 118] and presuppose relata. In the 
1960s, Allaire ([1963] and [1965]) argued similarly for the existence of 
bare particulars, while others (Chappell [1964], Meiland [1966]) objected 
that relations can individuate and so there is no need to postulate 
anything over and above the qualitative aspects of things. In general, as 
also witnessed by the debate concerning mathematical structuralism (into 
the details of which we need not enter, but which has some interesting 
analogies with the issues being dealt with here)36, that relations have the 
power to individuate surely is a controversial and disputable claim.
35 MacBride [2006] talks ofpredicatively versus impredicatively constituted objects, where 
in the former case relations presuppose relata, while in the latter they do not.
36 It is interesting to notice, in particular, that a recent debate concerning the viability of 
mathematical structuralism concerns exactly the notion o f weak discemibility. Burgess 
[1999] and Keranen [2001] object to structuralism about mathematics that if objects are to
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Granting the supporter of PII weak discemibility, however,37 let us 
now consider the possibility of counterexamples to PII again in the light 
of the foregoing discussion.
6. W orking Counterexamples?
It is worth noticing that, while making the shortcomings of Black’s 
argument explicit, a consideration of weak discemibility also provides 
the key to improving on that argument.
The way to do this is, obviously enough, by construing a universe like 
Black’s in which, however, the assumption of spatial separation is 
substituted with one of mutual interpenetration with complete overlap. 
That is, a universe with two identical and exactly coinciding spheres. 
Since the two spheres in Black’s universe only differ in virtue of the fact 
that the irreflexive relation of being at a (non-zero) distance from holds 
between them, in a universe in which otherwise qualitatively identical 
spheres occupy exactly the same location these are not even weakly 
discernible (as the distance relation becomes reflexive).
be individuated on the basis of inter-structural relations, then objects occupying structurally 
indiscernible positions should be deemed identical; but entities that we take as distinct, such 
as any complex number and its conjugate, are structurally indiscernible. Ladyman [2005] 
invokes the notion of weak discemibility to maintain that this is not actually the case, as 
each complex number is related to its conjugate by an irreflexive relation. Ketland [2006] 
replies that identity is in fact presupposed; and that, at any rate, counterexamples can be 
found to the claim that all structures are such that distinct individuals are at least weakly 
discernible (see his ‘dumb-bell’ structure [lb.; 309-310]). Ketland consequently claims that 
the existence of what he calls ‘non-Quinian’ structures shows that a reductionist analysis of 
identity is “mathematically unworkable” [lb.; 312]. The example of mathematics is 
especially interesting from the present perspective because it looks as though in the case of 
mathematical objects counterexamples cannot be rejected as artificial, purely hypothetical, 
or based on postulates that need not be accepted. See also Bermudez’s critique of Ketland 
[2007] and Ketland’s reply [2007].
37 Not only is it not my intention here to get into a discussion o f structuralism; ontologically 
speaking, that relations are (at least in some cases) prior to their relata appears to be a 
perfectly consistent position that cannot be discarded a priori.
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Clearly, in order for this updated counterexample to PII to work, it 
must be possible for more than one object to exist at any one location. 
But this does not seem to be a problematic assumption to make. Even 
though this might be disputed in the light of our everyday experience, it 
is surely true that impenetrability does not necessarily hold for all 
entities. Moreover, as we will see, not only is not impenetrability a 
metaphysical axiom in any sense; it is also explicitly violated by particles 
as they are described by our best theory about (the ultimate constituents 
of) the physical world, namely quantum mechanics.
While this might appear sufficient conclusively to reject the idea that 
PII is a necessary truth, a possible rejoinder remains available for the 
supporters of the principle. Della Rocca [2006] claims that the 
consideration of complete overlap is exactly what provides the 
opportunity to show
“that the opponent of PII is committed to a kind of brute 
fact that all of us would or should find intolerable” [lb.; 485].
And that, consequently, PII ‘wins by elimination’, as the alternative 
view -  negating it in favour of primitive individuality -  turns out to be 
unacceptable. What is the ‘intolerable brute fact’ that Della Rocca has in 
mind?
Della Rocca asks the reader to consider the possibility of 20 
indiscernible spheres, existing exactly in the same place at the same time, 
and w ith all the same proper parts. This scenario violates a shared 
conceptual truth to the effect that it is not possible for distinct entities to 
occupy precisely the same location and have all the same parts. However, 
Della Rocca argues, if PII is discarded it would appear that nothing stands 
in the way of attributing individuality to each of the 20 putative spheres.
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The reason for this claim is as follows. In order to avoid the patently 
counterintuitive possibility just described, the opponent of PII has to 
explain how s/he is supposed to reject completely overlapping 
indiscemibles only in the case in which they share all the same parts. 
Referring to simplicity, Della Rocca explains, does not do, for it is unclear 
why simplicity is not invoked in other cases; for instance, in the case of 
Black’s universe, to claim that there exists only one sphere.38 What Della 
Rocca calls the ‘defeatist’ answer -  amounting to the claim that there 
simply is no explanation for why the suggested scenario appears 
intuitively unacceptable -  is also unsatisfactory, as it adds to the 
primitiveness of identity and individuality another allegedly 
fundamental and non-further-explicable fact about things. Della Rocca 
goes on to suggest that the only thing that the adversary of PII can say is 
that:
“Partial overlap is OK because it allows for an explanation 
of non-identity; complete overlap is not because, in that case, 
non-identity would be inexplicable” [lb.; 489].
In other words, partially overlapping entities maintain (more or less) 
clear identity conditions that allow us to account for their numerical 
distinctness. In the case of completely overlapping entities, instead, their 
being numerically distinct appears entirely mysterious. So much so, that 
we exclude this possibility as inconsistent entirely a priori.
Unfortunately for the defender of primitive individuality, says Della 
Rocca, to follow this route amounts to acknowledging that claims of 
identity and distinctness actually do require an explanation, which is 
exactly what the opponent of PII wanted to deny. It looks as though if
38 This is interestingly related to Hacking’s reconstruction of Black’s universe.
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PII is not an option one must appeal to the principle that there can be no 
brute individuation in order to defend the position that there is brute 
individuation. This manifest circularity can only be avoided by accepting 
the possibility of numerically distinct indiscemibles sharing all their 
parts. Since we do not want to accept such a possibility, Della Rocca 
concludes, the foregoing considerations show that PII must be endorsed.
Della Rocca’s argument is interesting, I believe, but there are ways to 
respond to it. The main point that can be made against it is that rejecting 
PII while subscribing to the mereological principle that things with 
exactly the same parts are the same thing (one might call this the 
Principle o f the Iden tity  o f the Equicomposed Entities (PIEE)) is in fact a 
perfectly viable option. It provides a satisfactory explanation of why we 
want to exclude a priori possibilities such as that presented by Della 
Rocca, and does not necessarily represent a less appealing perspective 
with respect to the reductionist view.
Della Rocca claims that the supporter of PII has the advantage that 
s/he acknowledges that facts about identity require explanation, and then 
explains all such facts by having recourse to only one principle. Those 
who believe in primitive identity, he says, claim instead that facts about 
identity require no explanation, but then acknowledge that an 
explanation is in fact needed.
As I see it, however, the claim put forward by the opponents of PII is 
different: it is that facts about identity do not need explanation except in 
certain cases. And that these cases are correctly accounted for by having 
recourse to a mereological principle (PIEE) that should not be subsumed 
under PII and is in fact an autonomous basic metaphysical truth. As a 
result, it is necessary to subscribe to both a general assumption -  identity 
and individuality are primitive -  and a principle -  PIEE -  that defines
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constraints on the possibilities that such an assumption leads one to 
accept. This is a consistent point of view.
Secondly, the idea (suggested by Della Rocca’s treatment of the 
‘defeatist answer’) that to make two guiding assumptions instead of one 
represents a problem ignores the essential requirement that the 
explanations one provides by employing one’s basic presuppositions must 
be correct in view of actual matters of fact. By ruling out all cases of 
indiscemibles, the opponent of the reductionist view can argue, PII is too 
restrictive and leads one to ‘see identity’ where there is in fact no 
identity at all. It is for this reason that, in spite of the greater economy 
and simplicity of the reductionist perspective, an alternative, 
‘differentiated’ approach may nevertheless be necessary.
In addition to this, the supporter of PII might be criticised on the 
same grounds on which Della Rocca bases his attack. That is, by 
maintaining that s/he adopts an asymmetric approach that is avoided in 
other frameworks. The distinction (at the level of explanation of identity 
and distinctness) between partial and complete overlap, that Della Rocca 
rejects, is indeed analogous to that between almost complete and 
complete indiscernibility, that one who endorses PII as he does must 
accept (while it can be ignored by those who believe in primitive 
individuality).39 In conclusion, Della Rocca’s argument in favour of PII is 
not compelling40.
More generally, I take it that counterexamples to every form of PII 
can be conceived, and no convincing reason to discard them has been 
provided so far. This means that a priori analysis does not lend support 
to PII and the reductionist view of identity and individuality.
39 See Adams’ argument against PII, based on almost indiscernible entities, mentioned in 
section 4.
40 For a reply to Della Rocca along lines in part similar to those followed here, see Jeshion 
[2006],
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7. Ontology and Science: Experim ental M etaphysics?
Recalling a distinction drawn in the first chapter, we are now in a 
position to state the following: the conceivability of counterexamples to 
all forms of PII, and the lack of strong arguments for regarding the 
principle as a necessary truth in spite of them, entail that those who want 
to find a justification for the reductionist view of identity and 
individuality must aim to extract their intended metaphysical 
conclusions from what we know about things. In other words, a priori 
metaphysics makes room for metaphysics as derivative on epistemology 
and actual empirical evidence. For the supporter of PII, a consideration 
of the latter could serve to argue in favour of the thesis that the Quinean- 
Leibnizian view of identity is the one that is best supported by the world 
as we know it, as PII appears to be at least contingently true. For the 
primitive thisness theorist, on the contrary, the analysis of actual objects 
and their properties might provide evidence in support of the idea that 
PII cannot be considered as a criterion of individuation because there 
exist actual counterexamples to it and so the reductionist view is to be 
discarded altogether.
This change of perspective is a crucial one, and one that demands 
careful philosophical exploration. In particular, something must now be 
said about the status that logico-metaphysical concepts and issues acquire 
in a fallibilist perspective, essentially based upon actual evidence and 
revisable knowledge.
Aristotle produced a number of works which together were called 
the Physics. In an early edition, another set of writings was placed right 
after the Physics. Early Aristotelian scholars, therefore, called these t &
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( j e t o c  t o c  cpuCTiKoc pipAia, “those (works) that come after the (works about) 
physics”; from this the word ‘metaphysics’ (in Greek, pETacpUCTiKd) 
derived. This term, however, is not only a word that mirrors the editorial 
organisation of Aristotle’s works. It also points to the fact that the subject 
matter allegedly concerns things that underlie the empirical knowledge 
of the physical and are prior to it.41
In the modern era, as empirical knowledge gained greater and 
greater priority over purely a priori analysis, this conception was 
progressively abandoned. Metaphysics was first subordinated to science, 
and then ultimately disposed of in favour of the latter by many thinkers. 
For example, Bacon, while himself retaining the name ‘metaphysics’ to 
designate his science of the essential properties of bodies, harshly 
criticised the Scholastics and their emphasis on final causes. Locke, by 
limiting all our knowledge to two sources, sensation and reflection, 
excluded the possibility of speculation beyond the facts of experience and 
of consciousness. This line of thought was taken up by Hume, who 
declared that it is impossible to go beyond experience. It has remained a 
distinguishing feature of all strands of modern and contemporary 
empiricism, up to the well-known neopositivist condemnation of 
metaphysics as meaningless and the corresponding attempt to reduce 
philosophy to the logical analysis of the results of science.
Attempts to revive metaphysics by giving it a certain degree of 
autonomy, however, were made in the second half of the 20th century.
41 In this case, the Greek word ‘perd’, is not intended as the English ‘after’, but rather as 
‘beyond’, taken in the sense of ‘more fundamental’. The Metaphysics was divided into 
three parts: Ontology, Theology and Universal science. Theology was the study of God (or 
the gods). Universal science was the study of so-called first principles, that is, the 
elementary laws of logic. Ontology was the discipline that was later defined as ‘the science 
of being qua being’. This means that while, - for instance - physics is the science of things 
as determined by physical properties, mathematics is the science of things as determined by 
their mathematical properties (that is, by their ‘possessing quantity’) and so on for every 
specific discipline and delimited domain of application, ontology is the study of the very 
conditions of existence and possible forms of everything that exists (or can exist.
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An interesting view, in particular, of the metaphysical import of physics 
has been developed in the last 25 years or so, and is known under the 
label of experimental metaphysics. Such a view is obviously relevant in 
the present context.
This notion of experimental metaphysics was first introduced by 
Shimony [1981], and subsequently employed by other authors (for 
instance, Hellmann [1983], Jarrett [1989] and Redhead [1996; Chapter 3]). 
Shimony explicitly defined it in the context of a discussion of quantum 
mechanics, and in particular of Bell’s inequalities and the experimental 
confirmation of their violation, which is thus useful briefly to look at.
In his [1964], Bell revisited the well-known EPR paradox, presented 
by Einstein and two co-workers (Podolsky and Rosen) [1935] as the basis 
for an argument against the idea that quantum mechanics is complete 
(i.e., there is nothing that it does not represent of the physical systems it 
is concerned with). The original argument was based on an assumption of 
local action, or locality-; formulated in harmony with special relativity. In 
Einstein’s words, the assumption was that:
“It is characteristic of [...] physical things that they are 
conceived of as being arranged in a space-time continuum. 
Further, it appears to be essential for this arrangement of the 
things introduced in physics that, at a specific time, these 
things claim an existence independent of one another, insofar 
as these things “lie in different parts of space”. [...F]or the 
relative independence of spatially distant things A and B, this 
idea is characteristic: an external influence on A has no 
immediate effect on B; this is known as the principle of “local 
action” [...]. The complete suspension of this basic principle 
would make impossible the idea of the existence of (quasi- 
closed systems and, thereby, the establishment of empirically 
testable laws in the sense familiar to us” ([1948; 321-322], 
translation by Howard in his [1985; 187-188]).
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EPR considered a source emitting one at a time pairs of electrons in 
the singlet state of spin. These electrons do not possess definite values of 
spin, but only correlated probabilities as regards measurement results. 
The electrons are directed towards distinct measuring apparatuses, and 
one of them is measured first. The outcome of this measurement is a 
determinate value of spin. What is striking is that, once this 
measurement takes place, the spin component of the second electron is 
also determined, before a measurement takes place on it, even though 
the two electrons are at that point space-like separated (that is, at a 
distance that -  if Einstein’s principle of ‘local action’ holds - rules out a 
direct causal connection between events according to relativity theory). 
In particular, one of the two outcomes available to (and equally probable 
for) the second electron invariably occurs, namely, the opposite of that 
obtained in the measurement on the first electron.
Einstein thought that this was enough to conclude that quantum 
mechanics is incomplete, as the abovementioned principle of local action 
forbids this kind of -  apparently causal -  connection, and so there must 
be something about the particles, not described by the theory, which 
determines the evidence in agreement with local action. Bell, however, 
[1964] examined the data and the conceptual constructions in play more 
closely and concluded that this is not the case. For, if it were, one should 
in principle be able to find ‘hidden variables’ (that is, additional physical 
factors the consideration of which makes the theory complete) enabling 
one to explain the evidence without having to admit of the existence of 
non-local causal connections. Relatively simple calculations (involving 
the violation of certain equations now known as ‘Bell’s inequalities’) 
show, however, that any such hidden variable theory is bound to be non­
local.
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One possible reaction to all this is to claim that a ‘peaceful 
coexistence’ between relativity and quantum mechanics (that is, between 
locality and quantum correlations) should be sought. Some authors 
believe that it can indeed be found. Jarrett [1984] argues that the failure 
of the Bell inequalities can in fact be connected to the violation of either 
one of two different conditions: either a locality condition - different 
from Einstein’s local action (and thus better defined as parameter 
independence - which states that the outcome of the measurement at 
one end of the experimental setup is statistically independent of what is 
measured at the other (and of all the factors determining the exact nature 
of the other measuring device); or a completeness condition (or outcome 
independence> according to which the probability of the joint outcomes 
given the components measured and all the relevant parameters is just 
the product of the probabilities of each outcome separately. The evidence, 
Jarrett contends, implies only that at least one of these two conditions is 
violated; but only the former is entailed by special relativity.
On the basis of this, it has been argued that parameter independence 
is to be retained and outcome independence must be given up, as a 
rejection of the latter would not determine the possibility of 
superluminal signalling, which is what relativity rules out. This is the 
case because whenever outcome independence fails, an element of 
randomness is present which makes superluminal signalling impossible. 
As Jarrett puts it, if quantum systems only violate outcome independence, 
no contradiction with relativity arises as
“it is a consequence of the failure of determinism that 
measurement outcomes are not (even in principle) under the 
control of experimenters” [1989; 77].
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As could be expected, however, things are not so straighforward. First 
of all, it is unclear whether the fact that correlations cannot in practice 
be exploited for superluminal signalling is sufficient to claim that 
relativity is safe. For it might be maintained that relativity forbids any 
type of non-local connection, and not only the transmission of 
information between space-like separated regions. Moreover, it has been 
argued by Jones and Clifton that, even if quantum systems only violate 
outcome independence,
“the possibility remains open that the experimenter might 
use some controllable feature of the experimental situation as 
a “trigger” which operates stochastically on the outcome at her 
own end of the experiment. The signaller could then influence, 
without completely controlling, the result in the individual 
case, and could thus signal superluminally by employing an 
array of identically prepared experiments” [1993; 301].
On the other hand, that relativity prohibits superluminal signalling 
has also been put into doubt (Friedman [1983; Secs. 4.6-4.7]). If true, this 
would obviously deflate the whole issue. In between these two extremes, 
a large number of positions have been explored. For instance, Fine [1989] 
denies that the detected correlations need an explanation at all; while 
Winsberg and Fine [2003] suggest that the joint state could in fact be 
wholly determined by the separate states of the two particles, although 
by a functional relation weaker than multiplication, and the correlations 
consequently be perfectly explicable in local terms. 42 The entire 
‘Jarrettian’ approach considered so far has also been questioned: Maudlin, 
for instance, argues that if the aim is to study the nature of quantum non­
locality, it is misleading to perform general analyses of the statistical
42 See also Fogel [2007].
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(in)dependence between the parts and the whole, and instead necessary 
to look at the specific ontologies postulated by the various interpretations 
of quantum mechanics directly [1994; 94-98].
At any rate, we do not need to get into further details of this 
discussion here. The important question to ask for present purposes is the 
following: assuming that the interaction existing between science and 
very general hypotheses such as locality is (more or less) of the sort 
described here with reference to the debate on EPR correlations and 
Bell’s inequalities, what is experimental metaphysics?
According to Shimony [1981], a general pattern can be individuated 
in cases such as the one just described. It has the form E&H—»P. E is an 
accepted theory used to describe the relevant experimental setup (for 
example, quantum mechanics as it is employed to perform actual tests of 
Bell’s inequalities). H represents a general (allegedly) metaphysical 
hypothesis (in this case, locality). As regards P, it signifies a certain 
empirical prediction (in the above example, that the Bell inequalities 
hold). If P is disconfirmed and E is kept fixed, says Shimony, by modus 
tollens we should get to a rejection or modification of H, so bringing 
experiment to bear upon a metaphysical thesis. Shimony emphasises that 
this is exactly the dynamics to which the analysis of Bell’s inequalities 
and their violations gave rise to. In particular, philosophical reflection on 
the available evidence led several philosophers of physics to put 
Einstein’s assumption of locality as an untouchable metaphysical 
principle into doubt; and to then find (or, at least, look for) a peaceful 
coexistence between relativity and quantum mechanics via the 
identification of some internal distinction/specification within H. In 
Shimony’s words, it seems that:
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“Bell has provided us with the means for treating certain 
metaphysical hypotheses with the same level of control that 
has been achieved for typical physical hypotheses” [1981; 572- 
573].
This claim is remarkable, as it asserts that we are in a position to learn 
metaphysical lessons on the basis of experimental data, mathematics, and 
suggestions taken from our best current theories.
As far as the issue this thesis deals with is concerned, our previous 
results could be interpreted in the light of this as pointing to the fact that 
the only way to establish the significance of PII as a criterion of 
individuation is via experimental metaphysics. In the present case, H 
would be PII, E would be the relevant physical theory (i.e., again 
quantum mechanics) as a theory about individuals, and P would be the 
prediction that numerically distinct individual physical systems are 
always found to be discernible.
The first question to ask is, though, whether experimental 
metaphysics is metaphysics at all. In the case of the EPR paradox and 
Bell’s inequalities, it could be objected to Shimony that he is not justified 
in taking locality as a metaphysical hypothesis; and that, accordingly, it is 
not legitimate to conceive of the entire enterprise of examining the 
consequences of the violations of Bell’s inequalities as a form of 
metaphysics. The reason for this claim is that what is at stake is the status 
of what ultimately appears to be only a very general statement extracted 
from our best and most well-established theories, and that lies entirely 
within the domain of science, not metaphysics: Einstein’s presupposition 
to the effect that the world must be local43 appears indeed to be 
exclusively a consequence of his endorsement of a specific theory -
43 And the subsequent one that, in the light of the observed evidence, well-defined and 
mutually independent values for the observables of entangled physical systems must exist 
at all times, and so quantum mechanics must be incomplete.
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relativity; or, at any rate, of a general worldview that was the by-product 
of (common sense and) well-established theories prior to, and including, 
relativity.
Similarly, especially in the light of what has been said in this chapter, 
PII might be regarded as a mere empirical generalization that turned out 
to be true so far. It is true that, if one takes PII to be rooted -  as was 
suggested earlier -  in the bundle theory, then prima facie it seems to be a 
principle of a clearly metaphysical nature. However, the problem is that 
the belief in the bundle theory appears itse lf entirely based on the 
contingent efficacy of descriptions of the world that we successfully 
employed in the past (or, at any rate, can employ at the level of ordinary 
objects).
Of course, one might call presuppositions such as locality, or PII, 
metaphysical anyway, on the basis of the fact that they are (among) the 
most general statements about reality we can make. But this would be a 
merely terminological choice, and would not detract from the fact that 
those ‘principles’ appear ultimately rooted solely in our knowledge of the 
empirical evidence, i.e., science.44 If it is correct, however, that they are 
in effect very general empirical claims that only hold, as long as they do, 
given our best scientific theories, then (as for all empirical 
generalizations) one must be ready to revise them, or give them up 
altogether, when analysis and further evidence require one to do so - 
regardless of how entrenched the belief in their truth may be.
As regards identity and individuality, in particular, the inability of 
PII to qualify as a necessary truth (as far as the present state of 
philosophical analysis allows us to see, at least) coincides therefore with
44 Einstein himself, in his 1948 paper, explicitly presents ‘local action’ as a principle that is 
necessary to us for practical purposes, and that never fully applies outside of field theoiy. 
That locality is not an obvious truth is, after all, clear to physicists since the early debates 
on the nature of gravity.
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its becoming an entirely empirical claim. As such, it must be ‘tested 
against’ the evidence described by our best physical theories, which is 
what will be done in the next chapter.
Before moving on, however, something else needs to be said about 
metaphysics. In the preceding paragraphs, have put into doubt the status 
of certain general claims about reality as metaphysical principles, in the 
sense of general rules of a priori validity. Whether any general and 
necessary truth about the world can in fact be a priori is not of our 
concern here. It is interesting to ask, instead, whether the concepts and 
methods of metaphysics can still play some role in those domains in 
which the empirical element is essential.
It seems to me that another possible way of looking at metaphysics 
(perhaps an idea of what ‘real metaphysics’ is) is one that regards it as 
having to do with hypotheses rather than truths. It is the view according 
to which (a certain type of) philosophical analysis aims to account for the 
same reality as that described by science but, at the same time, 
substantially departs from the level of the ‘verifiable’ (or, as Popper 
would rather say, the ‘falsifiable’) and moves into the domain of the 
conjectural. That is, it is the conception according to which metaphysics 
constitutes an attempt to provide general categories and concepts that 
transcend the empirical and yet (albeit via hypothetical constructions) 
allow for an interpretation of what science tells us.45 The second part of 
the thesis will indeed be devoted to looking at identity, individuality and 
our best physics from this perspective (clearly, quite different from that 
assumed in this chapter, the previous one and the next).
45 Of course, metaphysical conjectures can be subsequently confirmed by scientific inquiry. 
The important point is that in metaphysics hypotheses are put forward that go beyond what 
science currently says.
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Conclusions
Even in its very weak version, taking genuine relations into account, 
PII is not exempt from counterexamples. The study of PII must therefore 
move from the level of the logical and metaphysical to that of the 
outright empirical. This means that a close examination of what physical 
theory has to tell us is essential in establishing the viability of a 
reductionist understanding of identity and individuality. 
Correspondingly, the question regarding why one should stick to PII as a 
fundamental principle becomes all the more pressing. At the same time, 
the possibility emerges of ‘proper’ metaphysics as the formulation of 
hypotheses as to the nature of reality that are not mere generalizations of 
the already known, but venture instead beyond current science as full­
blown conjectures.
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Chapter 3
Quantum Mechanics and its Ontological
Implications
In this chapter the real value of the reductionist view of identity and 
individuality will be examined by assessing the validity of PII in the 
specific domain of quantum mechanics (which is natural to look at, as it 
is the most well-established and successful scientific account of the basic 
structure of material reality). Quantum particles are shown to constitute 
actual counterexamples to PII if described according to the orthodox 
interpretation of the theory. In particular, it is denied that at least some 
of them can be regarded as weakly discernible. Doubts are, moreover, 
cast upon the idea that it is possible to re-describe quantum entities as 
non-individuals, thus obtaining a ‘peaceful coexistence’ between PII and 
standard quantum mechanics. On the other hand, it is shown that 
Bohmian mechanics fits well with the reductionist perspective, as it is 
essentially based on a classical ontology. However, it is argued, this at 
best avoids refutation of the PII, leading to some sort of 
underdetermination of metaphysics. It does not constitute an argument 
in favour of the reductionist view of identity and individuality.
1. Orthodox Quantum Mechanics and the Violation o f the Iden tity  o f 
the Indiscem ibles
In classical mechanics (CM), a presupposition of impenetrability is 
generally made. In the third regula philosophandi of book III of the
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Principia [1687(1999)], Newton included impenetrability in a list of 
fundamental properties of matter (together with hardness, capacity of 
motion, inertia etc.) determining that each body always has a unique 
location in space. As a matter of fact, impenetrability is not an axiom of 
CM (as, for instance, Newton’s first axiom - stating that every body 
preserves its state of rest or uniform motion in a straight line unless it is 
compelled to change that state by a force impressed on it). It is not a 
dispensable assumption either, though, as it plays a fundamental role. 
Usually, it is simply taken for granted, in the sense that it is postulated 
that only force functions that satisfy certain continuity assumptions are 
allowed, as these lead to equations that have unique solutions - and so 
also guarantee impenetrability (i.e., uniqueness of location in space). 
However, by substituting other force functions into Newton's 
fundamental equation, non-unique solutions follow. As a consequence, 
cases of non-uniqueness must be more or less arbitrarily excluded. Given 
this, it is only once - at the initial stage of the development of the theory 
- the requirement of uniqueness of solutions is accepted as basic that 
impenetrability becomes a necessity in CM. W ith this proviso in mind, in 
what follows classical entities will be said to always differ at least with 
respect to space-time location. As a consequence, weak PII will be taken 
as necessarily true in CM.
Impenetrability is not, however, a (quasi-)axiom in the theory that 
we now take as the correct description of the fundamental constituents 
of reality, namely, so-called ‘standard’, or ‘orthodox’, quantum mechanics 
(QM).46 As a matter of fact, as we will see in more detail below, particles
46 As anticipated the most well-established version of QM, namely the ‘standard’ 
interpretation based upon the formalisation given by Von Neumann and on the idea of 
‘collapse’ of the wavefunction, is assumed here as in most of the relevant literature. As we 
will see at the end of the chapter, Bohmian mechanics provides a rather different picture of 
reality, and so licenses quite different conclusions as far as the issues dealt with in this
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are described by quantum theory as being able to occupy the same 
location.
Having said this, it is now possible to move on to an evaluation of PII 
in the quantum domain. This requires, first of all, a detailed explanation 
of what exactly must be evaluated, namely, of what counts as a property 
in QM.
Properties are represented in the quantum formalism as H erm itiaif1 
operators in Hilbert space. The eigenvectors48 of these operators 
represent the possible values of the observable quantity represented by 
the operator. The important point is that, in general, the state of the 
system (which is also represented by a vector) is not an eigenvector of 
any property (or ‘observable’). This coincides with the fact that, normally, 
no value can be attributed to the system for a given observable with 
certainty, and it is instead only possible to assign a probability to each 
eigenvalue.
To see this, consider the following. The inner product <xP|P4i|vP> - 
with P 4! being the projection operator onto a ray49 containing Vi as an 
eigenvector for observable A50, and 'P the state of the system -  is what 
represents the ‘relation’ in Hilbert space between *P and vi. To ascertain 
whether *P will be measured to possess value vi for observable A, we first 
project 'P onto vi via P 4!, and then calculate the inner product51 between
thesis are concerned. Other theories and interpretations also exist, which will be briefly 
considered in the Appendix.
47 An operator A on a state space is Hermitian iff:
1. A is linear, that is, for all vectors u and v and any number c,
a. v4(u+v)=Au+Av
b. i4(cv)=c(Av)
2. <u|ylv>=<v4u|v> (see the definition o f inner product below)
48 The eigenvectors of an operator A are vectors Vi, v2, ... such that for each i ,4vj=ajVj. The 
ajs are the eigenvalues of the operator A. If A is Hermitian, these are real numbers.
49 That is, a one-dimensional subspace of the total Hilbert space.
50 For simplicity’s sake, I will refer to observables and to operators describing observables 
interchangeably from now on.
51 Defined, for any two vectors a and b (with the same origin), as <a|b>=length of a times 
length of b times cos(angle between a and b).
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the initial vector and the projection. If T  and vi coincide, which naturally 
expresses the fact that the state has the value for A  represented by the 
eigenvector vi (it simply is the state in which the observable has that 
value), then the inner product is equal to 1 - for the vectors under 
consideration are all ‘normalized’ (i.e.; they have unitary length), and 
cos(0°)=l. If 'P and vi are orthogonal, on the other hand, the inner 
product is equal to 0 (as cos(90°)=0), which is taken to mean that the state 
does no t have the value in question. Given this, and since the inner 
product can only take values from 0 to 1, the theory lends itself naturally 
to an interpretation in terms of probability assignments regarding states 
and their observables.
It can thus be said that quantum properties have an irreducibly 
probabilistic nature: the theory only answers questions about the 
properties possessed by physical systems by providing probabilities. In 
particular, these probabilities refer to how likely, given the system, 
specific results are upon measurement\ which is the only means to make 
actual values for quantum observables emerge. The probabilities are 
computed from the above inner product according to the statistical 
algorithm
Prob (oi)^* >=<4'|/cli|'P> 
known as Bom Rule. This gives the probability that a measurement of 
the observable corresponding to the operator O on a system in state ¥  
yields result Oi.
Similarly,
Prob (A )^ =<vP|7xa|vP>
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gives the probability that a measurement of the observable O on a system 
in state ¥  yields a result in the interval A.52
On the basis of these premises, it can be shown that, whenever they 
are part of the same physical system, particles that share all their state- 
independent properties such as mass or charge (called identical particles 
by physicists)53 can also share all their monadic and relational state- 
dependent properties, including spatial location (in this case, they are 
said to be indistinguishable). Let us see this in more detail.
French and Redhead [1988] consider two-particle systems of identical 
particles and an observable O with eigenvalues at and y, and analyse both 
monadic properties of the form Prob (x )^  -  that is, those expressed by 
the probability that in the state 'P observable O ‘actualises’ upon 
measurement with value x  for particle i, and relational properties of the 
form Prob ((x)0l|(y)02)|4,> -  that is, corresponding to the conditional 
probabilities of one value being actualised for O in one particle, 
conditional on the actualisation of the other value for the same 
observable in the other particle.54 Deriving values for these probabilities 
from the quantum formalism, they conclude that, both for fermions and 
for bosons, two indistinguishable particles
“do in fact have the same monadic properties and the same 
relational properties one to another” [lb.; 241].
To see why, consider the following.
52 In this case, of course, the projector operator projects onto a subspace, not (necessarily) a 
ray.
53 Of course, this use o f the word ‘identical’ is different from the philosophical one, as it 
does not imply numerical sameness.
54 Evidently, the fact that here it is the probabilities on particle 1 that are conditional on 
those on particle 2 is absolutely arbitrary, and the description can be reversed. The specific 
choice of values is also irrelevant.
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We can introduce a perm utation operator Penm ,2 having the 
following properties. First of all, Permi,2 |a>i|b>2=|b>i|a>2 for any |a>i|b>2 
(that is, |ab>) representing the system constituted by a and b in the 
Hilbert space which is the tensor product of the two separate Hilbert 
spaces for a and b. From this, it follows that {Penmp)2=I (with /being the 
identity operator), and so P erm i^P enm x1.55 Moreover, the operator has 
the same characteristics as those representing ‘proper’ observables, and 
this entails that it is its own adjoint56, and so P erm it=Permit. Hence, the 
permutation operator is unitary, and Perm it=Perm ixl. Therefore, one 
has, in particular, that PermitPerm\z=I=Perm\p.Perm\ £ .
The permutation operator acts as a unitary transformation of any 
operator O. Suppose O is considered with respect to two systems, namely, 
that 0\i= 0\® 0i. One has that P erm it Ch®hPenm2 =Ii® Oi and that 
Perm itI\® O iPenm 2.=Oi®h. Therefore, P erm it Ch.Perm\2 = On.
Additionally, for any (anti-)symmetric state the Indistinguishability 
Postulate (also known as Permutation Invariance) holds, according to 
which for any n-particle state and observable O on the n-fold tensor 
product state space, <Perm T'l 0\ Perm  VF>=<VF| 0\ VF> (with Perm being 
the operator associated with an arbitrary exchange of particles).
Given this and the statistical algorithm above, for any observable O 
and value at for that observable one obtains
Prob(x)^>=<'F|JP °\f¥>=<W \Penrn^ P  °\P enrn ,2 \¥>=
=<Penm,2 ^ \P  ° \  |Peirni.2vF>=<vF |/7 ° \ \ x¥>= P rob(x)^
Since all known particles (that is, both fermions and bosons) give rise 
to states that are (anti-)symmetric (they obey what is known as the
55 For exchanging two particles with each other twice leads back to the original situation, so 
effectively giving the same result as an application of the identity operator; but it is also 
obvious that an operator times its inverse is equal to the identity operator.
56 Roughly speaking, the adjoint of an operator stands to the operator as the complex 
conjugate of a complex number stands to the complex number.
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Symmetrization Postulate) and the choice of observable and value has 
been left absolutely unspecified, the above result allows us to conclude 
generally that identical particles in the same physical system have all the 
same monadic properties.
As for relational properties, one can prove that Prob ((x)0l | (y)0l )|v?> = 
Prob((x)J(y)0l)ixI<> as follows.
By a fundamental property of probabilities57, the above equality is the 
same as
Prob ((x)0l &(y)0j )|T> /Prob (y ) £  =Prob ((x)0! &(y)0l )|T> /Prob (y )^
The denominators have just been shown to be equal. But the numerators 
are also equal. Since,
Prob ((x)0l&(y)0!)l',’> =<xP |/> ° \ P ° ‘ y|*P>=
=<'P|/’ermut P 01 i(Penmz)2P°'yPenma[¥>=
<Penm ,2 p ° ' xp  y|Penms'¥>=
=<^| P 01 *P°'y |lP>=Prob((x)a,&(y)01)lT>
From this, it follows that all state-dependent properties are the same 
for indistinguishable particles in the same system, and
“so the weakest form of PII which we can formulate[,] 
which involves both monadic and relational properties, is 
violated” [lb.].
French and Redhead also show that systems of three 
indistinguishable paraparticles (still undetected58 particles that are 
neither fermions nor bosons and are hypothesised to exist as obeying 
different types of symmetry and statistics) are such that two particles
57 According to which Prob(A|B)=Prob(A&B)/Prob(B).
58 But see Camino, Zhou, and Goldman [2005]. The detection of paraparticles would of 
course make them much more relevant for present purposes (and not only). In what follows, 
however, they will be ignored.
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differ from the third in some property but have all the same monadic 
properties and all the same relational properties as each other.
French and Redhead’s results have been later improved upon by 
Butterfield [1993] and Huggett [2003]. Butterfield extended the proofs 
regarding relational properties to properties of two particles involving 
their relation to a third entity. Huggett gave a general proof of violations 
of PII for any number of particles and any number of observables. As for 
paraparticles, Huggett’s results show that for systems of n  identical 
paraparticles only a number m<n (determined by the type of particle) of 
them is such that they are indiscernible (Huggett also proved that the m  
indiscernible paraparticles are (anti-)symmetrized).
It thus seems that indiscemibility is an actual feature of quantum 
entities, clearly mirrored in the formalism.
The possibility has been contemplated, it should be noted, of 
identifying a quantum particle by referring to its history. Cortes [1976] 
pointed out that even knowing the entire history of a particle would not 
be sufficient for individuating it when it is part of a system of 
indistinguishable entities, because we would still be unable to ‘pick out’ a 
particle by making reference to its history. Barnette [1978] objected that 
this is a merely epistemic fact that does not necessarily determine 
metaphysical facts about individuality, and so the possibility that 
histories individuate remains open. However, it can in turn be responded 
(see the discussion in the previous chapters) that to ‘extract metaphysics’ 
from what we know is the best we can do. Hence, our inability to use 
histories in practice for individuation might be deemed sufficient to 
exclude histories from the range of properties that can count as making
75
things discernible. 59 Regardless of epistemic limitations on their 
accessibility as full-blown properties, at any rate, it can be doubted that 
histories can solve the problem with the individuation of particles for a 
simple reason: ‘history’ can only mean evolution o f  the same individual 
in time, and it consequently looks as though talk of particle histories, and 
the histories themselves, in fact presuppose identity. In other words, 
while, for instance, Van Fraassen [1991] states that the only problem 
with individuating histories is that they are ‘empirically superfluous’ - in 
the sense that they do not add anything to the physical description of the 
systems in question -, the real problem, it seems to me, is that to think of 
properties corresponding to histories existing as ‘free-floating’ until 
bundled with other properties makes no sense.
2. Weak D iscem ibility to the Rescue?
French and Redhead and the other authors mentioned above appear 
successfully to show that weak PII is violated in QM. However - 
obviously enough in the light of the discussion in the previous chapter - 
supplementary evidence must be taken into account as regards the 
possibility of tracing some degree of weak discemibility in quantum 
systems of indistinguishable particles. Do the latter exhibit, in addition to 
the more ‘canonical’ monadic and relational properties considered above, 
any individuating irreflexive relation?
The Exclusion Principle (EP) has sometimes been referred to (for 
example, by Weyl [1949]) as a vindication of PII for fermions. Because 
EP bans two indistinguishable fermions from having all the same
59 In a sense, histories would be excluded in this case on the same grounds as primitive 
identities. That is, that they would be postulated as epistemically inaccessible individuating 
factors.
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quantum numbers60, it seems to entail their discemibility. However, as 
first pointed out by Margenau [1944], EP represents a constraint only on 
future experimental outcomes, and fermions in the same physical system 
indeed have the same values for all their observables (provided, of course, 
that properties are identified with pre-measurement probabilities in the 
way described in the previous section).61
Still, it is a fact that identical fermions in the same system have all the 
same properties but we also know with certainty that, starting from a 
condition of entanglem ent1, they will give rise to opposite results when 
measured. Does this not point towards an actual fact of the matter -  
concerning a relation among the particles -  that is sufficient for 
individuation even before the measurement?
Saunders has recently ([2003], [2006]) tried to resurrect the claim that 
PII is vindicated for fermions exactly along these lines, by having 
recourse to weak discemibility. Fermions in the singlet state of spin63, 
Saunders claims, are weakly discernible because they are in an irreflexive 
relation expressed by
60 Where each quantum number specifies the value of a quantity that is conserved by the 
particle in the dynamics of the quantum system it belongs to, and the set of all the quantum 
numbers of a particle exhaustively specifies its properties. For a single electron in an atom, 
for instance, one has a principal, an azimuthal (also called angular, or orbital), a magnetic 
and a spin quantum number. Taken together, these numbers fully specify the qualities of 
that electron.
61 This is the working presupposition in French and Redhead’s reconstruction of the 
violation of PII in QM. Massimi [2001] maintains that indistinguishable fermions in 
entangled systems cannot be attributed monadic properties, and suggests taking their 
properties as relational. At any rate, she agrees that weak PII is violated by fermions.
62 The term ‘entanglement’ denotes the fact that the quantum states of two or more systems 
do not convey all the available information. A complete description of an entangled system 
must necessarily describe the entangled sub-systems with reference to each other, because 
there are irreducible correlations between their properties. The essential point about 
fermions is that EP determines that identical fermions in the same system only exist in 
entangled states. Here, the existence of component sub-systems is taken for granted, but 
this is exactly what I will put into doubt in what follows.
63 I.e., an entangled state with a correlation among spin values and total spin 0.
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“the symmetric but irreflexive predicate has opposite 
t-spin component of spin to ...”’ [2006; 59].64
Upon scrutiny, it looks as though not only is the spin correlation 
pointed to by Saunders a genuine property: it is exemplary of the type of 
property in the quantum domain that we can be realist about. The 
eigenstate-eigenvalue link (EEL), accepted as a correct postulate within 
the standard interpretation of the theory, connects quantum descriptions 
to real properties of physical systems. It states that a system can be said to 
actually possess a given property if and only if the theory tells us that it 
will exhibit it upon measurement with probability 1. In the other cases, 
by contrast, since the described property can fail to be actualised, one can 
always deny that the corresponding quantum predicate describes 
som ething real now.65 For quantum systems such as those under analysis 
(i.e., for systems of entangled fermions), EEL does not allow us to 
attribute definite spin properties to the separate components. Entangled 
fermions are not in pure states (a pure state is a state which is 
represented by a vector in Hilbert space; if it is also an eigenvector for 
observable O with eigenvalue o, then the system in that state will be 
measured as having value o for O with probability 1) but only in m ixed  
states (only defining probabilities -  smaller than 1 - for a number of 
possible outcomes).66 However, the composite system, represented in the 
Hilbert space which is the tensor product of the Hilbert spaces 
representing the component particles, is in a pure state.
64 Bosons, instead, might be individuated by irreflexive relations coinciding with spin 
correlations, but are not such that some form of discemibility always exists. I will say more 
on bosons in the next section.
65 This will be of paramount importance in the rest of the discussion.
66 It must be stressed that the theory (via the so-called Axiom of reduction) always allows 
one uniquely to identify separate mixed states for the component particles.
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Because of the above, the composite system constituted by two 
entangled fermions can always be said to actually possess spin 0. This 
latter fact, though, appears directly to lead one to regard the correlation 
between the entangled fermions as equally real. For, the total spin state 
of a system of two entangled fermions 1 and 2 is represented by the 
following expression:
W 2(|t>l|4>2-|4>l|t>2)
And the above conveys the information that, in spite of the fact that 
they have equal monadic and relational spin properties (in particular, 
they are both in the mixed state 1/2|T>+l/2|i>), fermions 1 and 2 will 
necessarily have opposite spin values upon measurement. That is, there is 
the same probability that fermion 1 will have spin up and fermion 2 spin 
down and that fermion 2 will have spin up and fermion 1 spin down, 
namely, 1/2. This is easily shown by recalling the statistical algorithm 
and noticing that67
<vF |JF 7i|'F >= |ci|2
and so
Prob(oi)^>=|ci|2
With reference to the above singlet state, it follows that (with S  
denoting the observable corresponding to the chosen component of spin),
Prob ( t  i| 1 2) ^  >=Prob ( i  i| 1 2) ^  =1/2
But this, Saunders maintains, points to the holding of an irreflexive 
relation, the conveyed information is about an actual property; it has to
67 Since any projection operator is Hermitean and idempotent, and so (given a projection 
operator P onto the one-dimensional subspace spanned by the eigenvector v) 
<v|/>|v>=<v|JP/5|v> (idempotence)
=<Pv\Pv> (Hermiticity)
=<cv|cv> (effect of the projection operator)
=c*<v|cv> (properties of the inner product)
=c*c<v|v> (properties of the inner product)
=c*c (normalization)
=|c|2 (properties of complex numbers).
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do with what is (will be) true o f the two particles together, it is not 
equivalent to two properties possessed by each particle separately; and it 
holds regardless of the order in which we consider the particles.
But if this is correct, one obtains that there is a relation R holding 
between any two entangled fermions a and b and such that Rah, Rba, 
-iRaa and —>Rbb. As a consequence, VR-i(R(at,j^aVz-i(R(z,z))) - the 
additional conjunct characteristic of very weak PII - is false when x  and 
y  are replaced with a and b, and so very weak PII tells a and b apart as 
distinct individuals. Whence, it looks as though fermions can be 
individuated by PII even when they are indistinguishable in the sense 
intended by physicists, and are neither strongly nor moderately 
discernible.
This result is interesting. Nonetheless, I believe that it can be 
questioned. There are three reasons for this.
The first has already been hinted at in the previous chapter. The basic 
claim Saunders makes regarding fermions is that they are exclusively 
individuated by relations, and that if spin correlations did not make them 
weakly discernible, then fermions would be absolutely indiscernible (and 
consequently identical). Therefore, Saunders is in effect subscribing to 
the view that relations can be independent of their relata, and actually be 
prior to them in the sense that they determine their numerical 
distinctness. This is obviously not inconsistent, and actually squares 
nicely with the structuralist ideas that Saunders explicitly underwrites. 
On the other hand, such a view, as explained earlier, is certainly 
questionable. Looking at the physics side of the matter, the following 
may be relevant in connection to this: there are results showing that the 
correlations between the subsystems of individual isolated composite 
quantum systems cannot be taken to be real and objective local
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properties of that system, with ‘real and objective’ taken to mean of a 
property P of system S that ‘P is such that it cannot change in immediate 
response to what is done to a system not interacting with S’.68 Seevinck 
[2006], in particular, takes certain relatively simple proofs to be sufficient 
for saying that the correlation between entangled particles is not 
ontologically ‘robust’, the latter qualification being taken to encompass 
impossibility, without interaction, of i) creation, ii) elimination via 
mixing, iii) flow into some environment upon mixing. It is certainly an 
interesting question whether or not a strong structuralist-like 
understanding of relations of the sort Saunders suggests requires 
ontological robustness so defined. I will not delve into this further here, 
however, as I take another fact to count decisively against Saunders’ 
attempt.
This leads me to introduce the second reason for doubting Saunders’ 
argument. It is more specific, and regards the nature of the relations that 
Saunders has recourse to. In order to formulate it, it is useful to look first 
at the criticism raised against Saunders by Hawley [2006].
Hawley attacks Saunders on two counts. On the one hand, she argues, 
PII perm its, rather than compels, one to take fermions as distinct objects, 
and it is instead Leibniz’s Law that requires one to posit distinct objects 
in certain cases. On the other hand, adds Hawley, the relations Saunders 
points to do not allow for the different treatment of fermions and bosons. 
In my opinion, Hawley misses the essential point, or at least does not 
give it the required attention.
68 Cabello [1999], Jordan [1999] and Seevinck [2006] argue, in different but related ways, 
that if one assumes that the correlations among entangled quantum particles are objective 
and real local properties of the composite systems these particles give rise to, then Bell-like 
inequalities for pairs of correlated pairs of particles can readily be formulated and shown to 
be violated.
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As regards the first criticism, it is true that PII tells us that 
indiscernible entities are identical, not that discernible entities are 
distinct objects; and that it is only Leibniz’s Law that allows one to infer 
numerical distinctness from discemibility. We have already seen, 
however, that Saunders follows Quine in defining  identity as 
indiscemibility. This entails that he endorses a bi-conditional claim that 
absorbs both PII and Leibniz’s Law. It follows that his general 
perspective on identity and individuality does in fact constitute a 
sufficient criterion for attributing numerical distinctness in the case at 
hand.
As for the point about relations and the different treatment of 
fermions and bosons, first of all Hawley says that
“Saunders argues that an entangled-fermion system has 
proper parts, while an entangled-boson system does not. For 
him, an entangled-boson system is just irreducibly symmetric.
Then why not say that an entangled fermion system is just 
irreducibly anti-symmetric? Neither symmetry nor 
antisymmetry has a better or worse claim to ontological 
basicness. We know that if entangled fermions did exist, the 
being-of-opposite-spin relation between them would not 
supervene upon their other properties. The same goes for the 
being-of-the-same-spin relation between putative bosons [....]
The difference between antisymmetry and symmetry doesn’t 
give us positive grounds for recognizing fermions but not 
bosons” [lb., 301-302].
But this is, at best, unclear. Saunders exploits the fact that only 
particles that give rise to anti-symmetric systems, since they obey EP\ 
have opposite spin necessarily. That is, his claim is that only in the case 
of fermions does one necessarily have irreflexive relations. It is for the 
latter relations, though, that he puts forward a claim of ‘ontological
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basicness’. Of course, then, it is the ontological status of the alleged 
irreflexive relations that one must discuss, not that of (anti)symmetry.
W ith respect to this, Hawley argues that the notion of weak 
discemibility is unappealing because
“[f]irst, it incites us to divide an object with, say, four 
units of mass into a three unit part and a one-unit part. 
Second, it conflicts with the modest, empiricist stance which 
makes PII attractive in the first place. PII tells us to restrict 
our ontology to the minimum required by Leibniz’s Law, to 
choose a single object over two indiscemibles any time. The 
present principle tells us to make work for Leibniz’s Law, to 
choose mereological complexity over simplicity whenever we 
can” [ lb.; 302].
But this methodological criticism appears weak. First, there is no 
need to make such unequal divisions as those suggested by Hawley. 
According to the generalist, an object’s parts can, to the contrary, be 
equal as regards their intrinsic properties, including mass, provided that 
they enter into irreflexive relations. If they do not, the very existence of 
distinct parts can be put into doubt. As for empiricism and simplicity, it 
seems plausible to claim that the empiricist stance is, in fact, to require 
facts regarding the things’ number to be determined by qualitative facts; 
and irreflexive relations appear to be the type of qualitative facts that 
demand complexity over simplicity. In this sense, the endorsement of the 
concept of weak discemibility does not lead one to abandon the tradition 
of ‘modest’ empiricism: it just invites to elaborate upon it on the basis of 
Quine’s reflections on relations. Indeed, even independently of whether 
or not one is an empiricist, it is difficult to deny that an irreflexive 
relation points to numerically distinct relata. Why should an empiricist 
ignore this?
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Hawley touches on the real issue only in passing, when she says that
“[w]e can treat each [both the relation holding between 
identical fermions and that connecting identical bosons in the 
same system] as either an irreducible property of the system 
or else as a non-supervenient relation amongst the parts” [lb.].
The key point is, in effect, w hether one has a relation at all in the 
ferm ionic case. But this requires much more philosophical analysis than 
offered by Hawley. This is what I will try to provide in what follows.
Saunders’ reasoning in favour of the weak discemibility of fermions is 
essentially based on an analogy between entangled systems of identical 
particles and Black’s universe (that can be accepted -  as I said in the 
previous chapter - as a valid counterexample to strong and weak PII, but 
fails to refute very weak PII). As Saunders puts it, Black’s thought 
experimental scenario fails to count as a counterexample to very weak 
PII because the fact that two individuals stand in a mutual spatial 
relation (that of being at a non-zero distance from) by no means entails
“that they each have a particular position in space” [2006;
59, italics mine].
Consequently, a condition for weak discemibility (non-zero distance) 
may hold, and in  fact holds, in spite of the fact that conditions necessary 
for stronger forms of discemibility (in this case, distinct space-time 
locations defined in non-relational terms) do not. This amounts to saying 
that the possibility and relevance of weak discemibility is based upon the 
non-supervenience of an (allegedly) discerning relation.69 Having taken
69 In effect, if the discerning relations were supervenient on properties of the relata, the 
latter would be sufficient to determine discemibility too. But this means that monadic 
and/or relational properties of the relata would be different, and so one would in fact have 
strong or moderate discemibility.
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this sensible position with respect to Black’s universe, Saunders argues 
that since two entangled fermions possess (dispositions to reveal) 
opposite spin components upon measurement without each having, 
because of this, a particular value for its spin component, the same 
reasoning holds for quantum systems too. If the overall situation exhibits 
a non-supervenient spatial relation that is enough to individuate two 
spheres in Black’s universe, that is, then it must also be accepted that the 
total state determines a non-supervenient spin correlation that is 
sufficient for individuation in the quantum case.
However, while the claim of non-supervenience cannot be disputed 
in either case, the analogy is not compelling, because it is only partial. A 
crucial ambiguity lies in the meaning that is to be attributed to the word 
‘particular’. In the case of spatial relations, it seems that Saunders can 
only be correct if by ‘particular’ he means ‘absolute’, or ‘specific’; not if 
he means ‘actual’. For, obviously two things can be at some distance from 
each other independently of what position each one of them occupies, 
and also independently of whether or not such a position is individuated 
in an absolute space-time. But, surely -  at least in the classical domain - 
each thing must occupy a location at the m om ent o f the holding o f the 
relation (by which I am not suggesting that absolute space must be 
presupposed). In Black’s case, the essential fact is exactly that we can be 
sure that, if there exists a (non-zero) distance relation R at time ti, then 
necessarily there also exist two distinct objects at ti, namely, those 
connected by R.
In the quantum case, however, this is not so. Since quantum 
properties only convey information about future experimental outcomes, 
despite the fact that we know with certainty at time ti that there is a 
certain correlation within a physical system, on the basis of such a
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correlation we can only say that at a later tim e ti, that is, after 
measurement, there will be two distinct physical systems. But this leaves 
it com pletely open whether
a) What is a single system (without component particles) at ti will 
split into two at t2, or
b) Two sub-systems already existing at ti will come into 
possession of such-and-such properties at t2.70
Although these two alternatives are empirically entirely equivalent, 
as they both account for the evidence, they are radically different from 
the ontological point of view, because the correlation holding at ti points 
to the existence of particles at that time only in the former case. In other 
words, the conclusion that the correlation in question is a relation and, as 
such, it holds among numerically distinct individuals, is far from obvious 
in  the quantum case.
The possibility suggested by a) above, namely that the correlation is a 
monadic property of the entire system, is clearly connected to that of 
describing entangled quantum systems along the lines of what is known 
as ontological holism.
That quantum systems exhibit holistic features is commonly 
acknowledged, and has been already explained when pointing out the 
characteristic features of entanglement. Entangled systems, as shown, for 
instance, by a consideration of EPR-like correlations, are such that the 
whole is more than the sum of the parts: that is, there is more 
information in the total system than in its (supposed) parts considered 
together. Of course, some form of property holism  (some properties of 
the whole are not supervenient on properties of component parts, but
70 In this respect, the fact -  described earlier - that EEL does not authorise one to regard the 
states of the (supposed) entangled fermions as describing actual properties of distinct 
systems is essential.
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sub-systems exist in spite of the non-separability of the corresponding 
states) might appear more plausible on an ontologically ‘conservative’ 
understanding of the theory. However, a stronger form of holism such as 
system  non-separability, determining that the system simply has no 
component parts, might also be true. In the context of ontological holism, 
spin correlations can only be taken as expressing what will, upon 
measurement, become of the entire system, which has no physical parts 
now. In particular, given a physical system, we w ill surely detect 
particles with certain qualities, but this only legitimises the claim that 
there w ill exist individuals.
Unlike in Black’s case, the ontological holist would say, there do not 
exist distinct particles and distinct properties in an entangled system. It is 
clear that, were this the case, it would just be an incorrect move to 
‘project backwards’ after measurement and deduce from the fact that 
there exist two distinct individuals then that this state of affairs already 
obtained before the measurement.
It might add further clarity to formulate this second criticism against 
Saunders in the terms introduced by Cleland [1984]. Spatio-temporal 
relations are plausibly described as what Cleland defines as weakly non- 
supervenient relations.71 A weakly non-supervenient relation, says 
Cleland, is a relation that cannot be reduced to properties of relata, and 
yet requires certain distinct instances of properties to exist. This is what 
establishes weak discemibility in Black’s case: since classical spatial 
relations are dependent on other properties (and, in particular, non-zero 
distance can exist only72 if distinct instances of size and shape exist and 
occupy different locations), then -  necessarily - the holding of a non-
71 Indeed, in her paper Cleland takes spatio-temporal relations as paradigmatic weakly non- 
supervenient relations.
72 Independently of whether space-time is relational or substantival.
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zero distance relation is sufficient for the individuation of two entities (as 
possessing those properties). However, Cleland convincingly 
differentiates the weakly non-supervenient relations just described from 
strongly non-supervenient relations. While the former are not reducible 
to properties of individuals, but are such that some intrinsic properties of 
distinct relata must necessarily be acknowledged if the relation holds, the 
latter are not reducible and are such that no intrinsic property 
whatsoever need be posited once they exist. But in a perspective in 
which relations are not necessarily ontologically dependent on related 
objects (provided, of course, that nothing else leads one to postulate the 
existence of distinct relata) this opens the way for a re-description o f the 
alleged relation as a monadic property o f the whole.
As it turns out, spin correlations in entangled systems are strongly 
non-supervenient in Cleland’s sense. That this is the case was first 
explicitly argued by French [1989] and is also suggested, for example, by 
Esfeld [2004]. These authors forcefully show that nothing whatsoever in 
the related ‘particles’ is entailed by the spin correlation. Given this, the 
essential point can be made again that since they do not entail anything 
about relata, spin correlations in entangled systems can always be re­
described as monadic properties o f the whole system. Consequently, 
underdetermination arises concerning their ontological status, and they 
turn out not to be sufficient for individuation.73
The essential question thus concerns the status of ontological holism. 
Perhaps I only pointed to a possibility that can be discarded as irrelevant?
Saunders might maintain that he is only taking QM at face value, so 
effectively assuming, a la Quine, that what is being described is a domain
73 It can be claimed that the peculiarity of strongly non-supervenient properties coincides 
with the ‘gap’ between times ti and t2 on which the previous formulation of this argument 
was centred: the holding of an irreflexive correlation does not necessarily entail anything 
about distinct related entities existing at the time of the correlation.
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of individuals and what appears to be a relation is indeed a relation. 
However, Quine’s aim was to provide a recipe for ‘reconstructing’ the 
identities of already given individuals in an identity-free language. But 
the reductionist about identity and individuality cannot do the same, and 
must entirely reduce individuals to qualities. Doing otherwise would 
require the certainty that PII is a valid criterion of individuation, and can 
thus be employed for confirming one’s provisional assumption as to the 
existence of distinct individuals. As we have seen, however, there are 
(still) no grounds to look at PII in this way. In this context, in particular, 
assuming numerical distinctness and then applying PII as a ‘test’ for 
individuality is not allowed because the only form of discemibility that it 
is possible to reconstruct (i.e., weak discemibility) crucially depends on 
the initial assumption.74 Were Saunders to insist on the ‘face value’ 
assumption, it would be legitimate to ask why one should take QM at 
face value only as long as it agrees with PII, and not when it attributes 
unique individuating ‘labels’ to particles. Or, which amounts to almost 
the same, why is it that reflexive relations should not be considered 
enough for individuation (such relations can be reconstructed by 
following a procedure for bosonic systems analogous to that described 
above for allegedly irreflexive relations between entangled fermions). To 
respond that this is not allowed because it violates PII would, of course, 
only manage to beg the question regarding the validity of the principle 
once again.
It seems that the only alternative is for Saunders to provide 
arguments against ontological holism from the perspective of the
74 It may be noticed that this is interestingly reminiscent o f the earlier discussion of 
trivialising predicates. It looks as though the assumption of numerical distinctness would be 
admissible only if the ‘test’ represented by PII turned out to fail. In that case the assumption 
would be self-refuting (or, alternatively, PII should be abandoned). This is exactly what 
happens with bosons.
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physical theory and its interpretation. French and Krause appear to have 
this in mind when they explain that Saunders
“is working with a relational conception of the quantum 
state here and this specific irreflexive relation is simply a 
manifestation of the anti-symmetric state itself: since they are 
in such a state, the electrons must have opposite spin. 
Furthermore, to insist that we can only talk about two 
entities in such a state if they can be said to possess separable 
states — which they obviously cannot— is equivalent to 
insisting that only such states, corresponding to monadic 
properties, allow us to distinguish and hence individuate the 
entities. But now the question begging has been turned, since 
it is precisely this latter insistence that Saunders wants to 
move away from” [2006; 170].
However, while this is correct, contrary to French and Krause I doubt 
that it represents a response Saunders can have recourse to. Surely, to 
have a relational conception of the quantum state may allow one to ‘take 
the irreflexivity seriously’, that is, as a genuine physical property 
‘essential’ to the entangled state; and to do away with the naive 
assumption that distinct individuals must be in separable states. But it 
requires one further step to claim that the irreflexivity lies in a genuine 
relation and not in a monadic property of the whole, and therefore one 
has distinct weakly discernible objects. It is this additional step that is 
missing in Saunders’ argument.
Perhaps one could emphasise that entangled states can always be 
decomposed into well-defined separate (mixed) states, and suggest that 
this is naturally accounted for along the lines of property holism. That is, 
of distinct systems which, although the whole they give rise to is not 
reducible to them, exist as well-defined separate entities. The problem 
with this is that, at least if one follows EEL, separate states by no means
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correspond to distinct systems; and the whole point of the present 
discussion concerns exactly what criteria should be applied for 
determining what distinct individual systems exist in the domain 
described by the theory. While property holism, as I said above, is surely 
the weakest (in the sense of least ‘revolutionary’ with respect to 
commonsense) consequence that can be derived from the evidence 
regarding entangled states, ontological holism could be argued for on 
other grounds. In particular, it could be, and has been, contended that it 
is necessary to endorse it in view of the results, discussed in chapter 2, 
related to EPR-like correlations and the violations of Bell’s inequalities. 
Recently, Lange [2002] has done exactly this.75 He suggests that in an 
entangled state
“the whole particle pair isn’t anything more than the stun 
of its parts [... and...] the wave-function collapse occurs over 
both wings because there aren’t separate physical objects on 
the left and right until after the measurement has taken place, 
so locality is satisfied” [lb.; 294].
Here, note, I do not need a conclusion to the effect that ontological 
holism is correct, or more plausible than property holism; but only that it 
is a possible interpretation of entangled systems, and there are arguments 
in its favour. And this has been uncontroversially shown to be the case. 
Therefore, without entering again into the details of the debate regarding 
quantum non-locality and EPR, it now seems legitimate to say that there
75 The suggestion that quantum entangled systems may exemplify ontological holism is also 
present in Howard [1989]. There, Howard says that “maybe we can opt for radical 
ontological holism and still do some physics” [lb.; 252] and, even more strongly, that “the 
universe is ‘really’ one, but once we put a specific question to it, it falls apart quite 
naturally into apparent parts” [lb.; 253].
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are no convincing arguments Saunders can have recourse to in order to 
break the ontological underdetermination pointed out in this section.76
Before concluding, two smaller remarks: first, the claim I have made 
is no t that Saunders points at discerning facts that obtain only after 
measurement (this would miss the key fact that Saunders is not 
interested in strong or moderate discemibility, which is what the 
measured properties of the separate individuals would give) but that he 
has insufficient evidence for concluding in favour of weak discemibility 
(before measurement). Secondly, the foregoing objection does not 
contravene EEL: the property expressing the correlation among 
entangled fermions is surely real, independently of whether a 
measurement is actually performed on the particles, and this is not 
denied at any point. It is not certain, though, (to repeat once more) 
whether it actually is a relation holding between subsystems; or just a 
monadic property of the entire system as a whole (albeit one that will 
necessarily evolve so as to give rise to two anti-correlated particles). The 
supporter of the weak discemibility of fermions needs to exclude this 
latter possibility; however, it would seem that s/he can do so only on 
purely a priori grounds.77
So much for the second question that can be raised about Saunders’ 
analysis. The third, and final, one will be formulated in a separate section, 
as it is more ‘indirect’ and has to do not with the treatment of fermions as 
individuals (because allegedly weakly discernible), but with that of
76 This seems even more correct once one considers that Saunders himself, as we will see in 
the next section, takes (or, at least, can be interpreted as taking) ontological holism as a 
natural perspective for understanding systems of indistinguishable bosons.
77 On the other hand, as I pointed out already, the denial of the existence of actual 
properties of separate entities in entangled systems is also based on EEL, and it is therefore 
fair to stress that different conclusions could be drawn if EEL were not regarded as a basic 
postulate. However, EEL is commonly assumed in the interpretation of quantum mechanics, 
and Saunders seems not to rely on any specific assumption to the effect that it is not a valid 
postulate. Nor can he be regarded as having shown that EEL should be dispensed with.
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bosons as non-individuals (because absolutely indiscernible). Importantly, 
the arguments that follow also apply to those who -  unlike Saunders -  do 
not intend to have recourse to very weak PII, and yet try to stick to PII 
as a valid criterion of individuation by entirely sacrificing the assumption 
that the latter is a theory about individuals.
3. Bosons and the Appeal to N on-Individuality
After arguing that fermions are genuine individuals, Saunders goes on 
to consider bosons. Indistinguishable bosons, as mentioned earlier, 
cannot be individuated via weak discemibility, because they can be 
irreflexively correlated in the same way as fermions but, since EP does 
not hold for them, such discemibility is not warranted in all cases.78 In 
the light of this, Saunders concludes that:
“The only cases in which the status of quantum particles as 
objects is seriously in question are therefore elementary 
bosons [...; with respect to these, w]e went wrong in thinking 
the excitation numbers of the mode, because differing by 
integers, represented a count of things; the real things are the 
modes” [2006; 60].
As I will argue in what follows, this claim too is problematic when 
put forward from the reductionist perspective.
Saunders’ use of the concept of ‘mode’ indicates that he has in mind 
the quantum-field-theoretic description of reality (basic field-points, 
whose excitations are taken to correspond to what we commonly take as 
particles, are indeed called ‘modes’). That particles are not individuals is
78 Sticking to the spin example, two identical bosons can be found in states that attribute 
either spin up or spin down to both of them. In such situations, no correlation holds among 
the two bosons that makes them at least weakly discernible, and so very weak PII is 
violated.
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plausible from the viewpoint of quantum field theory, where it can no 
doubt be motivated independently of philosophical considerations.79 Not 
so, however, in the context of Saunders’ treatment of standard QM, in 
which the choice of taking certain entities as non-individuals is 
exclusively made on the basis o f the assumption that P II is a valid 
criterion o f individuation*0
The natural interpretation of Saunders’ claims (suggested by the very 
title of his paper) is that everything that exists is either an ‘object’ or a 
‘non-object’, that the distinction depends on the things’ identity 
conditions, and that PII is a criterion of object-hood because it allows us 
correctly to identify these conditions.
If this is what Saunders has in mind, however, a problem arises. 
Suppose that he claims that, since they are not made discernible by PII, 
the natural interpretation of bosons is the field-theoretic one according 
to which they are only epiphenomenal manifestation of the bosonic field 
as a whole. If so, we have a situation in which, according to Saunders, 
fermions are individuated by PII provided  that ontological holism is 
excluded; and bosons are instead interpreted according to ontological 
holism because they violate PII. It seems clear that Saunders is forced to 
apply a sort of ‘double standard’, and that circularity arises as regards PII 
and the ontological interpretation of the relevant physical systems. This 
appears to represent one further confirmation of the fact that the 
generalist is faced with an ontological underdetermination in the 
quantum domain that s/he cannot break by only having recourse to the 
tools at his/her disposal. Either s/he first independently settles the
79 In particular, although it is possible to interpret quantum field theory as a theory about 
individual particles, the usual interpretation is that particles are mere ‘epiphenomena’ with 
respect to the underlying fields.
80 One should not forget the peculiarities of quantum statistics, o f course. These, however, 
are not taken to represent a threat to the claim that particles are individuals by Saunders. 
Quantum statistics will be discussed in chapter 6.
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question regarding the plausibility of ontological holism, or s/he must 
acknowledge that spin correlations cannot be employed for individuation 
and, consequently, fermions and bosons cannot be treated differently 
(and must both be regarded as non-objects from his/her perspective).
Another interpretative option is to assume that by ‘object’ Saunders 
means ‘individual’, as opposed to other entities that lack (part of) the 
identity conditions required for individuality and yet count as ‘objects’ in 
the sense attributed to the word by the perhaps more established 
vocabulary. That is, in the sense of being self-identical entities which are 
at best only cardinally countable when grouped together. On this 
construal, one can interpret Saunders as suggesting not that bosons are 
not objects at all, but rather that they are non-individual objects. This 
would allow him to avoid a holistic understanding of bosonic systems, as 
bosons would not ‘dissolve’ into unitary fields, but rather constitute 
‘aggregates’ of countable non-individual entities.
In this case, though, a definition of non-individuality compatible 
with the reductionist perspective on identity and individuality must be 
provided. For, consider the following. Cortes [1976] starts from the 
Leibnizian idea that no two substances differ solo numero, and uses it to 
define, a la Quine, individuality as the relational property of 
discemibility from all other entities. From this, he derives that, 
according to Leibniz’s view, non-individual objects (intended as 
indiscemibles) do not exist. He then goes on to argue that non­
individuals (again, understood in a Leibnizian fashion) do exist, as 
demonstrated by the evidence of QM regarding bosons (in particular, 
photons), and consequently PII is false. Hence, Cortes effectively 
provides a straightforward reductio ad absurdum of the Leibniz-Quine 
position. But of course the situation changes if one claims that PII is in
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fact a valid criterion of individuation because it is only violated by non­
individuals, and the latter can be defined as such on grounds other than 
(in)discem ibility.
In chapter 1, when discussing (and defending) the non-synonymy of 
the terms ‘individual’ and ‘particular’, I suggested that a difference 
between individuals and non-individuals within the broader class of 
particulars could be meaningfully established with respect to identity 
conditions. And work in this direction has already been done in the 
literature (although in the context of the, related but distinct, discussion 
of vagueness). It is thus to this work that we can briefly look now.
Lowe [1994] argues - against Evans’ [1978] well-known rejection of 
the possibility of ‘vague’ particulars - that for quantum particles it is the 
case that, although each particle is self-identical, it can be indeterminate 
whether one is identical to the other. Evans considered the property P of 
‘being indeterminately identical to x  to deduce that it cannot be 
indeterminate whether a=b. For, assuming that a=b is in fact 
indeterminate, b has P with respect to a but a does not, for every entity is 
determinately identical to itself (or so Evans holds). As a consequence, 
due to Leibniz’s Law, a and b are determinately non-identical, because 
there is at least one formula that does not apply to both. Lowe replies 
that, by assuming that it is indeterminate whether a=b, one ipso facto 
assumes that both a and b have P, because the identity of the entity that 
P is made relative to remains indeterminate. Since both entities are 
indeterminately identical to some entity, P does not make them 
determinately distinct.
But how is it possible for particles a and b to be determinately self­
identical separately but, at the same time, such that there is no objective 
fact of the matter as to whether or not a=bl French and Krause [1995] try
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to make sense of this possibility by tracing the source of ontic 
indeterminacy to the relations holding between entangled particles. 
They argue that quantum particles of the same kind differ from their 
classical counterparts only because of these relations, and so the root of 
their ontological peculiarity must be that there are non-supervenient 
relations making facts about a and b true without also determining which 
specific fact is true of which specific particle [lb.; 22]. French and Krause 
claim that -  once an ontology of relations is admitted -  even assuming 
that particles are individuals
“we cannot te ll whether electron a is identical to b, or not 
[...and...] we cannot in principle tell this; [therefore] 
assuming that quantum mechanics is correct, we cannot tear 
away the veil of non-supervenience and get at what is ‘really’ 
going on. It is not an epistemic problem but an ontic one” [lb.].
However (even granting that an in principle epistemic impossibility is 
equivalent to an ontic fact81), we have seen in the previous section that if 
one interprets the non-supervenient properties of entangled systems as 
relations, these suffice to make particles discernible and consequently, 
given PII, determinately distinct.82
French and Krause consider a second option, and put forward the 
idea that the peculiarities of quantum particles are due to the fact that 
concept of identity simply does not apply to them. In particular, that for
81 This might in fact be disputed, but appears to agree with the view - which we have 
deemed compelling at least as regards the issues being dealt with here - of metaphysics as 
something that coincides with the most general empirical truths, and that is consequently to 
be ‘tested against’ the evidence.
82 One may claim that, even independently of relations, French and Krause explicitly say 
that in this scenario particles are vague individuals, and so this option is irrelevant in the 
present context. However, their claim that one may have vague individuals in quantum 
mechanics is based on the assumption that self-identity is sufficient for individuality (and, 
consequently, indeterminacy in numerical distinctness does not affect individuality). Here, 
instead, determinate numerical distinctness has been deemed necessary for individuality.
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these entities it is not true that each one of them is identical to itself. 
Logics in which the expression x=y is not a well-formed formula have 
indeed been developed in support of such scenarios. The most fully 
worked out examples are the formalisms based on the notion of a ‘quasi­
set’, introduced, for instance, in Krause [1992] and in Da Costa and 
Krause [1997]. The basic idea is to posit as basic Urelemente so called m- 
atoms that are completely indiscernible and can be counted only 
cardinally. For such elements, French and Krause explain,
“identity, as it is usually understood, lacks sense; in other 
words, these entities are linked only by a weaker relation (=) 
[indistinguishability], which mirrors an equivalence relation, 
but the language does not allow us to talk about either the 
identity or the diversity of the m-atoms” [1995; 23].83
If this is correct, PII must then be understood as follows: P II applies 
to all particulars; if it establishes facts of identity and distinctness in 
agreement with the available evidence as regards countability, then it 
can be concluded that it picks out individuals; if, on the contrary, it turns 
out to be false, as in the case of bosons, then it is being applied to 
particulars that are not also individuals.84
83 Moving along similar lines, Dalla Chiara and Toraldo di Francia [1993], point out that 
quantum particles cannot be uniquely labelled and propose to regard them as ‘intensional- 
like entities’, where the intensions - much in the spirit of Quine’s conception of identity - 
are represented by conjunctions of intrinsic properties. On this construal, the extensions of 
the relevant natural kinds are collections of indistinguishable elements, called ‘quasets’.
84 It is important to point out the significance of the use of the verb ‘to apply’ here. Some 
authors (for instance, French [2006]) assume that the distinction between individuals and 
non-individuals is meaningful, and that PII only applies to the former. They feel 
consequently free to say that the issue of whether PII holds for non-individuals is simply 
obviated (and this is a possible explanation of the violations of PII by quantum particles). 
Although one may think that more needs to be said by way of justification of the 
assumptions being made, this position is in itself consistent. From a Quinean-Leibnizian 
perspective, however, PII is to be regarded as a principle of general applicability. Therefore, 
whenever it applies, but is violated, an explanation must be provided. The individual/non­
individual distinction could perhaps be employed in order to formulate such an explanation 
along the lines being suggested here. This, however, demands an answer to the question of 
whether the distinction can be drawn at all, i.e., a coherent definition of non-individuality
98
However, I do not see how this can be of any help for the supporter 
of the reductionist account of identity and individuality. For recall that 
s/he defines identity on the basis of the conjunction of the formulas 
satisfied in the (first-order and finite) language. Namely, s/he assumes 
that identity and uniqueness of description are the same thing  and one 
has a true bi-conditional of the form VWj^VF(Fjr-»F^<-»j£=y). This 
entails that, from the Quinean-Leibnizian perspective, a thing’s identity 
conditions are fixed as soon as it is determined which properties the 
thing possesses. But this is indeed the case for all quantum particles. 
Generalizing, it looks as though once, along Quinean fines, one reduces 
identity to uniqueness of description, one effectively gets rid of the very 
possibility of non-individual objects.
One might try to resist this conclusion by claiming that non­
individuals have indeterm inate self-identity. Translating again in 
Quinean terms, this would mean that it can be indeterminate whether an 
entity satisfies the same predicative formulas as itself. It might be argued 
that this is possible, because properties can be ‘indeterminately 
exemplified’ by things. In the cases in which this happens, the argument 
might continue, one has entities that satisfy conjunctions of predicative 
formulas indeterminately, and so possess indeterminate self-identity. 
However, even allowing for the possibility that properties (and 
conjunctions thereof) can be vaguely (i.e., not determinately) possessed 
by particulars, on a closer look this suggestion turns out to be untenable 
as well, because based on a fallacy. The indeterminacy of property- 
exempfification only causes the conjunctions of properties to be 
indeterminately exemplified; it does not entail that it is indeterminate 
whether a given individual has the same properties as itself. Suppose that
be formulated, by the reductionist. That this is not the case is what I will be arguing in what 
follows.
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an individual as identity is fully defined on the basis of its colour C (say, 
because its other properties -  and the relations it enters into - are not 
sufficient for discemibility). Now, it may be possible for C not to be 
determinately exemplified by a, so that it is indeterminate, say, whether 
a is red, and similarly for any other colour. But does the fact that a is not 
determinately of any colour imply that it is indeterminate whether a is of 
the same colour as itself (which is what would provide the grounds for 
attributing indeterminate identity to a)? As a matter of fact, it seems to 
me, there exists no such implication, and identity is a relation that holds 
between an entity and itself determinately, regardless of anything that 
can be the case about that entity’s properties. Analogous remarks can be 
made of course as regards the numerical distinctness between things: if 
two things are numerically distinct as soon as they have distinct 
properties, then there is no space for indeterminate, or at any rate non- 
definable, numerical distinctness within a reductionist framework.85
It thus seems that the earlier, and more immediately plausible, 
interpretation of Saunders’ claims about bosons as non-objects is the 
correct one, supported not only by what Saunders actually writes, but by 
the impracticability of the very distinction between individuals and non­
individuals in the context of the reductionist view of identity and 
individuality.
What has just been said also entails a more general argument against 
the reductionist perspective. It now becomes clear that those 
reductionists who do not employ the notion of weak discemibility 
cannot account for many-particle system of indistinguishable quantum
85 It is worth pointing out that a) the reasoning applies even if no property whatsoever is 
attributed to an entity (for in that case the identity o f that entity is defined by an empty 
conjunction of qualitative formulas); and b) even if it is accepted that quantum mechanics 
does not attribute properties determinately (which, I suggested, is at any rate insufficient to 
argue for lack of identity), state-independent properties are nonetheless possessed by 
particles determinately.
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particles either. Because even though they avoid making problematic 
assumptions with respect to the properties of entangled systems, for them 
too it is the case that the principle they employ for determining what 
distinct objects exist cannot be made consistent with the available 
evidence.
It can thus be concluded that, even accepting Saunders’ argument in 
favour of weak discemibility for fermions, problems arise as regards the 
possibility of consistently extending the ontological account he proposes 
to bosons. And this can be generalised so as to equally apply to the 
position according to which all quantum systems of many 
indistinguishable particles are not composed of distinct 
objects/individuals.
4. Bohmian M echanics
Throughout the present chapter, the canonical interpretation of QM 
has been assumed. The reason for this is that, as explained at the 
beginning of the chapter, the orthodox interpretation of the theory, 
based on the idea of collapse of the wavefunction and on the 
mathematical formalism first defined by Von Neumann, surely is the 
established one. It is, therefore, the obvious candidate for being the 
object of a realist86 look at science aimed to assessing whether an
861 take realism about scientific theories to be presupposed here because it seems to me that 
one needs to regard a given theory as a true (or approximately true) description of the world 
if one is to derive metaphysical conclusions from it - at least provided that metaphysics is 
considered, as seems plausible, as the study of fundamental features of reality. Of course, 
one may not be a metaphysical realist and yet be interested in studying metaphysics; or be 
interested in studying the metaphysical consequences of theories one does not regard as true 
or approximately true; or take some other theory/interpretation as a true (or approximately 
true) description of the world. In all these cases, the question regarding the metaphysical 
consequences of alternative theories becomes relevant; and even more so if, as I suggested 
is the case with PII, the metaphysical claims one intends to study are in effect nothing but
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empirical justification can be found for PII and the reductionist 
perspective based on it. Not surprisingly, it is for such a standard view of 
QM that the results regarding identity and individuality that have been 
described and discussed at length above have been proved and shown to 
arise with the greatest clarity. Nevertheless, as is well-known, alternative 
interpretations and altogether different theories have been developed, 
which rose to the status of serious and legitimate candidates for the 
explanation of the micro-world. And of course it is a possibility that 
these alternatives have rather different consequences from those of the 
orthodox theory. It is thus necessary to look (if briefly) at these other 
theories and interpretations too from the perspective of the present study.
Things appear to change radically with respect to the preceding 
discussion if one considers Bohmian mechanics, which is a paradigmatic 
example of a theory presented as distinct from, but empirically 
equivalent to, standard quantum mechanics. Bohmian mechanics is based 
on an essentially classical ontology, with traditional particles whose 
behaviour is determined by ‘guiding fields’. Some authors (for instance, 
Bohm himself [1952], also together with Hiley [1993], Albert [1992] and 
Valentini [1996]) are realist about the latter and stress the ontological 
dualism between particles and fields. This leads them to conceive of the 
theory as a second-order theory, with classical particles moving under 
the influence of various forces. However, a minimal interpretation of 
Bohmian mechanics has also been developed (see, for instance, Durr, 
Goldstein and Zanghi [1992]) which dispenses with fields and makes do 
with particles and the guidance equation only. In such an interpretation, 
Bohmian mechanics becomes a first-order theory with particle velocities 
as the fundamental quantities.
very general empirical statements extracted from science. This question will be dealt with 
in this section and in the Appendix.
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In general, Bohmian mechanics can be described in terms of five 
postulates:
i) The state-description of an n-particle system is given by 
specifying the total state and the actual position of each of the n  
particles;
ii) The quantum state evolves according to the Schrodinger
df¥)
equation ih— — = i / |xl/> where H  is the Hamiltonian
N h2H= -  V ----- d 21 ck[2K +V(q) with V(q) denoting the classical
mk
potential and m* the mass of the £-th particle;
iii) The velocity of an TV-particle system is defined as v^(Q) =
dt
where V^(Q) = is a velocity field on the
configuration space that evolves as a function of Q  according to
v dQk . h  .
^  = - r L = (— )ftn[- — ](6i, -»ejy);  dt mk 'F * T
iv) The ‘quantum equilibrium’ configuration probability
distribution for an ensemble of systems each having quantum 
state T1 is given by p=|vF|2;
v) The quantum state gives rise to a quantum potential
U= -  (—— )(—^—) determining a related force field which
k 2mk R
causally affects the particles.
This last postulate is what the different formulations of Bohmian 
mechanics disagree over. It is the source of the suggestion of a dualist 
ontology of fields and particles, as the quantum potential, according to 
some, is necessary correctly to account for the evidence (most notably, to 
explain particle trajectories) and must be regarded as determined by real
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fields because of the requirements of a proper causal explanation. Others, 
as mentioned, consider the influence of quantum potentials and of the 
related fields as being purely nomological.
What is relevant here is that, even without entering into the details 
of the formulation of the theory, it is possible to claim that Bohmian 
mechanics has the peculiar feature of defining an ontology with more or 
less classical discernible individual particles.87 This is due to the fact that 
Bohmian mechanics postulates that position is always unique for each 
particle. As a consequence of this, the essential feature that makes weak 
PII true in the classical domain is retained, and particles can be said to be 
always discernible in Bohmian mechanics. This comes as no surprise, as 
one of the basic assumptions of Bohmian accounts of the quantum world 
is that the available evidence can be perfectly explained in the classical 
terms of impenetrable particles moving in space along continuous 
trajectories and interacting with each other.
W hat does this entail for our discussion?
Surely, were Bohmian mechanics to be taken as the true description 
of microscopic reality, PII would be vindicated, at least in its weak form 
(essentially, as a claim of impenetrability). However, Bohmian mechanics 
is not regarded as the (approximately) true theory by the majority of the 
members of the scientific community; and an evaluation of its pros and 
cons may provide a hint as to why this is the case. On the one hand, 
besides postulating an ontology in continuity with the classical one, 
Bohmian mechanics allegedly solves the measurement problem without 
postulating wavefunction collapses or recurring to the concept of 
decoherence. On the other hand, though, it is a manifestly non-local and 
contextual theory; it makes specific assumptions about the particles’
87 The guiding fields might be real, but for them questions of individuality do not arise. 
Hence, they can be ignored in the present context.
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distribution and (in some cases) the existence of real guiding waves 
which causally affect particles but are not, in turn, affected by the latter; 
and the list could perhaps continue. The debate regarding Bohmian 
mechanics is in effect open in the scientific community. At any rate, it is 
certainly not obvious that Bohmian mechanics has any more right to 
claim the role of (approximately) true description of the microscopic 
world than orthodox quantum mechanics. Its classical, or almost classical, 
ontology is, to be sure, an element that many see as an intuitively 
compelling reason to explore it, and perhaps to regard it as preferable. 
But this alone cannot be taken to be a sufficient motivation for choosing 
Bohmian mechanics over the alternatives. It surely is not, at any rate, in 
the present case: we are discussing exactly on what grounds one’s 
ontology (in particular, one’s notions of identity and individuality) 
should be defined; and this obviously has a bearing, among other things, 
on the comparative evaluation of the ontological consequences of our 
theories. Does orthodox quantum theory truly entail anything highly 
non-classical and Counterintuitive?88
It seems to me that the right assessment of the situation is that there 
is, at most, a sort of underdetermination of the ‘right’ theory by the 
evidence and the other factors normally taken into account when 
choosing among alternative theories. And that, consequently, even if one 
were to ignore the fact that the orthodox interpretation is the dominant 
one (say, on the basis that this could merely be a historical contingency), 
no univocal conclusion could be reached anyway. Therefore, while the 
standard interpretation of quantum mechanics, I argued, suggests that PII 
and the reductionist view of identity and individuality are incompatible 
with the evidence, once Bohmian mechanics is also taken onto account
88 In the second part of the thesis, I will suggest that it does not.
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one can at best claim that the existing alternatives for describing the 
quantum domain point in different directions. In view of the fact that (at 
least as far as I could see) there is no convincing non-empirically-based 
argument for PII and reductionism, though, this is still sufficient for 
reaching a conclusion with respect to the issue on which the first part of 
the thesis focused. For it means that, even once our best knowledge of 
the world is taken into account, no positive reason emerges for endorsing 
the reductionist view  o f iden tity  and individuality.
5. W here Do We Stand? A  Recapitulation
We set out initially to study the nature of individuality. Having 
defined individuality as the condition in virtue of which an entity 
possesses determinate identity conditions (in particular, it is 
determinately self-identical, and determinately distinct from all other 
entities), we then focused on the notion of identity. W ith respect to the 
latter, an alternative to the view that identity is a primitive relation was 
identified by making reference to the work of Quine. According to 
Quine, the identity of an entity can be defined as the conjunction of non­
identity involving formulas that the entity satisfies in the language 
(provided that the latter has a finite vocabulary and is first-order). This 
entails acceptance of PII as a principle that can be employed as a 
criterion on the basis of which to attribute individuality to things.
PII, we have seen, has not been convincingly shown to be necessarily 
true except in a metaphysically non-informative form. It is thus 
necessary for the reductionist to try to justify the Quinean view and PII 
on the basis of the empirical evidence. With respect to this, physics, and 
in particular quantum mechanics, is the best candidate for defining the
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non-logical vocabulary on the basis of which to (attempt to) provide a 
reductionist account of things’ identities. As we have seen in this chapter, 
however, quantum particles falsify PII in the orthodox theory of 
quantum systems. This claim is controversial for fermions, for which 
weak discemibility (distinctness brought about by irreflexive relations) 
might be an option, but is straightforward for bosons. As regards 
fermions, to make recourse to weak discemibility requires, first of all, a 
commitment to the thesis that relations can be ontologically prior to 
their relata. Whatever one’s reaction is regarding this, Saunders’ claim 
that fermions are weakly discernible can at any rate be rejected as not 
conclusive, on the basis of the fact that it cannot be claimed with 
certainty that the properties allegedly individuating them truly are 
relations. As regards (at least) bosons, if - for some reason - one insists on 
endorsing PII, an explanation must be given of why it is violated by such 
particles and yet is still to be regarded as a valid criterion of individuation. 
Such an explanation, it seems, must be based on a distinction between 
either objects and non-objects or non-individual and individual objects 
(particulars). Each of the two differentiations, however, must be drawn 
with respect to identity conditions, and the latter must in turn be 
explained in Quinean terms because of the very reductionist thesis with 
respect to identity that characterises the position. This entails, though, 
that in fact the distinction cannot be made at all within the reductionist 
framework. One could react by presenting Bohmian mechanics as an 
alternative. Bohmian mechanics, indeed, vindicates weak PII, as it 
attributes unique positions to the particles. It, however, is at best an 
equally valid alternative to orthodox quantum mechanics. From this, it 
follows that my previous claim of refutation of the reductionist 
perspective is only weakened: what we now have is a form of
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underdetermination by the evidence of a principle which, however, does 
no t have any other justification.
For all these reasons, the reductionist view of identity and 
individuality can legitimately be deemed unconvincing. Even though it 
has by no means been conclusively refuted, and so the alternative to it - 
based on primitive identity - need not be considered necessarily correct, 
it is nevertheless interesting now to look at the latter in some detail. The 
issues to be dealt with in doing so belong, I believe, to the sort of ‘proper’ 
metaphysics -  more decidedly concerned with the domain of the 
conjectural - the peculiarity and relevance of which I argued for at the 
end of the previous chapter. First and foremost, a new issue now emerges 
that concerns what ontological reconstruction (if any) can be offered (in 
terms of primitive identities) of reality in general and of the domain that 
has been taken into account in this chapter in particular. An assessment 
in this sense requires the application of specifically ontological categories, 
products of purely philosophical speculation, for the development of a 
consistent and plausible general scheme, to be then applied for the 
interpretation of the (part of) reality described by microphysics.
It is to this kind of enterprise that I will turn in the following 
chapters.
Appendix: Iden tity and Indistinguishability in  O ther Interpretations 
o f Quantum Mechanics
The relevance for the present discussion of the fact that there is more 
than one theory and interpretation of the quantum domain has already 
been stressed; and the possibility of deriving different conclusions from 
each one of these different theories and interpretations has also been
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illustrated via a consideration of the two emblematic, and opposite, 
alternatives constituted by orthodox quantum mechanics and Bohmian 
mechanics. It is interesting, nevertheless, to look at other possible 
theoretical descriptions of reality (albeit briefly in an Appendix) from the 
perspective of the present study.
There is more than one modal interpretation of the quantum 
formalism, but for present purposes it suffices to consider Van Fraassen’s 
([1972] and [1991]). This does away with the projection postulate and 
distinguishes between the actual, determinate state (value state) of the 
system and the description of its possible future evolution (dynamical 
state). The dynamical state (unless it corresponds to a pure state) only 
constrains the possible value states, and is not an objective description of 
the system. An objective interpretation of probability is thus restricted to 
value states only, and the EEL is consequently not accepted, as the 
system might actually possess a specific value for an observable even 
without it being the case that the quantum state is an eigenstate of the 
observable corresponding to that value. All this re-introduces the 
possibility of individuation via PII at least for certain particles, namely 
those to which distinct value states can in fact be attributed.
Both Bohmian mechanics and modal interpretations reject the idea of 
collapse. Other alternatives keep collapses in the picture, but modify 
other elements.89
89 Another interpretation that, similarly to modal variants and Bohmian mechanics, drops 
the idea of collapse of the wavefunction is Everett’s [1957] relative-state interpretation, 
which inspired other important developments such as the many-worlds interpretation 
(DeWitt [1971]), the many-minds interpretation (Albert and Loewer [1988]), the many 
histories interpretation (Gell-Mann and Hartle [1990]) and the relational approach (Rovelli
[1996]). These views, however, appear to have significant differences from standard QM 
only with respect to what a measurement (broadly intended) is and determines in the 
universe, not as regards the properties attributed to physical systems before measurement. 
The latter thing is, however, what is relevant in the present context, so we do not need to 
get into the details of these interpretations here.
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One possibility in this sense is that represented by spontaneous 
collapse theories, such as those presented by Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber 
[1986] and Ghirardi, Pearle and Rimini [1990]. These have been 
developed with a view to solving the measurement problem and the 
paradoxes connected to it, such as the well-known Schrodinger’s cat 
paradox. It is hypothesized that collapses of the wavefunction are not 
induced by measurements but are spontaneous in nature. To express this, 
two new constants are introduced in the formalism, which define the 
localization accuracy and the mean localization frequency respectively. 
While the original model, based on discontinuous ‘jumps’, as 
acknowledged by Ghirardi himself,
“does not allow to deal with systems of identical 
constituents because it does not respect the symmetry or 
antisymmetry requirements for such particles” [2002],
this does not happen for its subsequent evolution, known as the 
‘continuous spontaneous localization model’. Concerning the latter, it 
seems fair to say, the only difference being in the dynamics of the 
collapse, no significant divergence exists with respect to standard QM as 
regards property attributions, identity and individuality.90
90 It must be pointed out that there is no agreement over the interpretation of this theory.
The original formulation was shown (by Albert and Loewer [1990]) to fall prey to the ‘tails 
problem’, consisting of the fact that the collapse of the wavefunction does not determine a 
complete localisation. Albert and Loewer [1996] suggested an interpretation rule known as 
the ‘fuzzy link’, only requiring the presence of most of the wavefunction in the relevant 
region of configuration space. But this, in turn, gave rise to the ‘counting anomaly’ (Lewis
[1997]), consisting of the fact that for systems of n objects (with a large enough n), each 
one of them is located in a region and yet the compound is not. The ‘mass density’ link (see 
Ghirardi, Grassi and Benatti [1995]) has been then presented as a valid alternative (Monton 
[2004]). According to it, n objects are located in the region if there are n regions for which 
a mass density distribution in ordinary three-dimensional space meets certain requirements. 
However, Lewis [2005] argues that the mass density link gives rise to the ‘location 
anomaly’: one can be sure that n objects are located in a region but also that, at the same 
time, not all of them will be found there upon observation (and not for practical limitations). 
Even though somehow tangent to our present concerns, these remarks show that it is not 
obvious that the spontaneous collapse theory satisfactorily solves the measurement problem.
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One last interpretation that is worth mentioning (in spite of its 
manifest lack of popularity) is the ensemble, or statistical, interpretation. 
Einstein notoriously believed that quantum mechanics could describe 
only ensembles of similarly prepared systems, and this idea has been 
developed by Ballentine [1970]. According to the ensemble 
interpretation, the wavefunction is an abstract mathematical object that 
is not directly connected to real individual systems, and only gives us 
information about the latter indirectly, by describing ideal ensembles of 
systems with the same features. Because of this, nothing can be said 
about specific physical systems given the quantum formalism. It follows 
that nothing can be said about metaphysical issues such as those 
regarding indiscemibility, identity and individuality either.
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Chapter 4 
Primitive Identity and Substrata
In the first part of the thesis, the Quinean view of identity and 
individuality was shown to be unconvincing. This chapter begins by 
offering a tentative diagnosis of why it, nevertheless, looks so attractive 
to some. It is claimed that this is the result of a misunderstanding of 
certain (legitimate) empiricist demands. This heralds the beginning of 
the second part of the thesis, based -  as explained earlier - on ‘proper’ 
metaphysics as a conceptual enterprise aimed to provide hypothetical 
accounts of the structure of reality. In this part, the view of identity and 
individuality as primitives is defended, articulated and ultimately applied 
for an interpretation of the relevant physics. In the present chapter, I 
analyse the possibility of claiming that the individuating work is 
performed by bare particulars. While - it is argued - most traditional 
criticisms raised against such a view miss their intended target, 
difficulties exist for an ontology of bare particulars related to the fact that 
the latter must be intended as necessarily attached to (some) properties if 
certain important ontological commitments are to be avoided. This leads 
one to explore the plausibility of nominalism. The last part of the chapter 
begins this exploration by examining how nominalism fares with respect 
to similarity.
1. Suchness and Thisness
Adams’ [1979] distinction between a thing’s qualities as suchnesses 
and its individuality as thisness was introduced in chapter 1. While the
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supporters of PII as a criterion of individuation attempt to get rid of the 
latter notion as otiose, according to the alternative position individuals 
are such in virtue of their possessing prim itive thisness, also called 
haecceity,;91 The analysis performed in chapters 2 and 3 has shown that 
the reduction of the individuality of things to their suchnesses is not 
supported by a priori metaphysical arguments, nor by empirical evidence. 
Identity and individuality, therefore, could plausibly be intended as 
rooted in primitive thisnesses, and an assumption to this effect will 
indeed be taken for granted in the rest of the thesis.
From this perspective, sense is immediately made of the idea that 
counterexamples to PII can be identified: on this construal, individuality 
cannot be said always to coincide with discemibility - the Principle of 
the Identity of the Indiscernibles is false -  because primitive thisnesses 
can make exactly resembling bundles numerically distinct. Of course, 
letting the quantifier in PII range over thisnesses as well is not an option, 
for it would contravene the no-trivialisation requirement specified 
earlier, according to which predicates containing reference to things’ 
identities cannot be considered when establishing facts of identity and 
distinctness.92
One clarification: to have primitive thisness/haecceity as a
metaphysical property is the same as to be an individual. The only 
difference is that individuality being a brute, primitive fact, it is best 
understood not as a property, but as a mode o f being. In Scholastic 
terminology, a mode is the necessary way in which a thing exists. The
91 This term derives from the Scholastic notion of haecceitas. According to Duns Scotus 
and his followers, haecceitates are additional metaphysical factors that individuate bundles 
of properties uniquely. It is, that is, the unique nature of instantiated (bundles of) universals. 
In contemporary use, however, haecceity has become a synonym of primitive thisness, to 
be considered as a metaphysical property that can be possessed by any particular.
92 Since primitive thisnesses can be seen as corresponding to predicates expressing self- 
identity, they are undoubtedly trivialising properties.
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difference can be explained by saying, borrowing Gracia’s words, that 
modes
“are positive determinations over and above the 
intensions of what they modify, determining its state and 
way of being, but without adding to it a new entity. [...] The 
extension of a mode does not go beyond the extension of 
what it modifies” [1988; 135].
Rejection of the Quinean-Leibnizian view indeed requires 
commitment to the view that at least some entities are such that 
individuality is their fundamental mode of being. These entities are said 
to possess primitive thisness as a metaphysical property.93
Specific advantages immediately emerge from the application of this 
view of identity and individuality to the areas that have been considered 
in the previous chapters. In general, the problem of accounting for 
(alleged) unwelcome limitations on the expressive powers of language 
does not arise. In particular, the idea that identity and individuality are 
primitive turns out to be relevant with respect to the interpretation of 
quantum mechanics: if the individuality of the particles is rooted in their 
thisnesses, then no detailed study of their properties is required for 
assessing whether or not they are individuals. In fact, it can be assumed 
that they are individuals until further evidence is brought to bear against 
a ‘traditional’ ontological understanding of the domain in question.94
93 The concept of thisness is discussed by Swinburne [1995], who provides an interesting 
analysis of possible types of individuals and of whether or not thisness is possessed by each 
of them.
941 am not claiming that quantum particles certainly are individuals. The weaker claim that 
is being put forward is that, as long as intuitions to the effect that the basic constituents of 
reality are individuals -  and that the formalism of the theory mirrors this fact -  are regarded 
as compelling, primitive thisnesses provide an acceptable basis to believe that this is truly 
the case.
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But alongside these advantages there are a number of potential 
difficulties that could be exploited for a reconsideration of the 
reductionist perspective. In particular, it seems to me, the alleged 
problems fall into three categories:
1) The notion of primitive thisness arguably violates legitimate 
empiricist requests;
2) It is arguably impossible to define a consistent ontology of 
particulars endowed with primitive thisness;
3) It is arguably impossible coherently to account for the 
elementary constituents of reality (as described by quantum 
mechanics) on the basis of such an ontology.
This chapter will be devoted to an analysis of the first problem and to 
the consideration (and rejection) of one classical response to the second, 
based on a two-category ontology of universals and bare particulars (or 
substrata).
2. Primitiveness, Empiricism and the Principle Acquaintance
The first supposed difficulty above relates to an interesting question 
that naturally arises at this point of the thesis. The question regards why 
exactly, if PII is not a necessary truth and there are good reasons not to 
take it as a true empirical generalization either, the Quinean-Leibnizian 
perspective should be seen (as it often is) as more natural and intuitively 
appealing than the competing view based upon primitive thisness. And 
why, correspondingly, in the fight of the conflict between PII and the 
evidence, what Shimony calls a ‘peaceful coexistence’ should be sought 
by sacrificing the idea that our physical theories describe individuals -  
and, consequently, individuals are what ‘populates’ the basic level of
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reality - rather than PII itself, which has not been justified on grounds 
other than it worked so far and is not violated at the level of 
commonsense, and in general by classical objects.
In his [2003], Saunders endorses what, following O’Leary-Hawthome 
and Cover [1996], he calls the generalist picture. The generalist, he 
explains, endorses
“a distinctive and uncompromising form of realism, a 
commitment to the [ontological] adequacy of purely 
descriptive concepts” [lb.; 289-290].
Van Fraassen ([1977-8] and [1991]) endorses an analogous semantic 
universaiism, that is, the thesis that all factual descriptions can be given 
completely in terms of general propositions that make no reference to 
individuals. An exemplary quotation from Van Fraassen is the following:
“At bottom, everything that can be said about the world, 
can be said in purely general statements, without modalities. 
There is no thisness beyond suchness, but every actual 
individual is individuated already by the properties it has in 
this world; hence can be denoted in principle by a definite 
description in which the quantifier ranges over actual 
existents alone. [In this perspective...] every choice of 
conventional identifications which does not violate the 
identity principle that no two existents in world a have all the 
same properties in a [is equally good; and... in] a full model, 
no proposition peculiarly about a particular entity can be 
necessary” [1977-8; Part IV].
For yet another quotation along these lines, Hintikka remarks that
“each possible world contains a number of individuals with 
certain properties and with certain relations to each other. We 
have to use these properties and relations to decide which
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member (if any) of a given possible world is identical with a 
given member of another possible world. Individuals do not 
carry their names on their foreheads; they do not identify 
themselves” [1970; 410].
All these quotations are clear expressions of the Quine-Leibniz 
reductionist position. But where do the convictions that they express 
come from? Why should one believe that our experience and science - 
which, as we have agreed, should be employed in order to characterise 
our richest non-logical vocabulary - justify the idea that qualities enjoy 
such a privileged status? By going so far as to modify our established 
interpretation of (certain elements of) reality when it clashes with this 
type of belief, and putting faith in PII ahead of all the rest, some authors 
in effect seem to embrace the view that there are a priori -  or at least 
very strong - reasons never to distrust the Quinean-Leibnizian view. And 
yet these reasons have not been explicitly formulated.
It seems to me that the reductionists’ best argument in this sense is 
one that is formulated on the basis of an important epistemological 
criterion first explicitly advocated by Russell in his early writings. Russell 
([1912; Ch. 5] and [1917]) endorses a Principle o f Acquaintance setting 
empiricist constraints on reasonable beliefs. After distinguishing 
knowledge by acquaintance (direct, non-inferential knowledge) and 
knowledge by description (knowledge that is mediated, inferred from the 
direct knowledge of something else), Russell claims that a person can 
refer determinately and with certainty only to things that s/he knows by 
acquaintance. According to Russell, the only knowledge by acquaintance 
that we have is that of sense-data. Everything else is known by 
description: a middle-sized physical object, a table for example, is only 
known indirectly for, in order to say that we know it, we need to rely on 
the proposition ‘the table is the cause of such-and-such sense data’,
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which does not refer to something we are directly acquainted with. The 
result is that only demonstratives pointing to sense-data can be taken at 
face value, and not doubted; we can only be certain, that is, about the 
impressions coming from our senses. The expressions referring to these 
are defined by Russell as logically proper names.
Of course, the Principle of Acquaintance needs to be ‘refurbished’ for 
it to satisfy the needs of the present-day empiricist. To begin with, it can 
be argued that Russell’s limitation of knowledge by acquaintance to 
sense-data is too restrictive, and that the Principle of Acquaintance can 
be relaxed so as to include at least some of the properties of physical 
objects in the range of what is known with certainty.95 Those who 
support PII as a metaphysical criterion of individuation appear indeed 
committed to such a move from phenomenalism  to (at least partial) 
direct realism  about material objects. In the context of the present 
discussion this would entail, among other things, that PII licenses 
conclusions about things out there, not (only) about complexes of sense 
data. Moreover, the range of what can be taken as warranted on the basis 
of a criterion of acquaintance must now necessarily include scientific 
claims, because it is science rather than direct experience that we take 
nowadays as the best available description of the properties of things.
These are, to be sure, highly non-trivial commitments, as direct 
realism is not a completely uncontroversial position; and it is at least 
unclear in what sense the claims of our best science are so secure that 
they can be considered as knowledge by acquaintance. However, for the 
sake of argument, this specific (neo-)Russellian approach to knowledge 
will be granted the reductionist, while noticing that, if his/her position
95 See, for example, Brewer [2001; esp. 251-255].
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fails when taking these things for granted, then it will all the more fail in 
the context of a more restrictive empiricism.
The essential point for present purposes is that the Principle of 
Acquaintance seems to clearly press one to avoid commitment to the 
existence of things that are not known (or, a fortiori, know able) directly, 
and subscribe only to claims about what is known by acquaintance. Since, 
it is suggested, we are (can be) acquainted with the qualities that things 
possess and nothing else, these latter claims must be about the things’ 
properties and nothing else. Therefore, we should explain everything 
about the world surrounding us in terms of (known) properties; and 
suspend judgment whenever this is not possible. The Principle of the 
Identity of the Indiscernibles should consequently be seen as the ‘best we 
can get’ as regards a criterion of individuation: given the characteristics 
of our epistemic access to reality, the reduction of facts of identity and 
individuality to qualitative facts is no t only plausible, but necessary.
This line of reasoning may appear correct, but I contend that it is in 
fact fallacious. On the one hand, it is questionable whether only qualities 
are known by acquaintance. On the other hand, even if this were the 
case, it would not entail a commitment to the bundle theory and PII (nor 
should it be taken to strongly push towards such a commitment).
As regards the first point, for example, Allaire ([1963] and [1965]) 
suggests that property-less particulars are known by acquaintance as the 
source of the numerical distinctness of things. He claims that:
“When presented together [two qualitatively identical 
objects...] are presented as numerically different [and t]hat 
difference is presented as is their sameness with respect to 
shape, (shade of) color, and so on. [And thus...] something 
other than a character must also be presented. That something
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is what proponents of the realistic analysis call a bare 
particular” [1963; 4].
And concludes that:
“Individuals are the carriers of numerical difference as 
directly presented to us” [lb.; 8].
It might be objected (as first done by Chappell [1964]) that Allaire’s 
reasoning is not entirely based on phenomenological description, and so 
should be rejected. This appears indeed correct. However, at the same 
time, such a reply highlights the key distinction which is essential for my 
second point.
Suppose one perceives (or, using more specific terminology, ‘is 
presented with’) a green spot. Surely, because of this, s/he can say that 
s/he is acquainted with a green sense-datum, or a green object.96 Surely, 
different explanations can be offered as regards the numerical identity of 
the green spot as one spot in the eyes of the observer, including both 
those stating, a la Allaire, that the spot is known directly as one 
independently of the properties it exhibits; and those suggesting, in 
Leibnizian-Russellian fashion, that the fact that the spot is one and is 
distinct from everything else can itself be reduced to relations among 
instantiated universals. However, in a completely analogous manner, 
whether ‘green’ is a universal, or the perceived green is an unrepeatable 
particular, also remains entirely open. But only the form er alternative 
can ground P II as a criterion o f individuation?7 It thus looks as though
96 Depending on his/her philosophical inclinations. Strictly speaking, as already explained 
when discussing Russell, talk of an ‘object’ that has the property one perceives already 
goes beyond knowledge by acquaintance. The object is inferred on the basis of one’s 
perceptions. This is the reason for Russell’s subscription to phenomenalism, much 
anticipated in the works of the great British empiricists such as Berkeley, Locke and Hume.
97 Remember the connection between PH and the bundle theory described in chapter 2.
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acquaintance in itself does not allow one to say anything about the 
ontological categories that underlie one’s experience: something 
additional to the mere data of experience is in fact required in order to 
formulate any ontological explanation. That is, analysis is needed in 
addition to the data of direct experience not only by the view postulating 
primitive thisnesses, but by the reductionist position too.
Of course, it is possible to reply that properties can be known directly 
as an ontological k ind  for example, the Russell of The Problems o f 
Philosophy [1912] took universals to be something we are acquainted 
with as soon as we experience a property. However, this would be 
insufficient to establish the truth of the bundle theory, because one also 
needs to exclude the existence of bare particulars; but once it is accepted 
that universals are known by acquaintance, it is to say the least unclear 
why one should reject Allaire’s analogous hypothesis for bare particulars 
as ‘carriers of numerical difference’.
At any rate, it seems to me much more plausible that an ontological 
view can only be arrived at by thinking, and that it is a very important 
truth that, while what is being experienced directly can (perhaps) be 
straightforwardly identified, what sort of ontological categories underlie 
this experience is not obvious and surely does not immediately follow 
from perception (as, after all, should be inferred from the general lack of 
agreement in this respect). A crucial differentiation, therefore, can and 
must be drawn between one’s object o f acquaintance and what (in terms 
o f ontological categories) exists. If it is true that a hypothesis as regards 
the latter requires analysis regardless of whether or not there is a 
correspondence between the two, it seems correct to claim, along with 
Clatterbaugh [1965] and Hochberg [1966], that the Principle o f 
Acquaintance cannot be employed to establish any ontological view
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directly. Of course, it does so indirectly, as an ontological explanation 
must not contradict the evidence obtained via perceptual experience and 
best science. However, an ontological account can never be shown to be 
true or false by only making reference to experience (and science).
Suppose one (believes that one) is directly perceiving two individual 
objects. When so presented, one is acquainted with both each object’s 
qualitative features and with a fact of numerical distinctness. This is 
something the reductionist does not reject. Given the above discussion, 
though, his/her argument can only be that, since whenever we are 
acquainted with the latter type of facts we are also acquainted with the 
former, then perhaps it is the case that, by knowing facts about the 
things’ qualities, one ipso facto also knows facts about these things’ 
identities. However, with this s/he only offers one among the available 
ontological explanations of the experienced facts. And one that can only 
be formulated on the basis of a specific metaphysical hypothesis and 
conceptual analysis, and is surely not an incontrovertible datum  of 
experience.
The foregoing reflections, I hope, have clarified the origins and true 
strength of the reductionist perspective. As far as I am concerned, in the 
light of what has been said in chapters 2 and 3, I take them to be 
sufficient to claim that accounts of reality alternative to the reductionist 
perspective might turn out to be preferable to the latter and yet remain 
wholly within the boundaries set by a sensible empiricism.
Before moving on, some remarks on the general perspective on 
metaphysics assumed in this second part of the thesis can now be 
formulated. The underdetermination of ontological explanations by 
empirical data just pointed out could be considered sufficient for 
avoiding certain questions and hypotheses altogether: this was essentially
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the basis of the condemnation of metaphysics by the members of the 
Vienna Circle. I do not think, however, that stressing the need for all our 
hypotheses, claims and questions to be rooted in reality naturally leads 
one to dispense with all forms of intellectual inquiry which are not 
wholly expressible in the form of empirical questions and 
verifiable/falsifiable statements. To the contrary, hypotheses such as 
those just considered, connected to actual facts but also containing an 
irreducible conjectural element, may have both an independent interest 
in themselves and an important potential with respect to furthering our 
knowledge of reality. In this connection, Popper’s view of metaphysics as 
playing a heuristic role appears to be more mature than the neopositivist 
complete rejection of metaphysics, as it leaves room for the purely 
conjectural to become empirically testable at a later stage, which is a 
possibility that cannot be discarded a priori?* When no empirical data at 
all can be brought to bear, on the other hand, it seems necessary to 
accept that ‘rational’ knowledge makes room for some sort of (religious, 
artistic, or what have you) intuition. It is only once it is intended as 
scepticism about the latter as a form of knowledge on a par with rational, 
empirically-based knowledge, it seems to me, that scepticism about 
metaphysics is justified.
3. Bare Particulars
The traditional alternative to the bundle theory examined in chapter 
2 holds that properties are indeed universals, but there also exist
98 In my terminology, this of course means that I conceive of the boundary between 
experimental metaphysics (i.e., very general science) and proper metaphysics as blurred 
and relative to our knowledge and practical possibilities.
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individuating bare particulars, or substrata," for those properties. This 
view is intuitively supported by the fact that drawing a distinction 
between individuals and their properties appears natural at the level of 
both experience and language. Philosophical analysis should, of course, 
be able to transcend common sense. However, it is sensible to begin the 
exploration of the possibility of avoiding acceptance of the bundle theory 
(and of all its consequences) by looking at what seems to be the most 
‘natural’ ontology from the perspective of the layman.100
A particular x, the argument in favour of bare particulars goes, must 
be distinguished from all the properties that x  exemplifies and taken as a 
property-less bearer, or ‘support’ (this is what the word ‘substratum’ 
means) for such properties.
The essential idea underlying the concept of a ‘substratum’ dates back 
to the works of Aristotle. Reflecting on the notion of substance, Aristotle 
argued in the Categories that all attributes are necessarily attributes o f 
some entity that is the subject of predication; and that, for this reason, 
the subject must be something ontologically distinct from what is 
predicated. In the M etaphysics, Aristotle elaborated on this point and 
introduced the well-known distinction between m atter and form. 
Anything in the universe, he claimed, is composed of a quantity of 
matter, which is ‘qualified’ by the particular form(s) that inhere(s) in it. 
Properties, identified with this latter formal element, were seen by 
Aristotle as dependent on matter, i.e., as in need of a material support 
and unable to exist without it. At the same time, they were said to be
99 These two expressions will be used interchangeably in what follows.
100 It must be pointed out that it is logically possible to claim that properties are bome by 
bare particulars but they are themselves particulars and not universals. However, ontologies 
in which bare particulars are introduced normally assume that properties are universals, as 
this seems to provide a relatively simple account of both individuation and similarity. In 
this section, therefore, the notion of a bare particular will be discussed under an assumption 
of realism about universals.
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essential in order for the subject to actually be something, in the sense of 
existing as one specific kind of thing rather than another. According to 
Aristotle, then, matter needs form to be qualified, and form needs matter 
to perform its very role of defining the ‘way in which things exist’. In the 
third chapter of Book Z, he writes:
“When all else is stripped off evidently nothing but matter 
remains. For the rest are affections, products, and potencies of 
bodies [...] and not substances” [1029a; 10-25].101
The ground for the move from the Aristotelian concept of matter to 
the notion of a bare particular was prepared in the 17th century by Locke. 
In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding [1690(1975)], he argues 
that the claim that substrata exist does not require complicated 
philosophical elaboration and is in fact very simple to justify as 
compelling. Along fines clearly reminiscent of Aristotle, Locke claims 
that:
“Everyone, upon inquiry into his own thoughts, will find 
that he has no idea of any substance [...and yet will have to 
admit of the existence of an] unknown support of those 
qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist 
sine re substante, without something supporting them [....
W]e call that support substantia, which according to the true 
import of the word is, in plain English, standing under or 
upholding” [lb.; Book 2, Ch. 23, Secs. 2-6].
101 Notice that Aristotle did not conceive of substances as composed of matter and form as 
two ontological ‘ingredients’. Rather, he believed that matter and form are two inseparable 
aspects of every substance. It is actually debated whether substances for Aristotle are real 
composites of matter and form or, instead, what is known as ‘substantial forms’; namely, 
the result of the individualization of universal forms, which is what gives rise to matter. At 
any rate, this has to do with Aristotelian exegesis rather than with the present discussion. 
For our purposes, it is enough to point out the matter/form distinction, and the idea that 
matter is something other than the formal, qualitative element.
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Locke generally prefers to use the word ‘substance’, but he often uses 
the term ‘substratum’ in the same sense.102 For him, a substratum acts as 
bearer of properties and individuates the latter as the properties of a 
specific individual. It is debatable whether Locke reluctantly embraced 
the notion of a substratum or tried instead to emphasise its limitations, 
and perhaps even its unacceptability. At any rate, it is the distinction 
itself, rather than the specific convictions entertained by a specific 
thinker, that we are interested in at present.
Contemporary philosophers in the analytical tradition indeed regard 
the notion of a bare particular as denoting a well-defined ontological 
category. According to some, it is in fact a necessary notion in one’s 
ontology.
Martin [1980], for instance, argues that the Lockean (but, we have 
seen, originally Aristotelian) device of ‘partial consideration’ - i.e., the 
thought of a thing under an incomplete description, in this case, qua 
bearer of properties, but deprived of all its qualities - shows that substrata 
are necessary in order for objects to exist at all. Substrata, he claims, are 
the element about the objects that determines their individuality and, 
thus, their being what they are [lb.; 6-9]. In the present context, this 
suggestion can be formulated as the idea that bare particulars are the loci 
of primitive thisness. In Bergmann’s words:
“Bare particulars neither are nor have natures. Any two of 
them are not intrinsically but only numerically different” 
[1967; 22-23].
102 See, for example, Book 1, Ch. 4, § 18; Book 2, Ch. 23, Sec. 1; Book 2, Ch. 23, Sec. 5; 
and Book 4, Ch. 6, Sec. 7. Nowadays, following Aristotle’s talk of ‘primary substances’ as 
opposed to ‘secondary substances’ as kinds of individuals, the concept of substance is 
commonly conceived of as denoting individual entities. It is therefore advisable to only use 
the term ‘substratum’ (or ‘bare particular’).
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As mentioned, the structure of our language and thought prim a facie 
confirms the plausibility of this view. Nevertheless, alleged problems 
exist for any ontology postulating bare particulars over and above 
properties that are directly related to the ontological nature of bare 
particulars themselves.
First of all, there is a supposed epistemological issue. If all we 
experience of things are properties, how can we get to know substrata? If 
we cannot, on what basis do we feel compelled to introduce them? We 
already in fact dealt with these questions in the previous section. The 
apparent force of this objection only arises from a conflation between 
levels of the sort described in the previous section. That is, a conflation 
between the domain of what we know by acquaintance and that of the 
basic ontological categories. Once one makes the plausible assumption 
that we are only acquainted with empirical facts but ontology needs 
more than that, the application of the Principle of Acquaintance as a 
guide to what facts we must acknowledge does not affect in any way the 
range of explanantes that can appear in our ontological hypotheses.
In other words, scientific/rational method correctly demands that we 
be suspicious of (alleged) entities that are not only inaccessible in our 
current epistemic situation, but epistemically inaccessible in principle. 
However, philosophical analysis might show that postulating such 
entities is necessary for explaining facts that are within our epistemic 
reach. In the case being considered, it might turn out to be not only 
perfectly legitimate but also necessary to postulate the existence of 
substrata despite Locke’s famous dictum  that a bare substratum is a 
mysterious ‘I know not what’.
LaBossiere [1994; 367-368], for example, argues that we know 
substrata by inference from the fact that we experience properties as
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belonging to the same individual and as somehow connected to each 
other. According to him, the only way to explain this while avoiding an 
infinite regress of relations is by postulating something ontologically 
distinct from properties that binds the latter together. This is due to the 
fact that the postulation of properties binding other properties appears 
unable to provide a satisfactory answer to the question regarding the 
nature of the bond; whereas substrata are postulated exactly as capable of 
binding without being in turn bound by something else.
Were one to undertake a specific examination of substrata, claims 
such as these should be assessed in detail.103 At any rate, arguments such 
as LaBossiere’s suffice to show that the epistemic status of substrata is not 
in itself a reason to steer clear of ontologies that acknowledge the 
existence of such entities. However, further objections come from a 
consideration of the ontological nature of bare particulars.
One idea that is often found in the literature is that the very concept 
of a bare particular acting as carrier of properties is inconsistent. In his 
[1952], Sellars argues that the sentence “Universals are exemplified by 
bare particulars” can only be expressed formally as 
Vjk(30(0a)—»—i3<D(<Dat)) (with at denoting a particular and O a universal). 
Sellars stresses that this formula is in effect the claim that “If a particular 
exemplifies a universal, then there is no universal it exemplifies”, which 
is obviously self-contradictory. This objection is easily answered, 
however, for of course a bare particular is only bare if it is considered in  
abstraction from the fact that it actually instantiates properties. Bare 
particulars do exemplify properties, and yet are in them selves deprived of 
any property. Indeed, the response can continue, their condition of
103 For instance, I will argue later on that the reality of a bond does not necessarily require 
an actual binding entity, and can instead be conceived of as the holding an internal relation. 
Were the latter actually die case, LaBossiere’s argument would obviously lose force.
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intrinsic bareness -  far from being contradictory with exemplification - is 
necessary for the latter to occur.
Even less weighty are those arguments that aim to reject truly bare 
particulars by noticing that if they are truly bare then they have at least 
the property of ‘being absolutely property-less’ (and in fact, given their 
ontological features, many more, such as ‘being a constituent of material 
objects’, ‘having the capability of exemplifying properties’ etc.). Surely, 
the supporter of bare particulars neither wants nor has to say that no 
properties whatsoever can be attributed to substrata (in which case, one 
could not speak about them); but just that -  in itself - a bare particular 
does not have any ‘first-order’ property. Bare particulars, that is, only 
possess non-empirical features that allow them to be given a 
metaphysical description. All ‘real’ properties are exemplified by them as 
distinct entities to which they get somehow ‘attached’.
A slightly more incisive objection is that, if substrata exist as bearers 
of real properties, then they are real themselves, and must consequently 
exist in space and time, which entails that at least one empirical property 
-  space-time location - must be attributed to them. This difficulty too, 
however, can be defused: space-time location is (normally) taken not to 
be an intrinsic property, but rather a relational property (between 
material entities and either space-time points or other entities).104 It is 
therefore possible to conceive of substrata as existing in some space-time 
‘setting’ that provides them with a specific location, and yet being 
completely devoid of any intrinsic physical content, as the view requires.
104 Of course, I am referring here, on the one hand, to the substantivalist (Newtonian) view 
that takes space-time points as individual entities that have ‘ontological priority’ over the 
entities that get located in space-time; and, on the other hand, to the relationalist 
(Leibnizian) view, according to which space-time is nothing but the ‘web’ of mutual 
relationships between the things that exist.
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Those who are not convinced by this105 can just add a specification to the 
definition of a bare particular - which does not seem crucially to affect its 
ontological status: bare particulars, they can claim, are fundamental 
- entities that have no properties whatsoever except (‘second-order’, 
logico-metaphysical ones and) space-time location.
Another criticism is that bare particulars, that are introduced (among 
other things) in order to act as individuators, cannot in fact do so. Loux 
argues that:
“As they present themselves to the substratum ontologist, 
substrata are qualitatively indiscernible, so that the entities 
supposedly guaranteeing the diversity of ordinary objects, are 
themselves subject to the very problem their introduction was 
meant to resolve” [1978; 151].
Mertz [2001], after stating the principle according to which two 
entities having exactly the same constituents are identical (he calls it the 
“‘constituent’ analog of the Identity of the Indiscernibles” [lb.; 48]), 
similarly concludes that:
“All bare particulars in having no constituents have exactly 
the same constituents and so are identical” [lb.; 52].
These criticisms, of course, cannot be avoided by attributing 
discerning empirical properties to the bare particulars in themselves, as 
the latter are assumed to be property-less. Also, even if one makes the 
(dubious) assumption that bare particulars have simpler constituents, the 
latter would, at any rate, themselves be bare particulars for which the
105 See the authors suggesting that space and time are intrinsic properties of physical objects 
mentioned in chapter 3.
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same problem would in turn arise. It seems to me that the above 
objections are nevertheless mistaken. As regards Loux, he claims that
“for the same reason the bundle theorist could not appeal 
to the identity-properties of indiscernible substances in 
explaining their diversity the substratum theorist cannot 
appeal to the identity-properties of substrata to explain their 
diversity” [1978; 151].
But this is plainly wrong. The bundle theorist cannot appeal to 
putative identity-properties of indiscernible substances because in 
his/her view the latter are bundles of universals, and universals lack the 
required identity-properties by definition. The idea of a bare particular is, 
to the contrary, specifically introduced in order to be able to refer to 
well-defined identities without the need for a reductionist explanation. 
The fact that bare particulars can be regarded as possessing primitive 
thisness undermines the analogy which Loux’s argument is based on.
As regards Mertz’s objection, the principle invoked by Mertz is 
certainly correct if it is intended as entailing that things with 
num erically the same constituents are identical. But Mertz is in effect 
only in a position to claim that bare particulars have the same num ber of 
constituents. And, given this, one can follow Sider in specifying that to 
endorse the idea of a bare particular
“does not mean accepting distinct individuals with the 
same parts, of course [...], since each individual is its own 
part” [2006; 394, fn. 1]
and then add that for these parts too (indiscemibility 
notwithstanding) numerical distinctness is determined by the fact that 
each one of them is endowed with primitive thisness. Hence, Mertz’s
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‘constituent analogue of the Identity of the Indiscernibles’ fails to entail 
the numerical identity of all bare particulars.
A different attack against bare particulars comes from a consideration 
of their relationships with properties. Bare particulars are variously said 
to ‘instantiate’, ‘exemplify’, ‘be tied to’ or ‘bind’ properties. But is the 
positing of these relations (which, I take it, can be considered equivalent 
to each other) enough satisfactorily to explain the nature of things as 
‘possessing’ qualities?
In objecting to what Moreland [1998; 260] calls the ‘tied to’ relation, 
Mertz [2001] answers negatively. Mertz argues that, since a bare 
particular is
“devoid of all intension or content [...,] there is no reason 
why both Round and Square could not by tied-to [it]” [lb.; 50-
51]-
But the latter scenario must be ruled out as impossible, and so an 
ontology of bare particulars must be incorrect, for it is incapable of 
providing an explanation of a basic truth about reality.
I take this to be a weak criticism. Intending to invalidate the reply 
that the mentioned impossibility is due to the nature of properties, Mertz 
points out that it is perfectly possible to claim both that ‘Round is 
contrary to Triangle’ and that ‘Square is contrary to Triangle’, so 
connecting contradictory properties to the same relatum  via the same 
relation. Therefore, Mertz concludes, the problem must regard bare 
particulars. However, this argument is not compelling. Ontologies 
without substrata must equally explain why certain properties are never 
bundled together. And if (as suggested by Mertz’s reference to the need 
for some ‘content’) a satisfactory response can be given along the lines
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that it is simply a fact about the world that for every determinable (say 
‘Shape’) there can only be one determinate (say, ‘Square’) for each 
particular; such a response will suffice independently of one’s 
understanding of ‘particular’. That is, it will work in the case of bare 
particulars as in any other ontological account, for the described ‘mutual 
exclusion’ just depends on the way properties ‘work’.
A related objection (see, again, Mertz [1996; 163-173]) is that, once 
one introduces an exemplification relation between particulars and 
properties, then an infinite regress arises as soon as we attempt to 
account for the relation between the exemplification relation and each 
one of its relata. In formulating the objection, Mertz explicitly refers to 
Russell and Bradley. Bradley’s well-known regress [1908; esp. 21-25] 
appears particularly relevant here. Bradley assumed that
1) Whenever entities stand in a relationship there is a further 
entity, a relation, in virtue of which these entities are related; 
and that
2) Relations are universals that are instantiated (exemplified) by 
their relata.
Since, he claimed, 2) entails that relations are related to their relata, 
by 1) the existence of one relation requires the existence of two other 
relations, and so on ad infinitum . Since this is unacceptable, Bradley 
concluded, relations are not real. Mertz applies this reasoning to the 
exemplification relation, suggesting not that it is not real, but rather that 
to posit bare particulars exemplifying properties has intolerable 
consequences, and one should therefore avoid doing so.
However, it seems to me that to assume that substrata can become 
tied to properties without giving rise to infinite regresses of ‘tied to’ 
relations is perfectly possible. Substrata constitute an ontological
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category of their own, and to attribute this peculiar feature to them is 
certainly legitimate. Mertz could reply that this is ad hoc, but one may 
respond in turn that the ad hocness is inevitable, in the sense that 
substrata m ust be posited as entities with this peculiarity if one wants to 
have a satisfactory ontological explanation of the fact that particulars 
have properties at all. Also, having recourse to a ‘tu quoque type of 
counter-argument, it can be objected to Mertz that -  once the reasoning 
leading to Bradley’s regress is accepted - it is at least equally ad hoc to 
assume that regresses do not arise with respect to the compresence 
relation which is necessary (in order to explain how distinct property- 
instances give rise to individuals) in ontologies with properties only.106
On the other hand, I take it that a much more satisfactory answer 
would be simply to deny that the connection is determined by a real 
entity. As we have seen, LaBossiere, for example, claims that it is 
perfectly plausible to conceive of bare particulars as possessing 
primitively a ‘binding ability’ which is not itself a property to be ‘reified’ 
(exactly in the same way as they possess numerical identity primitively) 
[1994; 364]. Similarly, Sider argues that substratum theorists need not 
and should not reify instantiation, as they can perfectly well take it as a 
primitive part of their ‘ideology’ [2006; 388].
A more interesting problem arises from the fact that if bare 
particulars constitute an autonomous ontological category, absolutely 
independent of properties for their existence, then the substratum 
ontologist must provide an explanation for the impossibility of bare 
particulars that do not instantiate any properties.
106 In the latter case, one may add, the ‘connecting’ relations would be of the same 
ontological kind as the connected entities, i.e., universals, and the potential for an infinite 
regress seems even more evident.
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Against this, Sider argues that it could be in the essence of a bare 
particular to instantiate properties; he adds that if this is taken to amount 
to an ad hoc assumption as to the impossibility of truly bare particulars, 
then the analogous claim that there cannot exist non-bundled universals, 
necessary for the bundle theorist, must be seen as equally unacceptable 
[lb.; 390-392].
My opinion is, at any rate, that truly bare particulars in fact pose no 
problem for the substratum theorist, independently of any specific 
metaphysical assumption of (im)possibility, at least once it is denied that 
bare particulars are known by acquaintance. In this case, it makes perfect 
sense to claim that bare particulars can exist without exemplifying 
properties, and yet we only know them when they do. More specifically, 
one can legitimately claim that bare particulars are the cause of our 
experiencing numerical distinctness; that is, of our recognizing distinct 
individuals as such, but they can only be objects of experience when they 
are parts of complexes also instantiating properties.107
The criticisms usually raised against the notion of substratum can, it 
seems, all be met. Admittedly, though, what has just been said by way of 
answer to the objection against bare particulars not instantiating any 
property allows to see that further considerations might, after all, make a 
commitment to substrata uncomfortable.
In his [1990], Campbell argues that:
107 Notice that this positing of real but in principle unknowable entities seems to be less 
problematic than the analogous claim, that the bundle theorists might be forced to make -  
perhaps in order to avoid counter-objections such as Sider’s above, that non-bundled 
universal-instances can exist and yet we only know them when bundled with other 
universal-instances. For in this latter case it is, to say the least, unclear why an instance of a 
universal should only be knowable when compresent with other universal-instances, given 
that any universal-instance has ‘empirical content’ and should, consequently, be 
epistemically accessible independently of the relations it enters into with other instances of 
universals.
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“All causal action is exerted by way of the properties of 
things and all effects are effects on the properties of things.
The substratum, precisely because it is without properties, 
including passive powers, ought to be totally im m une to all 
causal activity. A  fortiori\ it ought to be unscathed by every 
destructive process. Yet if we introduce metaphysically 
indestructible substrata, we are undertaking a priori natural 
philosophy of a most discreditable kind. What items can you 
produce or postulate, belonging to the natural order, that are 
necessarily immune from destructive alteration?” [Ib.; 9].
One way of formulating a potential problem with bare particulars is, 
then, to say that by admitting of them as entities not instantiating any 
property, not only do we accept the possibility that something exists 
which is in principle unknowable. We are also forced to accept that this 
something remains forever outside the natural order of things, essentially 
based on the possibility of change, interaction, creation and destruction.
One may respond that this is by no means a problematic assumption 
to make. For example, it is possible to hypothesise that whenever an 
individual ceases to exist, in fact its bare ‘core’ continues to be an actual 
entity. After all, we have seen earlier that truly bare particulars do not 
necessary represent an unconceivable possibility. Still, Campbell has a 
point in emphasising that bare particulars seem to be endowed with a 
peculiar feature the avoidance of which in one’s ontology is likely to 
appear welcome to everyone.
While that bare particulars do not have causal efficacy appears to be 
an unavoidable assumption, one might try to reject Campbell’s reasoning 
by denying that all causal action is on properties. Perhaps it is also the 
case that properties can causally affect bare particulars. However, it 
appears difficult to develop even the basic outlines of a theory of causal 
interaction between bare particulars and properties. It seems that, by the 
bare particularisms own admission, the only relation between properties
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and bare particulars is that of exemplification. Surely, this cannot mean 
that the needed account cannot be formulated.108 For the time being, at 
any rate, a different response to Campbell’s objection appears much more 
plausible.
LaBossiere suggests that Campbell’s argument can be answered by 
claiming either that each bare particular exemplifies at least one property 
necessarily, or that each bare particular exemplifies necessarily at least 
one property (i.e., cannot be property-less, and whenever it loses a 
property it gains another one) [1994; 370]. This is possible, and indeed 
re-establishes the acceptability of bare particulars. But at a non-negligible 
price: that of making bare particulars existentially dependent on entities 
(properties) that are instead commonly regarded as subordinate to them. 
Such dependence might be considered unproblematic: for instance, Sider 
(as mentioned before) suggests that - in spite of a widespread 
understanding of the distinction - what is known as a thin  (as opposed to 
a thick) particular109 can and should be conceived of as only bare at the 
conceptual level. He claims that, despite the fact that it must be thought 
of in abstraction from the properties it exemplifies,
“[t]he intrinsic nature of a thin particular is given by the 
monadic universals it instantiates” [2006; 389].
Questions regarding the plausibility of Sider’s understanding of thin 
particulars aside, however, further analysis shows that this type of 
response to Campbell’s difficulty is in fact unavailable for the bare 
particular theorist. For, if bare particulars are existentially dependent on
108 In which case, the rest of this section would lose its force, but the problem pointed out in 
the next would remain.
109 The distinction is due to Armstrong. He takes the thin particular to be the “thing taken in 
abstraction from all its properties” [1978; 114], and the thick particular to be the “particular 
taken along with all and only the particular’s non-relational properties” [1997; 124].
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one or more of their properties, then one has two alternatives, both of 
which turn out to be unsatisfactory.
If properties are universals, then bare particulars are existentially 
dependent on specific instances of universals. But since bare particulars 
act as individuators of concrete particulars and universal-instances are 
made distinct from other universal-instances by the fact that they belong 
to a specific concrete particular, it follows that it is the fact of being 
exemplified by a specific bare particular that individuates universal- 
instances. Hence, we a have circularity: the bare particularist claims that 
bare particular x  exists because of the fact that (or insofar as) it 
instantiates property-instances a, b, c,.... But s/he is also forced (by the 
nature of universals and his/her views on individuation) to say that 
universals A, B, C,... are instantiated as a, b, c,... because the latter 
instances are exemplified by x.
If properties are tropes110, instead, then on a construal such as that 
suggested by LaBossiere and Sider the particularity of the tropes attached 
to the bare particular (particularity which is primitive and not itself 
caused by the bare particular) grants the existence of the latter. But what 
role does the bare particular play, then? Perhaps, as LaBossiere contends, 
a bare particular does not individuate, but unifies tropes in a single 
concrete particular. The internal unity of substances too, however, 
appears to be warranted here independently of bare particulars: if bare 
particulars exist only thanks to n  tropes being ‘glued’ to them, then the 
tropes are ‘doing something together’, as it were, independently of the 
bare particular and, specifically, prior to the existence of the latter. The 
step from this to the idea that bare particulars simply play no additional
110 That is, particularised qualities which admit of numerical distinctness in spite of exact 
similarity. See Stout [1921] and [1923], Williams [1953], Campbell [1981] and [1990], 
Simons [1994].
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role to that of tropes at all, and can therefore be dispensed with 
altogether is, of course, very short.111
Thus, we see that the sort of existential dependence of bare 
particulars on properties envisaged by LaBossiere to overcome 
Campbell’s objection (and also supported by Sider) is not only 
unappealing for reasons having to do wdth the usual understanding of 
thin particularity, but also not viable. The bare particular ontologist who 
wants coherently to subscribe to the theory must therefore admit that 
bare particulars exist completely unaffected by change (or, alternatively, 
provide an account of how properties can causally affect bare particulars, 
which appears rather difficult, if not impossible, to formulate).
An analogous difficulty comes from the consideration of possible 
worlds and trans-world identity, and has to do with the idea of a ‘bare 
identity’.
Chisholm [1967] argues that if two individuals a and b in the actual 
world do not have any essential properties, then there can be a possible 
world in which a and b ‘switch roles’, that is, exchange all their 
properties without also exchanging their identities. But then one is 
forced to admit of ‘bare identities’, that is, of things whose identities are 
determined independently of their properties. Truly bare particulars, 
obviously enough, must possess bare identities, as they (in the established 
understanding) do not have any properties essentially attached to them. 
But since according to the ontologies with bare particulars the latter are 
the ‘cause’ of the things’ identities, it follows that all individuals have 
bare identities in these ontologies. Is this something we are ready to 
accept?
111 The most promising way to make this step is via the postulation of an internal relation 
connecting the tropes directly (see Simons [1994] and Denkel [1997]). More on this in the 
next chapter.
139
The scenario just described is, of course, connected to what is known 
as haecceitism. Kaplan takes the latter as the
“doctrine that holds that it does make sense to ask -  
without reference to common attributes and behaviour - 
whether this is the same individual in another possible world” 
[1975; 722].112
While surely not inconsistent, Chisholm seems to suggest, a 
commitment to bare identities is unappealing because it entails strong 
haecceitism, which severs the link between the identities of things and 
their properties entirely. Weak, or moderate, haecceitism leaves instead 
some space for properties to determine the things’ identities and is, for 
this reason, to be preferred. Would we be ready to accept that, say, 
Socrates would have been Socrates even if the bare particular 
constituting him had not been tied to any of the properties actually 
exhibited by Socrates (not even, say, manhood)? It seems not. Indeed, we 
tend to think that an entity would not have been the same (not only not 
the same kind of) entity if it did not have at least some of the features it 
actually has (and especially so in the case of human beings).113
The important point for present purposes is that in this case too, in 
order to avoid what seems to be a clearly undesirable consequence, bare 
particulars need to be connected to some properties. In the case of
112 See also Lewis [1986; 221].
113 See the treatment of haecceitism in Adams [1979] and Ten Elshof [2000]. Davis [2004] 
formulates a related objection: he argues that if a concrete particular x has a specific bare 
particular as its individuating constituent, this means that the bare particular in question is 
necessarily the individuator of x; but this entails in turn that the bare particular has the 
property of ‘being the individuator of jc’ in every possible world, which makes it essentially 
connoted by an impure property that presupposes exactly what needs foundation, namely, 
the identity of x. The present difficulty is, however, even more fundamental, as it has to do 
with the fact that the bare particular can be regarded as being x. In other words, while Davis 
is assuming the weak haecceitistic idea that a bare particular identifies the concrete 
particular it happens to constitute insofar as the latter is a particular with specific properties, 
the real problem is that truly bare particulars identify the concrete particulars they constitute 
independently o f any property.
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Socrates, for instance, one may include manhood, and perhaps other 
properties (being a philosopher, having been accused by the Athenians, 
having died on 399 B.C. etc.), in the ‘nucleus’ of properties essential to 
him, and so necessarily tied to the bare particular constituting him. 
However, this entails, again, an ontic dependence of bare particulars on 
at least some properties.
If this dependence is intended in the existential sense, the difficulty 
considered in the previous section re-emerges. Perhaps the dependence 
can be intended not in the sense that the bare particular would not exist 
at all if it did not exemplify certain properties, but rather in the sense 
that it would not in that case exist as the entity constituting that 
particular object, i.e., as the individuator of that specific entity which it is 
one of the constituents of. However, since every bare particular 
exclusively exists as a property-less entity provided with a primitive 
identity thanks to which it individuates the complex it is part of, this is 
equivalent to the claim that the bare particular does not exist if not 
connected to certain properties, and we again have the problem of 
existential dependence.114
The only alternative remaining is to maintain that bare particulars are 
not dependent on any properties for their identity and existence and yet, 
for some reason, the identity of an object is determined by its bare 
particular only once the latter is tied  to certain properties. That is, that 
although bare particulars are fully autonomous entities, the individuating 
work is not done by bare particulars alone. But if such work is not
114 For, if an entity only exists as something with a function, the fact that it cannot perform 
such a function unless certain circumstances are the case makes the entity existentially 
dependent on those circumstances and their subjects. Since the individuating function of 
bare particulars depends, obviously enough, on their identities, one can also formulate the 
present criticism as the claim that bare particulars are existentially dependent on properties 
because they are dependent on them for their identities. The idea that identity-dependence 
is constitutive of existential dependence appears very plausible. It is defended, for instance, 
by Lowe ([1998; esp. Ch. 6] and [2005]).
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entirely done by bare particulars, why not say that individuation does 
not require a bare particular at alP.
As in the case of the previous difficulty, one may object that the 
things’ identities may be determined independently of bare particulars 
(e.g., by their properties as unique particulars, or by their locations), but 
bare particulars are still needed as the ‘unifying factors’ making it 
possible that scattered properties give rise to unitary objects. However, it 
is at least unclear why the unifying factor must be reified: both for 
universals and tropes, internal relations may legitimately be invoked 
‘gluing’ the properties together into a single concrete particular. This 
becomes especially plausible if a lot of metaphysical work has been 
already attributed to properties that bare particulars were, on a first 
instance, expected to do.
In the case of the difficulty with strong haecceitism too, therefore, 
the bare particularist must either accept a strong metaphysical doctrine 
entirely a priori, or acknowledge a form of dependence between bare 
particulars and properties that undermines the world-picture s/he 
subscribes to. Where does all this leave us?
I see the situation as follows. It has been established earlier that any 
ontological explanation of the basic facts we want our ontology to 
explain can only be evaluated on the basis of philosophical analysis, not 
on the basis of a criterion of acquaintance (provided, of course, that such 
an explanation is compatible with the available empirical evidence). This 
means that, given the same facts as explananda, several ontological views 
acting as empirically equivalent explanantes should be compared on 
grounds other than explanatory power. That is, on the basis of criteria 
such as internal consistency, simplicity, economy, entailed consequences
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and so on. It is exactly an evaluation of different ontological accounts 
along these lines that this second section of the thesis aims to offer.
Now, in chapters 2 and 3 I suggested that the bundle theory in its 
canonical (and most plausible) formulation fares badly already at the 
explanatory level: in particular, as far as an account of individuation is 
concerned. The bundle theory, as we have seen, is committed to a 
principle, PII, that has not been convincingly shown to be necessarily 
true and also appears in conflict with the empirical evidence. To avoid 
this latter conflict and stick to PII, in particular, the bundle theorist is 
forced to either re-describe reality in terms of undeniably less intuitive 
ontological categories; or choose a specific physical theory as the 
(approximately) true description of reality on the basis of extra-scientific 
elements.
In this chapter, I argued that to have recourse to bare particulars does 
not appear a very good choice either, this time for reasons having to do 
with ontological economy and with the nature of the posited entities. On 
the one hand, an ontology of bare particulars requires commitment to 
two basic categories -  particulars and properties; on the other hand, even 
though it can avoid doing so without inconsistency (by endorsing an a 
priori thesis to the effect that bare particulars are unaffected by change, 
and strong haecceitism), such an ontology is likely to make one of the 
posited categories (bare particulars) essentially dependent on the other 
(properties). But if this is actually the case, then one is led seriously to 
question the very idea of an ontology with bare particulars (also recall, in 
connection to this, the traditional doubt concerning bare particulars as 
unknowable in themselves). Obviously enough, this in turn requires the 
individuation of plausible alternatives. The option emerges at this point 
of considering whether the truly best available ontological explanation of
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reality is a one-category ontology with neither bare particulars nor 
universals.115
A moment’s reflection on the available categories suffices to show 
that this means that it is now necessary to evaluate the viability and 
strength of a nom inalist ontology: namely, one that denies that 
properties are universals, and states instead that only (non-bare) 
particulars exist. Specifically, we need to see whether it is possible to 
endorse a nominalist ontology and satisfactorily explain individuation, 
similarity and the unity of properties in complex entities as is required 
from any ontology, while avoiding inconsistency and implausibility in 
the light of the evidence and also maximizing economy, simplicity and 
avoidance of ‘collateral’ ontological commitments. Were this the case, 
one would clearly obtain an overall picture which is preferable to those 
considered so far.
Of course, nominalism straightforwardly accounts for the dynamics 
of individuation. In a nominalistic setting, it is just a basic fact that 
particulars exist; and the fact that they (or at least some of them) are self­
identical and numerically distinct from everything else can equally be 
regarded as fundamental. It is equally obvious, on the other hand, that 
the main difficulty for a perspective that does away with universals is 
that of explaining similarity. In the remainder of this chapter, I will 
argue that universals are in fact not needed in order to account for 
similarity, and that nominalists have a perfectly plausible story to tell 
regarding facts of resemblance.116
115 As the bundle theory and ontologies with both bare particulars and universals, 
considered so far, are the only possible ontologies compatible with realism about universals.
116 The nature of complex particulars in a nominalist setting will be dealt with in the next 
chapter, where a specific form of nominalism will be endorsed and articulated.
144
4. Sim ilarity and the A lleged Indispensability o f Universals
The argument in favour of the idea that it is necessary to commit 
oneself to the existence of universals might be seen as a sort of 
indispensability argument. Such arguments conclude that some kind of 
entity must exist by showing that the assumption that it does exist 
cannot be dispensed with without explanatory loss in some domain. A 
classic example is the argument for the reality of numbers on the basis 
that eliminating numbers from our postulated ontology would leave 
physics severely impoverished.117
The idea that only the existence of universals can explain the 
resemblances among things that we experience has indeed been the 
starting point for the realist view of universals from Plato onwards. 
However, what sort of indispensability one is talking about, and whether 
universals are really indispensable are questions that require detailed 
analysis.
One way of trying to establish the indispensability of universals 
might be (and has often been claimed to be) through a consideration of 
ordinary language. Indeed, we use the same word to refer to what we 
consider the same property exemplified by many individuals. However, 
as mentioned in chapter 1, Ramsey [1925] famously argued (in opposition 
to Russell) that there is in fact no valid argument to the effect that the 
structures o f our language show that universals must exist. The fact that 
our usual way of talking makes a distinction between particulars as 
subjects and universals as attributes cannot -  in itself - be taken to point 
to an intrinsic difference between two ontological categories. A 
proposition such as ‘Socrates is wise’, Ramsey explains, is completely
117 See, for instance, Quine [1960a] and Putnam [1979].
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equivalent to the (albeit less frequently used) proposition ‘Wisdom is a 
property of Socrates’. In this alternative rendering, what is commonly 
considered to denote a universal becomes the subject of discourse, and so 
the alleged correspondence between linguistic structures and ontological 
ones is immediately undermined.
Quine’s [1953] argument against the necessity of universals is rooted 
in a different but related idea, connected to his general views about 
language and ontological commitment. In his words,
“entities o f a given sort are assumed by a theory i f  and only 
i f  some o f them  m ust be counted among the values o f the 
variables in  order that the statem ents affirm ed in  the theory 
be true [...; one...] frees himself from ontological
commitment [...if...] he shows how some particular use which 
he makes of quantification, involving a prima facie 
commitment to certain objects, can be expanded into an idiom 
innocent of such commitments” [lb.; 103].
In the light of this, it
“may happen that [...the...] method of abstracting 
universals is quite reconcilable with nominalism, the 
philosophy according to which there are really no universals 
at all. For the universals may be regarded as entering here 
merely as a manner of speaking -  through the metaphorical 
use of the identity sign for what is really not identity but 
[qualitative] sameness” [lb.; 117-118].
Quine’s idea is thus that quantification determines the only criterion 
for ontological commitment; and that, since it is not necessary to 
quantify over abstract entities (and it is in fact possible systematically to 
eliminate everything that is abstract from the range of one’s
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quantifications), this criterion fails to provide a basis for realism about 
universals.
Ramsey’s and Quine’s analyses complement each other in an 
interesting way. Ramsey’s aim is to undermine the belief in an alleged 
one-to-one correspondence between linguistic and ontological 
categories; Quine gives support to the idea that there is no such 
correspondence by showing that our language can be replaced without 
cognitive loss by a language where one category (that of abstract nouns) 
does not play any role whatsoever.118
An obvious rejoinder is that language does not necessarily mirror 
reality, and yet the more frequently used structures of language have 
been shaped in the light of true facts about types of entities: in particular, 
regardless of language, there appear to exist entities that have the 
peculiar feature of being m ultiply instantiable, that other entities do not 
have. As to Ramsey’s argument, then, it is true that ‘Socrates is wise’ can 
be reformulated as ‘Wisdom is a property of Socrates’, where ‘Wisdom’ 
appears as the subject of the sentence; nonetheless the property denoted 
by ‘Wisdom’ retains its peculiarity of being attributable to many 
individuals besides Socrates. Similarly, against Quine it might be objected 
that, even though the use of abstract terms can be consistently avoided, 
an explanation of why we normally use the same words and concepts to 
refer to entities apparently exemplified by many, distinct individuals - 
that we take to be sim ilar in that respect - is still required.
All this seems to license the conclusion that considerations about 
language cannot be used for determining conclusions about ontological
1,8 It is fair to point out, though, that Quine did not suggest that nominalism is the correct 
ontology. Despite his general scepticism about abstract entities (see the paper he wrote with 
Goodman [1947]), his point appears rather to be that whatever type of entity can be 
consistently eliminated from die range of the quantifiers in one’s language can accordingly 
be excluded from one’s ontological commitments. As a consequence, there is in particular 
no reason to believe in the reality of universals.
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matters of fact, no matter whether they appear to count in favour of an 
ontological commitment or in support of the dispensability of a certain 
ontological category.119 Realism about universals, in particular, is not 
established by linguistic analysis but neither is it refuted by it. It is thus a 
direct ontological analysis of facts of similarity, rather than an 
examination of the ways in which we express them via our language, that 
must be undertaken in order to establish whether realism about 
universals is compelling or not.
The basic ontological argument in favour of universals is that the 
similarities between particular things require the postulation of multiply 
instantiable entities. It is the celebrated one-over-many argument; first 
devised by Plato.120 The argument can be formulated as follows:
1) Any property P exemplified by a particular is ontologically 
distinct from that particular;
2) Since it can (and does in fact) happen that many particulars all 
have the same property P, P can be (is) exemplified by more 
than one thing at the same time;
3) Therefore, P is separate and distinct from each particular and 
is a ‘one-over-many’;
4) Since P must always be available for predication, an entity 
exists that is the most perfect case of P-ness, and it is 
everlasting;
5) Whatever is, like P, a one-over-many, separated, and 
everlasting entity that gets exemplified by concrete particulars 
is a form (i.e., a universal);
119 This need not be read as a general statement. Even though I am sceptic about the 
ontological significance of linguistic analysis tout court, it suffices here to regard the 
presented conclusion as holding in the case of the debate over realism about universals.
120 It is commonly agreed that Plato first introduced it and what he called Forms in his 
Phaedo [65d4-66a3].
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6) Therefore, every actual property is in reality an instantiated 
form.
In particular, Plato believed in the existence of a world -  distinct 
from ours - constituted only of unchanging, perfect and unique forms, or 
Ideas. It is open to debate whether for Plato forms are predicable of 
themselves or just ‘are what they are’ (that is, whether or not self­
predication reduces to identity in the case of forms); and whether they 
are always simple or instead -  at least in some cases -  complexes that 
admit of some degree of analysis. However, it is uncontroversial that 
Plato holds that all the things in the universe we inhabit are related to 
the forms by a special relation, that of partaking. Considering, for 
instance, the property of being beautiful in its relation to the idea of 
Beauty, Plato has Socrates say:
“It seems to me that if anything else is beautiful besides 
Beauty Itself, it is beautiful on account of nothing else than 
because it partakes of Beauty Itself. And I speak in the same 
way about everything else” [100c3-7].
As shown by the reasoning summarized in 1) - 6) above, endorsing 
such a metaphysical picture allegedly allowed Plato to explain similarity 
across multiplicity, that is, why the same property can be predicated of 
many subjects and also be exemplified in different ways by different 
subjects. The Platonic view of properties, however, meets with well- 
known problems: if properties are conceived of as ideas actually existing 
in a heavenly realm distinct from the actual world (more generally, and 
to use the technical definition, if they exist as ante res universals), an 
explanation of the relation between them and what we experience must 
be given. But this explanation seems impossible to develop due to the 
inevitability of infinite regresses of the sort hinted at earlier when
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discussing the exemplification relation between bare particulars and 
properties. Plato himself realized this in his Parmenides, where [131e- 
133a] he laid the basis for the argument that, thanks to Aristotle, came to 
be known as the third man argument. The classical rendering of this 
argument (which gives the name to the argument itself) concerns the 
universal ‘manhood’, or ‘being a man’:
1) If at is a man, at is a man in virtue of x s  participating in the 
form of manhood, and this form is a paradigm of which a t  is a 
likeness;
2) Paradigms and their likenesses are similar to one another (to 
varying degrees);
3) If any two things are similar to one another, they are similar 
by participating in some one form;
4) Therefore, if x  and manhood are similar to one another, there
is some further form in which they both participate that
makes them similar;
5) Therefore, there is another form of manhood, call it level-2 
manhood, in which a t  and the initial (call it level-1) manhood 
both participate, and in virtue of which they are similar;
6) (...and so on ad infinitum ).
In the light of this reasoning, Aristotle rejected transcendental' ante
res universals and argued that properties should, instead, be understood 
as im m anent (in rebus). That is, that universals are real entities, but they 
do not have to be -  indeed they cannot be - distinct from their instances; 
instead, they are ‘fully present’ in those instances.121 This move avoids 
the third man argument, since universal forms and particular qualities
121 For Aristotle, then, in rebus universals constitute the formal element that qualifies matter.
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(instantiated by real objects) are numerically identical (not just similar) 
and for this latter type of fact no explanation is required.
Even though several contemporary authors, aptly modifying or 
defending the Platonic account of the relationships between universals 
and actual entities, still endorse ante res realism about universals122, it is 
this Aristotelian perspective that appears more plausible nowadays. The 
most strenuous current defender of realism about universals along 
Aristotelian lines is undoubtedly Armstrong (see, for example, his [1978] 
and [1989]). He presents his position as an a posteriori (or ‘scientific’) 
immanent realism about universals: he believes that there is no 
automatic correlation between predicates and universals123, and that we 
need to discover which universals really exist (namely, which predicates 
truly correspond to real properties) through the empirical work of 
science.
Understood this way, universals do not appear to be clearly 
dispensable in one’s ontology. As a matter of fact, within immanent 
realism the one-over-many intuition appears to be developed in strong 
enough a way to suggest that universals might in fact represent the best 
explanation for facts of resemblance.
On the other hand, the indispensability of universals has not been 
established yet. Indeed, since the ontological indispensability of entity(- 
type) x  entails that there are some facts that cannot be explained except 
by appeal to x ; the non-indispensability of x  can still be demonstrated by 
showing that the same facts can be explained by entities other than x
122 See for example Plantinga [1974], Bealer [1982], Hale [1987], Tooley [1987] and 
Grossmann [1992]. There exists a further distinction: Theistic Platonists, such as Plantinga, 
hold that Platonic abstract entities exist in God’s mind. Atheist Platonists, such as Tooley, 
believe that they exist independently of any mind.
123 This characterizes what is known as a sparse, as opposed to an abundant, conception of 
properties. This distinction was first made explicit by Lewis [1986; 59-69].
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without any other disadvantage. If this turned out to be the case, then 
methodological considerations could be brought to bear (which could 
take into account the fact that universals constitute a very peculiar 
ontological category of multiply instantiable entities).
We thus need to ask whether facts of similarity can be accounted for 
without appeal to universals; that is, whether a plausible nominalist 
account of similarity can be formulated.
5. Sim ilarity and Nominalism
The realist view of universals, whether Platonic or Aristotelian, has 
been criticised and rejected in favour of various sorts of 
nominalism/conceptualism by many thinkers since the Middle Ages. In 
the 1 l th/12th century Roscelin said that universals are nothing but a ‘flatus 
vocis’; and nominalism was also supported, in various versions, by Peter 
Abailard in the same period, John of Salisbury a few decades later and 
other thinkers. British empiricists of the 17th and 18th century, most 
notably Locke and Hume, rejected universals as hypostatizations of 
‘abstract ideas’, produced in the mind by the repetition of certain 
individual sense-perceptions, or ‘impressions’. Locke, for instance, 
claimed that:
“The mind makes the particular ideas, received from 
particular objects, to become general; which is done by 
considering them as they are in the mind such appearances, 
separate from all other existences, and the circumstances of 
real existence, as time, place, or any other concomitant ideas.
This is called abstraction, whereby ideas taken from particular 
beings, become general representatives of all of the same kind; 
and their names, general names, applicable to whatever exists
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conformable to such abstract ideas” [1690(1975); Book II, Ch.
9, Sec. 9].
Currently, there are two forms of nominalism. One claims that all 
that exists are particular substances, and properties are derivative on the 
particulars that exist and hence do not constitute an independent 
ontological category (consequently, it is also denied that bare particulars 
exist). The other claims that only particular property-instances exist, and 
all individuals are bundles of such instances. These two proposals are 
Resemblance Nominalism  and Trope Theory,; respectively. The former 
can be traced to Carnap and was later developed by Price [1953] and, 
more recently, Rodriguez-Pereyra [2002]. The latter appears in the work 
of Stout in the 1920s (see Stout [1921] and [1923]), and then of (among 
others) Williams (see Williams [1953]), Campbell (see Campbell [1981] 
and [1990]) and Simons [1994]. While the two views will be looked at in 
more detail in the next chapter, for the time being it is necessary to see 
how they fare with respect to similarity; to do this, no internal 
distinction within the nominalist camp needs to be drawn.
Any nominalist must find a way to avoid what is known as ‘Russell’s 
regress’. According to Russell [1912; Ch. 9], if properties are not 
universals, then we need to explain why things resemble each other with 
respect to properties. If the answer is that there exist specific 
resemblances among particulars, then an account is needed of what 
makes each resembling pair exhibit the same relation, i.e., a resemblance 
relation. However, if positing infinite particular instances of resemblance 
(among particulars, then among resemblances among particulars, then 
among resemblances among resemblances among particulars, and so on) 
is to be avoided, this is likely to be done in terms of resemblance as a 
universal. But this move is exactly what nominalists attempt to avoid: if
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they acknowledge the need for one universal, then their basic claim that 
universals are just useful fictions that can be consistently dispensed with 
becomes fatally weakened.124
My opinion is that Russell’s regress does not arise. It is plausible to 
claim that an ontological explanation of similarity simply does not 
require a commitment to the existence of additional entities. The claim I 
wish to defend is, in particular, that a resembles b exclusively in virtue of 
a and b and the way they are, and nothing more needs to be said about 
the matter. Similarity, that is, is a primitive fact completely supervenient 
upon the natures of the similar entities.
This account is neither uninformative nor simplistic. It can perhaps 
be best illustrated via a consideration of our epistemic access to 
similarities among everyday objects. Would we say that we experience 
things as similar or dissimilar because we experience or fail to experience 
a similarity relation holding among them? It seems not. The similarity 
between two objects, it seems, is established by experiencing them 
separately and acknowledging the fact that they have the same ‘causal’125 
powers with respect to the things around them. This latter sameness, 
however, does not seem to require an analysis, and to be something that 
can be regarded as completely supervenient on the way each object is 
(which of course does not depend on other objects, or on relations the 
object enters into). Since there appears to be no reason not to accept this 
reasoning when it comes to providing an ontological account of 
similarity, I suggest, all particulars (especially the simplest ones to the
124 However, it is possible to claim that commitment to the existence of one universal is 
different from -  and better than -  commitment to realism about universals tout court. See 
Rodriguez-Pereyra [2002] and his distinction between quantitative and qualitative economy.
1251 put terms related to causality among inverted commas in order to avoid endorsing 
realism about it. If one is sceptical about causation, the latter can be reduced to regularities 
in the observed world. Nothing in the thesis being put forward hinges upon a particular 
understanding of causality.
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existence of which one is committed on the basis of one’s specific 
ontology) should be regarded as similar to each other in virtue of the fact 
that they exist and are such-and-such entities, and not because of other 
entities making them similar.126
Of course, this view concerning similarity and the dispensability of 
universals is essentially based on an intuition, to the effect that 
resemblance facts do not need a cause and immediately follow from the 
existence of the resembling things as entities with a specific ‘nature’. As 
such, it cannot be presented as absolutely compelling. However, it seems 
to me that the realist’s idea that, given facts of resemblance, we need to 
acknowledge the existence of universals is equally based on intuition.
On the other hand, if it is correct to claim that similarity relations are 
primitive and only require particulars with ‘qualitative content’, the 
dispensability of universals is established and it is consequently possible 
to examine the prospects for a nominalist ontology, dispensing with both 
bare substrata and multiply instantiable universals, in more detail.
Conclusions
In this chapter, I critically assessed the claim, central to the defence 
of the Leibiniz-Quine reductionist view of identity and individuality, 
that the notion of primitive thisness must be discarded because it is in 
conflict with sensible empiricism. I argued that only a confused 
understanding of empiricism (and, in particular, of the Principle of 
Acquaintance) can lead to the conclusion that the bundle theory and PII 
represent the most appealing (or even the only) possible understanding
126 Rodriguez-Pereyra [2002; 115] similarly claims that the truth-makers of la and b 
resemble each other’ (R) are just a and b, and therefore the existence of a and b is sufficient 
for the truth of R. However, as will be seen in the next chapter, he develops this claim into 
an ontology different from the one I endorse.
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of the ontological structure of the world and, in particular, of identity 
and individuality. The possibility was explored of endorsing an 
alternative ontological account, in which primitive thisness is explicitly 
accepted, in the form of the substratum ontology of Aristotelian-Lockean 
derivation. This ontology can, I argued, overcome most of the objections 
traditionally raised against it. However, it is a dualist ontology of bare 
particulars and properties, with the former being a mysterious 
‘something’ which is never known (or, better, experienced) alone and 
appears in fact existentially dependent on (at least some) qualities. The 
idea consequently suggests itself that one should assess the viability of an 
ontological framework in which primitive thisness is retained but is also 
detached from the notion of a bare particular. To endorse a non-dualist 
ontology without bare particulars means to opt for some form of 
nominalism. This view puts individuality directly into the particulars (be 
they complex particulars with properties or property-instances), and so 
straightforwardly accounts for individuation. It has been argued here 
that it can also account for similarity, once the latter is taken as a direct 
consequence of the particulars’ natures rather than of the holding of 
some relation between particulars and universals that should be reified as 
the cause of the resemblance among things. Having said this, it is now 
time to say something more in detail with a view to
i) Addressing the remaining general criticisms moved against
the notion of primitive thisness (see section 1 of the present
chapter);
ii) Completing the evaluation of the explanatory power and
overall appeal of nominalism (see section 3).
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Chapter 5
Which Nominalism? In Defence o f Trope
Ontology
In this chapter, the answer to the second potential problem for the 
supporters of primitive thisness identified in the first section of the 
previous chapter - i.e., that a consistent ontology based on primitive 
individuals cannot be formulated - is completed. Earlier, I have suggested 
that some form of nominalism is the preferable ontological view, as it 
allows one to account for individuation and similarity within a one- 
category ontology. Arguments are offered here in support of the thesis 
that, within the nominalist camp, trope ontology is preferable to 
resemblance nominalism. Trope theory is shown to be able to respond to 
the objections commonly raised against it, and satisfactorily to account 
for the constitution of complex particulars.
1. Resemblance Nominalism
The central idea of resemblance nominalism has already been 
explained in the previous chapter. It is fair to summarize that idea by 
saying that it consists of the claim that the initial step in Plato’s one- 
over-many argument for realism about universals is flawed. Realists 
believe that properties are ontologically distinct from the particulars 
exemplifying them, and that things resemble each other because each 
one of them instantiates literally the same entity, i.e., the universal 
corresponding to the property that the things have in common.
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Resemblance nominalists, on the other hand, deny that properties 
constitute an autonomous ontological category. They reverse the 
customary order of explanation and take properties to be ‘by-products’ of 
the fact that resemblance relations hold among ‘ordinary particulars’. 
Such relations, crucially, are considered primitive and not in need of 
further analysis (nor capable of further analysis). It is clear that such a 
view not only can account for similarity and individuation, but also 
provides an immediate and natural explanation of the internal unity of 
complex particulars.
The first explicitly to endorse this position was Price [1953]. 
According to him, resemblance classes are determined by similarities 
between particulars and paradigms, intended in the sense of ‘privileged’ 
entities that possess properties independently of other particulars. The 
view is, then, that paradigms (or ‘exemplars’) determine similarity classes 
and “hold a class together” [lb.; 21-22].127 However, the rather obvious 
question: “What determines that the paradigm is to count as a paradigm, 
and what makes it a paradigm for a specific property?” led the majority of 
resemblance nominalists to opt for a different view. Namely, one in 
which no paradigm is required, but only similarities which hold between 
any particular and any other (the key assumption remains, at any rate, 
that properties are derivative on primitive facts of resemblance). This 
specific version of resemblance nominalism will be analysed in what 
follows, making reference to the author who did the most in recent times 
to elaborate it and make it a sophisticated and consistent ontological 
view.
In some recent work, Rodriguez-Pereyra ([2001], [2002] and [2003]) 
revives resemblance nominalism by suggesting interesting ways to
127 A Pricean position has been defended in more recent times by Cargile [2003].
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overcome traditional difficulties. First, of all, he endorses the claim, 
presented in the previous chapter, that similarities supervene on the 
existence of things [2002; Ch. 6].128
Rodriguez-Pereyra makes it clear, though, that making the 
resembling particulars the sole truth-makers of similarity claims requires 
a specific, non-negligible metaphysical commitment. For, he admits, if 
the existence of a and b is sufficient for the truth of the claim that ‘a 
resembles b\ then the claim should be true also in possible worlds in 
which a and b are not similar and yet they both exist. Dispensing with 
possible worlds talk, it looks as though a and b might have existed 
without being similar, or cease to be similar while continuing to exist. 
But then similarity and existence do not go hand in hand as needed, and 
similarity still requires an explanation. Rodriguez-Pereyra argues that 
this difficulty is overcome by taking the things that exist as necessarily 
being the way they are. In the language of possible worlds, this amounts 
to denying trans-world identities, namely that things in different worlds 
can be identical. This is exactly what is obtained by endorsing Lewis’s 
([1968], [1986; 192-263]) Counterpart Theory,; which is essentially the 
claim that individuals only exist in one world, and correspond to 
individuals in other worlds via a relation that is weaker than identity. 
Rodriguez-Pereyra thus embraces counterpart theory.
Bearing in mind this commitment, it is possible to accept Rodriguez - 
Pereyra’s account of resemblance, and move on to a consideration of the 
other problems allegedly making resemblance nominalism unviable. 
Resemblance nominalists are traditionally required to overcome four 
fundamental obstacles (the last two of which were first pointed out by
128 Rodriguez-Pereyra also explains that, once it is specified that only sparse and non­
conjunctive properties are considered, it is possible to claim that resemblance is the unique 
relation made true by the existence of the resembling particulars together [2001; Sec. V].
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Goodman [1972] as criticisms of Carnap’s resemblance nominalist 
intuitions expressed in the Aufbau [1928(1967)]):
1) The many-over-one difficulty: If particulars are not analysable 
in terms of properties that they exemplify, and properties do 
not in fact constitute an independent ontological category, 
how can a single particular, which is to be understood as ‘non­
composite’ with respect to qualities, resemble different sets of 
other particulars, and consequently possess many different 
properties?
2) The coextension problem: assuming that similarities
determine the properties that exist, if the sets of resembling 
particulars determining properties A and B are constituted by 
the same individuals, what is it that makes property A distinct 
from property B?
3) The companionship difficulty: according to resemblance
nominalism, maximality is required for the set of resembling 
particulars determining property A. That is, the set must 
comprise all individuals said to possess property A, and no 
individual resembling all those particulars can fail to be in the 
set (otherwise it would resemble all A-particulars without 
being one). If this is the case, though, how can one account for 
the possibility that, for instance, all individuals with property 
A also have property B but not vice versa? In such a scenario, 
there would indeed exist particulars which are similar to every 
A-particular (albeit with respect to B) and yet fail to belong to 
the property set for A.
4) The im perfect com m unity problem: since it is possible that a
certain group of particulars all resemble each other but do not
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all have the same property, how is the resemblance nominalist 
to distinguish genuine from non-genuine resemblances?129
The first difficulty is overcome as soon as one recalls that -  in a 
resemblance nominalist framework - properties supervene on 
resemblance facts, and not vice versa. That is, one should not conceive of 
different ‘aspects’ of things, in virtue of which the latter belong to 
various similarity sets. This is exactly the assumption that leads towards 
the sort of realism about properties that the position under discussion 
rejects. Rather, if resemblances are primitive one should no t seek an 
explanation for the fact that an individual belongs (or can belong) to 
more than one property set, and should instead acknowledge that this 
fact is just due to the way things are. This thesis might not convince 
everybody, but appears nonetheless consistent. More on what it entails 
(and on why one might want to avoid accepting it) will be said later.
As for the coextension problem, this is solved, claims Rodriguez- 
Pereyra, if one takes property sets as comprising individuals in all 
possible worlds. According to this perspective, an individual has property 
P if and only if it resembles all possible P-particulars. Especially under 
the assumption that properties are sparse (which excludes the possibility 
of ‘concocting’ predicates automatically corresponding to alleged 
coextensive actual properties), Rodriguez-Pereyra explains [2002; Ch. 5], 
it must be possible to tell any two distinct properties A and B apart in 
this way. As an example, with respect to the well-known ‘having a heart’ 
and ‘having a kidney’ scenario (and similar ones), it can be argued that it 
is a mere contingency that all animals that have one organ also have the 
other (it might even be just false, given the possibility of temporary lack
129 If one wants to avoid talk of ‘same property’, the problem might be formulated as that of 
explaining why the sum of the non-empty and non-overlapping intersections of any three 
(or more) distinct property classes does not constitute a property class.
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of heart or kidney during a transplant). As a consequence, the property 
of having a kidney and the property of having a heart fail to be identical 
according to the proposed construal. What about necessarily coextensive 
distinct properties? Is it not possible that two properties are necessarily 
compresent in all the individuals in which one of them is exemplified? It 
seems to me that Rodriguez-Pereyra is correct in rejecting this scenario. 
In all putative counterexamples one can come up with (for instance ‘is 
triangular’ and ‘is trilateral’) it appears to be possible to individuate what 
is common and define that as the real property, the existence of which 
one must be committed to (in this case, something like ‘has the shape of a 
triangle’).130
I take it, then, that Rodriguez-Pereyra can provide a satisfactory 
answer to the coextension problem. However, he can only do so at the 
cost of making another surely not insignificant metaphysical 
commitment. Since properties are entirely defined in terms of 
resemblance sets, and these, as we have just seen, need to comprise 
particulars in all possible worlds, the resemblance nominalist is forced to 
endorse realism about possible worlds.
Rodriguez-Pereyra overcomes the companionship problem by 
refining the notion of resemblance and making it ‘come in degrees’. The 
key idea is that two particulars a and b share n  properties if and only if ‘a 
resembles b to degree n  is true [lb.; Ch. 10, Sec. 2]. This involves 
identifying resemblance sets with maximal perfect communities, that is, 
with groups of particulars that all resemble each other to the same degree. 
In a case of companionship where all F-particulars are also G-particulars 
but not the other way around (and no other similarities are involved), 
the G-particulars form a maximal perfect community of degree 2 (since
130 Remember, once again, the assumption of a sparse account of properties.
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all the G-particulars have property F as well as G), whereas the F- 
particulars form a maximal perfect community of degree 1. Hence we can 
distinguish between a property and its companion. To use a concrete 
example (which, of course, assumes the existence of properties in a way 
that is illegitimate for the resemblance nominalist), take particulars a, b, 
and c to be all red, but only a and b to be square, while c is round. 
Particulars a, b and c constitute a perfect community of degree 1 of red 
things, and particulars a and b a perfect community of degree 2 of square 
things that are also red (roundness is, by contrast, shared by c with 
particulars other than a and b).
Once again, the proposed solution works, but only at a price. That is, 
that of substituting the reasonably intuitive notion of primitive 
resemblance with a more complex relation that is made relative to 
degrees. The resemblance nominalist does not possess criteria of property 
individuation other than resemblance itself, and so cannot understand 
the above bi-conditional (n  shared properties<-»resemblance to degree n) 
as a definition of resemblance to a degree. Instead, s/he must take the 
latter notion as primitive.
As for the problem of imperfect community, of course the 
resemblance nominalist cannot speak of ‘resemblance in the same 
respect’, as this would assume the existence of properties as ‘respects’. 
Rodriguez-Pereyra’s proposal [lb.; Ch. 9, esp. 169-172] is to replace 
resemblance with an iterative relation. This relation, call it R*, is defined 
as follows: two particulars are related by R* if and only if they share a 
property; two ordered pairs of particulars <a, b> and <c, d> are related by 
R* if a and b share a property that cand d  also share131; two ordered pairs 
of pairs « a , b>, <c, d »  and « e , />, <gy h »  are related by R* if the
131 That is, if the R* relation gives rise to the same property when it holds between a and b 
and when it connects c and d.
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property shared by <a, b> and <c, d> is also shared by <e, f> and <g, h>, 
and so on. A perfect community, on this construal, is such that its 
members are related by R* to each other and, moreover, pairs of 
members, pairs of pairs of members, pairs of pairs of pairs of members 
and so on also are all in the relation R* to each other.
This effectively guarantees that only perfect communities (in which 
the same property is shared by all members) are individuated by the 
resemblance relation. But again, and in this case perhaps in the most 
patent way, the price to pay for a consistent resemblance nominalism is 
high. What must be taken as the essential fact about things in the world, 
accounting for all their properties, turns out to be a rather abstract and 
complex relation, and not similarity as it is commonly intended.132
Looking at the overall picture that emerges, Rodriguez-Pereyra’s 
resemblance nominalism does not appear entirely convincing. Although 
he manages to revive the basic intuition that was already present in 
Carnap’s writings, in fact developing the latter into a consistent 
ontological view, his proposal is subject to a number of criticisms.
The immediate criticism is, as might be expected, that the 
resemblance relation that is invoked is very different from the similarity 
between things that is experienced by human beings, and thus the 
alleged plausibility of resemblance nominalism is inevitably reduced. 
This difficulty should not be intended in the epistemological sense: 
namely, in the sense that resemblance nominalism should be rejected 
because it has the consequence that to perceive a similarity between two
132 After having offered solutions to the traditional problems affecting resemblance 
nominalism, Rodriguez-Pereyra also deals with one remaining problem [2002; Ch. 11], 
consisting of the fact that the conditions he individuates for sets of resembling particulars 
are also met by what he calls ‘mere intersections’. That is, the particulars in the intersection 
of two perfect communities determining properties A and B also form a perfect community, 
as they all possess property A&B and no other particular has such a property. To get rid of 
this problem, Rodriguez-Pereyra makes the (sensible) assumption that there exist no sparse 
conjunctive properties.
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particulars requires the capability to perceive a complex relation holding 
among all particulars with that property. It seems indeed fair to say that 
this is not the case, since what makes a set of particulars all have the 
same property by no means needs to be the same thing as what is 
perceived when specific similarities among particulars are recognized. It 
is at the ontological level that the increased complexity of the 
resemblance relation cannot be ignored. Rodriguez-Pereyra claims that:
“The superiority of Resemblance Nominalism lies in its 
avoiding to postulate ad hoc entities. [...] Universalism and 
Trope Theory postulate ad hoc entities because they postulate 
entities, universals and tropes respectively, whose main or 
only claim to credence is that they provide a solution to the 
Problem of Universals” [lb.; 13].
This charge of ad hociless appears based on the idea that we should 
opt for an ontological construal that appears plausible because it is as 
close as possible to our familiar picture of the world, and ‘qualified’ 
particulars are what we experience around us. But why should the same 
criterion not apply to resemblance (regardless of the fact that it is not an 
entity but a relation)? As construed in the framework of Rodriguez- 
Pereyra’s resemblance nominalism, resemblance becomes an iterative 
relation among not only particulars but pairs of particulars, pairs of pairs 
of particulars and so on; it needs to range over particulars in all possible 
worlds, with the latter realistically intended; and it requires a 
commitment to counterpart theory. It seems undeniable, in the fight of 
this, that Rodriguez-Pereyra too defines the crucial element of his 
ontology in an ad hoc way, exclusively with a view to defending the 
ontological construal itself. True, he can claim that, since he had set 
himself exactly the task of defining a consistent resemblance nominalism,
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his attempt is successful; however, it is quite another thing to consider - 
because of this -  resemblance nominalism compelling as compared to 
other ontological options. And it is the latter issue that is relevant here.
In addition, other more specific problems can be identified for 
Rodriguez-Pereyra’s proposal. The notion of ‘resemblance to degree ri, 
for instance, that he employs to solve the companionship difficulty, 
presupposes that every entity can have only a finite number of properties. 
It would be impossible to distinguish a property from another on the 
basis of the ‘resembles to degree d  relation if the degree of similarity 
were equal to infinity in both the resemblance set determining one of 
these properties and in that determining the other.
Moreover, properties with only one instance, which are surely 
conceivable, must also be defined by the resemblance nominalist in 
terms of resembling particulars. And this has the consequence, suggested 
by Rodriguez-Pereyra himself [lb.; 90-91], that it must be accepted as a 
possibility that the fact that a particular in the actual world has a 
property is explained exclusively on the basis of a resemblance between 
that particular and particulars in other worlds.
In the light of all this, I suggest, it is worth exploring the option that 
resemblance nominalism is wrong, or at least modifiable, in one or more 
of its basic assumptions.
I believe that amending it in the light of the above criticisms in order 
to avoid the complexity and costly ontological commitments Rodriguez- 
Pereyra is forced to make amounts to endorsing trope theory. In the 
remainder of this section I will show why this is the case.
The reasoning underpinning resemblance nominalism can be 
summarised as follows:
1) Facts of resemblance ground the exemplification of properties;
166
2) Resemblance requires at least two particulars;
3) Since particulars can enter into many resemblance relations
without this entailing that they are analysable, the
multiplicity of properties exhibited by things can be 
accounted for by making reference exclusively to particulars;
4) Therefore, the n> 1 particulars involved in a resemblance
relation are the sole truth-makers of claims about their 
similarity;
5) Therefore, the n> 1 particulars involved in a resemblance
relation are the sole truth-makers of claims regarding
properties and their exemplification.
In the previous chapter, I committed myself to 4). What else, if 
anything, can be modified?
A key idea is expressed by 3): that the same concrete particular can 
belong to different resemblance classes without this entailing that the
particular is analysable any further (let alone in terms of properties). 
Rodriguez-Pereyra claims that this assumption is necessary because it 
provides with the ability to solve the many-over-one problem, and this 
must be considered as an important advantage. He rejects what is known 
as Ostrich Nominalism  (the position that predication does not need an 
explanation and a is the truth-maker of every claim of the form ‘a is P’) 
exactly because, according to him, the latter is unable to account for the 
multiplicity of properties in particulars [2002; 43-46].133
However, I believe that to allow for the analysability of complex 
particulars in terms of simple components by no means affects one’s
133 The definition ‘Ostrich Nominalism’ is due to Armstrong [1978; Vol. I, 16] who coined 
it on the basis of the fact that the position acknowledges that there are facts of property- 
exemplification, but then refuses -  in ostrich fashion - to accept that these need an 
explanation. An ostrich nominalist position is defended by Devitt [1980] and Van Cleve 
[1994].
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ability to account for the multiplicity of properties in concrete particulars. 
And that, therefore, 3) can be given up without explanatory loss. In fact, 
my contention is that doing this determines an evident gain at the level 
of ontological commitment.
Suppose that ordinary particulars can in fact be analysed in terms of 
simpler elements, where ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ are intended as 
synonymous with ‘with one property only’ and ‘with n> 1 properties’, 
respectively (that is, in resemblance nominalist jargon, to ‘belonging to 
one resemblance class’ and ‘belonging to n> 1 resemblance classes’). This 
in itself is by no means excluded by a resemblance nominalist ontological 
perspective.
It can be immediately seen, though, that with this supposition many 
of the problems affecting resemblance nominalism disappear: the many- 
over-one problem is not simply ‘explained away’ anymore, as every 
ontologically basic particular belongs to only one resemblance class, and 
every particular with many properties is (as noted) analysed in terms of 
such basic components. Moreover, once one takes only simple particulars 
into account, there is no subset of any property class which is also a 
(different) property class, for any subset is composed by particulars with 
only one property, and the same as that of the particulars in the initial 
property class. Hence, the companionship problem is overcome. For 
analogous reasons, at the level of simple particulars there do not exist 
imperfect communities (since each particular only has one aspect, a set of 
particulars all resemble each other if and only if they all have the same 
property); and the coextension of different property classes is also 
impossible (for the coextension of two - or more - different property 
classes requires at least some particulars to belong to more than one such 
class, which is being assumed here to never be the case).
168
In short, by identifying sparse properties with those determined by 
resemblances between simple particulars - only belonging to one 
resemblance class134, m ost of the traditional problems for resemblance 
nominalism would be solved without the need to construct a complex 
(analogue to the) resemblance relation as Rodriguez-Pereyra is compelled 
to do. The possibility is therefore definitely worth exploring that the 
only properties the existence of which one should be committed to are 
those determined by resemblances between simple particulars; and that 
every particular which is not simple should be analysed in terms of 
simple particulars.
As I said, to accept the analysability of particulars just hypothesised 
does not entail the rejection of resemblance nominalism, for the basic 
simples are still particulars with properties. Nonetheless, here is where 
tw o fundam ental facts emerge that render trope ontology preferable. 
These are related to two remaining difficulties.
First, as we have seen, the resemblance nominalist invokes 
realistically intended possible worlds in order to avoid the coextension 
problem (by saying that contingent coextensions are not sufficient for 
defining properties); and the problem with properties with only one 
instance (by saying that the unique actual particular instantiating that 
property does so in virtue of its similarities with particulars in other 
possible worlds). Now, although to limit the similarities determining 
properties to those holding among particulars only belonging to one 
resemblance class allows one to prevent coextensions from arising, the 
other difficulty must still be faced by the resemblance nominalist. That is, 
one-instance properties still demand realism about possible worlds.
134 In Rodriguez-Pereyra’s terms, I am in effect hypothesizing that only properties 
determined by resemblance classes of degree 1 are real properties.
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Moreover, since s/he takes the particulars belonging to property 
classes to be concrete particulars, the resemblance nominalist (at least 
according to Rodriguez-Pereyra’s depiction of the theory) must still 
avoid the possibility that the existence of a is not sufficient for as being P 
by endorsing counterpart theory (for it is still conceivable that the same 
-  simple or not - concrete particular does not have a given property, that 
is, that a does not necessarily belong to the resemblance class for P).
The trope theorist, however, who identifies the simple particulars 
with their qualitative content, can dispense w ith both possible worlds 
and counterpart theory. As for one-instance properties, they ‘explain 
themselves’, as it were, and do not require any similarities holding 
between particulars: a trope P is necessarily a trope with the specific 
‘qualitative content’ it happens to have, independently of any similarities 
holding between it and other particulars. In addition, the possibility of a 
P-trope not having property P is discarded at the outset without 
subscribing to any specific metaphysical thesis, because a P-trope is a 
property (of type) P.135
We are thus in a situation in which an initial hypothesis of 
analysability of particulars in terms of simple components - belonging to 
one resemblance class only - allows the nominalist to overcome most of 
the difficulties besetting resemblance nominalism without postulating 
such a complex relation as Rodriguez-Pereyra’s R*; and in which, 
moreover, understanding these simple particulars as tropes rather than 
concrete particulars additionally allows one to avoid a commitment to
135 This, incidentally, allows one to make sense of Ostrich nominalism. As explained, the 
central idea behind Ostrich nominalism is that ‘a is P’ can be true and yet require no 
explanation other than that a exists. It seems to me that such a position becomes convincing 
as soon as it is assumed that property classes are composed of tropes rather than concrete 
particulars. If a is a trope, it follows that it is a particular property. But this means that ‘a is 
P’ is to be intended as an identity claim rather than a predication. From which it follows 
that, given a, it is necessarily true that ‘a is P’ (at least as long as one assumes that all 
tropes are determinately self-identical).
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certain strong ontological theses (counterpart theory and realism about 
possible worlds) that Rodriguez-Pereyra was forced to subscribe to.
As for 4) above, which -  as I recalled -  is a claim that I subscribed to 
when discussing similarity, notice a crucial difference: according to 
resemblance nominalism, 4) must be intended as the claim that the two 
or more concrete particulars involved in a resemblance relation are 
together the sole truth-makers for the sentence expressing it and, as a 
consequence the truth-makers for statements attributing a specific 
property to them. In a trope ontology, 4) is equally true, but as the claim 
that the two or more particulars that are the sole truth-makers for certain 
resemblance claims are such in virtue o f the following fact: that, each 
one of them by itself, they are the sole truth-makers for the property 
attributions that regard them. This is exactly why predication is only 
possible with more than one individual in resemblance nominalism but 
not in the trope-based perspective being proposed; and why, 
consequently, only the former is committed to the existence of possible 
worlds. Therefore, the thesis expressed in 4) can be endorsed without 
having to face the difficulties faced by resemblance nominalism.
Another thing deserves mentioning. Emergent properties, I contend, 
find a better explanation in trope ontology than in resemblance 
nominalism. Consider one specific case that was already mentioned in 
chapter 3, and will be considered more extensively in the next chapter. 
In (standardly interpreted) quantum mechanics, so-called ‘entangled’ 
particles appear to be such that there is a real physical fact true of them 
which is not determined by the monadic and/or relational properties 
they have separately. This fact corresponds to an emergent property of 
the entangled system as a whole. Surely, the resemblance nominalist can 
claim that emergent properties such as this can be explained in terms of
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resemblances between particulars exactly in the same way as other 
properties. However, entangled systems appear to exhibit emergent 
relations among pairs of particles, and so it is the composite of two 
particulars that should be considered as the member of a resemblance 
class. That more or less ad hoc ‘composite particulars’ constituting 
resemblance classes have to be postulated on the basis of the n-adicity of 
the emergent relation that must be accounted for might not be a lethal 
problem. Nonetheless, on the resemblance nominalist construal, one 
must accept the following possibility: that of two particulars which enter 
into the same system and then, since the system happens to resemble 
other physically analogous systems, become related by a new property. 
This undoubtedly adds to the unnaturalness of the resemblance 
nominalist construal. The trope-theoretic account appears, instead, closer 
to what physical theory tells us. It allows one to say that two bundles of 
tropes become related by an emergent relation because the bundles 
become parts of the same physical system and, at that point, one further 
property (a trope) is exemplified by the whole. In general, trope ontology 
makes room for properties that do not supervene on more basic ones and 
instead constitute further, non-reducible, sets of basic particulars.136
Two potential objections must now be considered. On the one hand, 
it might be claimed that the postulation of simple particulars with only 
one aspect is itself ad hoc, as once it is accepted the road to trope theory 
is necessarily very short, but in fact it simply need not be accepted. On 
the other hand, it could be maintained that physics tells us that the basic 
entities constituting reality are particles with more than one property, 
and so the postulation of simple particulars can be rejected on the basis of 
science. To the first objection, I respond that the idea that simple
136 A trope-theoretic interpretation of the mentioned emergent relations in quantum 
mechanics will indeed be suggested in the next chapter.
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particulars with only one aspect exist has exclusively been put forward 
with a view to avoiding certain undeniable complications that arise for 
resemblance nominalism in terms of ontological commitment. That such 
an idea leads one towards trope theory is just an (of course, not 
completely unexpected, nor unwanted) consequence of the fact that it 
does in fact avoid such complications. As for the second objection, my 
answer is that the standard model of elementary particles can be 
interpreted as describing what the most fundamental concrete particulars 
are, as the imaginary critic would have us do; but it can equally be 
understood as describing the basic properties of physical reality as 
independent simples, and the way they exist together in our world. In 
this second understanding, the ‘precedence’ of concrete particulars over 
tropes would not be ontological (that is, to be explained in terms of the 
non-analyzability of the former), but epistemic (in that it would follow 
from certain mutual relationships invariably holding in our world among 
the latter).137
In the light of the foregoing arguments, it seems to me that the 
possibility should be contemplated, both for specific reasons having to do 
with resemblance nominalism’s pros and cons, and for more intuitive 
motivations138, that resemblance nominalism is mistaken in its central
137 Arguments against the idea that particles as concrete particulars with many properties 
should be considered as the basic ‘building blocks’ of reality come from quantum field 
theory and quantum gravity, but I believe it is not necessary to refer to these theories in 
order to formulate my point. Much more on the perspective being suggested will be said in 
the next chapter.
138 True, Rodriguez-Pereyra can object that “with metaphysical theories about the basic 
structure of the world, like Resemblance Nominalism, Trope Theory and Realism about 
Universals, there is no reason to expect that our intuitions will be true. Intuitions are the 
product of evolution and so metaphysical intuitions, which have little if any survival value, 
are unlikely to lead us to metaphysical truth” [2003; 232]. Despite the fact that this appears 
correct as a general claim, it still looks as though - all the rest being equal - intuitions can in 
fact lead one to prefer one metaphysical hypothesis to another. In the present case, at any 
rate, intuitions in favour of the view that similarities are dependent on properties and not 
the other way around are coupled with explicit ontological arguments for choosing trope 
theory over resemblance nominalism.
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assumption; and that things resemble each other because they have (in 
actual fact, so far as the basic elements of reality are concerned, they are) 
properties, and not the other way around. This means to say that trope 
ontology is preferable to resemblance nominalism.139
2. Trope Ontology
Trope ontology, as mentioned earlier, is the view that the whole of 
reality is composed of particular qualities, endowed with primitive 
thisness.
In his [1953], Williams starts from the suggestion that partial 
similarities between things can be accounted for in terms of complete 
similarity among component parts of these things. And that these parts 
can be understood as abstract particulars, i.e., particular qualities. He 
suggests that:
“Entities like our fine parts or abstract components are the 
primary constituents of this or any possible world, the very 
alphabet of being” [lb.; 7].
According to Williams, more specifically, such entities
“not only are actual but are the only actualities, in just this 
sense, that whereas entities of all other categories are literally 
composed of them, they are not in general composed of any 
other sort of entity” [lb.].
139 As for the role of universals, Van Cleve, making reference to Sellars [1963], argues that 
“the formula ‘3F(Jack and Jill are both F)’ need not be read as ‘there is a quality that Jack 
and Jill both have’, but may be read instead as ‘there is something that Jack and Jill both 
are’ -  to which one could append [the word allegedly denoting a universal, but in fact 
describing Jack ‘s and Jill’s nature]” [1994; 587-588]. This seems to me absolutely correct 
from the viewpoint of trope theory.
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It is abstract particulars understood this way that the more recent 
literature refers to as ‘tropes’. But what does it mean to take abstract 
particulars as the basic ‘building blocks’ of reality? One criticism often 
moved against property-based ontologies is that properties are said to be 
abstract because they are not ontologically autonomous entities, and so 
the prospects are dim for trope ontology as a one-category nominalist 
ontology. If properties are by definition things which get predicated of 
something else (which is not itself a property), the criticism goes, then 
they cannot - in  principle - be autonomous, let alone fundamental, 
entities. In his [1998], for example, Lowe claims that tropes
“lack the fully determinate identity conditions 
characteristic of objects proper [...because they are...] 
adjectival rather than objectualm  nature” [lb.; 156].
It is evident, though, that -  at least as they have been conceived of in 
the previous section - tropes do in fact meet the requirements for being 
attributed an ‘objectual’ nature. For, contrary to what is commonly 
thought, and also mirrored by Lowe’s quotation, according to the 
suggested perspective tropes are not dependent on, but rather required 
for, the identity of the complexes to which they belong, as they simply 
are the fundamental components of the latter.
The whole project of trope theory is, indeed, based on the conviction 
that (certain) properties can be seen as autonomous entities. That they 
are inevitably dependent on something else that belongs to a different 
category and acts as ‘subject’ is, according to this view, just a pre- 
theoretical intuition which can (and must) be overcome upon 
philosophical analysis. For instance, emphasising that the dualist 
substance-property paradigm and the related idea that properties are
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dependent on their bearers are entrenched in our way of speaking and 
thinking about reality, but should nevertheless not be taken for granted 
at the ontological level, Campbell declares that:
“We must overcome a long-standing and deeply ingrained 
prejudice to the effect that concrete particulars, atoms or 
molecules or larger swarms, are the minimal beings logically
capable of independent existence [; o] n the view that tropes
are the basic particulars [it is in fact the...] concrete particulars, 
the whole man and the whole piece of cloth, [that] count as 
dependent entities” [1981; 479].
The ‘abstractness’ of tropes must thus be understood as consisting of 
the fact that they are always experienced as parts of complexes, and so 
each one of them can only be ‘isolated’ by an act of conceptual 
abstraction from the particulars it belongs to. That they are abstract in 
this sense by no means entails that tropes are not concrete in the sense of 
constitutive of material reality, which indeed they are.140
In short, once tropes are identified with the basic simples making up 
reality, Williams’ claim that tropes are ‘the alphabet of being’ seems 
justified.
One might reply that this may perhaps be true of some properties, 
but others certainly cannot be so understood: it is impossible, for 
example, to conceive of a ‘shape’ trope if not as inhering in something 
else which is a material ‘thing’, ontologically prior to it, shaped in some 
specific way. Therefore, at least some tropes are not independent. Also, 
not all tropes seem to qualify as concrete in the sense defined above: in 
what sense can, say, ‘colour’ properties constitute material reality?
140 Simons [1994; 557] suggests modifying the customary definitions and take tropes as 
dependent concrete particulars. I take it that ‘dependent’ must be understood here as 
dependent on other tropes (together with which each specific trope gives rise to the 
complex particulars it is part of), not on entities belonging to other ontological categories.
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This objection appears indeed quite dangerous, at least for those trope 
ontologies that take all properties as basic tropes.141 However, a trope 
ontologist can avoid doing so, provided that s/he can offer a reductionist 
account o f all the properties whose existence s/he acknowledges in terms 
of simpler properties which are immune to the suggested difficulty and 
‘qualify’ as tropes. A generally valid answer to the question whether the 
trope theorist can solve the present difficulty in this way can only come 
from a detailed examination of our best relevant scientific theories and 
what they tell us about what counts as fundamental. Such an 
examination will be carried out in the next chapter. At this stage, 
however, it is useful preliminarily to suggest a classification of types of 
properties that captures the key intuition; and to provide answers to 
other traditional objections against trope theory.
3. Tropes, O ther Properties, and Replies to Some Objections
First of all, I believe that it is correct to say is that there exist three 
distinct types of properties, which can be categorized as follows:
1) TROPES: tropes proper, to be identified with the basic, simple 
elements of material reality, which are concrete entities only 
dependent on other entities of the same type;
2) D-PROPERTIES: derivative properties, that is, complex 
structures of tropes that are not primitive and yet are 
physically efficacious. Properties like colour, or shape, are D- 
properties;
141 That all properties are ontologically on a par seems to have been Williams’ position, but 
is not a shared assumption nowadays. It is explicitly abandoned, for example, in Campbell 
[1990].
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3) C-PROPERTIES: Non-material conceptual/logical properties. 
These exist in our minds, i.e., only have a conceptual status, 
but are (at any rate, can be) nevertheless based on objective 
facts. Exemplification, or resemblance, are such properties.
The distinction between tropes and derivative properties is 
particularly important, because it is what allows one to overcome the 
difficulty mentioned at the end of the previous section. The basic claim is 
that only D-properties can fail to be concrete and/or existentially 
independent of the complexes they belong to. To provide an example of 
the way D-properties are constructed out of tropes, consider the case of 
an object exemplifying the property of being of some specific colour. For 
a thing to be of a certain colour, science tells us, means that that thing 
reflects and absorbs light waves in a particular way. But the modality of 
this reflection is related to the kind of surface that thing happens to have. 
And this, in turn, is reducible to the structure of the set of molecules the 
thing is composed of and, further, to the specific arrangement of the 
particles that constitute the thing. My contention is that scientifically- 
informed analysis ultimately leads us to (what we currently see as) the 
most basic physical level, where the property of being coloured 
‘dissolves’, as it were, into more basic physical facts; and that these facts 
exclusively concern entities that can be regarded as tropes.142
The discrimination between tropes and D-properties allows the trope 
theorist to dispose of another traditional ‘difficulty’ for trope ontology, 
known as the boundary problem. The alleged problem, discussed for 
instance by Campbell [1990; 142-145], is that if every property is a trope, 
then it looks as though every time a particular possessing a property P is 
divided, its P-trope also splits. For example, consider this white sheet of
142 See the next chapter for further details.
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paper. The whiteness of it is a particular instance of white, or so it 
appears to be: this seems rather uncontroversial as soon as we distinguish 
this whiteness from that, say, of the stool over there. As such, on a ‘naive’ 
trope-theoretic construal, it should be considered as a trope. But what 
happens if we tear this sheet into two parts, each one of these in two 
again and so on? It looks like we get as many white tropes as the number 
of pieces we tear the original sheet into, without any actual 
multiplication of the original stuff. This hardly supports the view that 
tropes are the fundamental constituents of reality. Where exactly is the 
boundary between one trope and another? What should we take to be 
truly fundamental?
The problem is easily solved on the basis of the suggested distinction 
among types of properties. The claim can be put forward that it is only 
D-properties as defined above that can be ‘divided into parts’, and this 
avoids ontological inflation. As explained, derivative properties are 
structures of tropes, while tropes are simple and indecomposable. It can 
thus be maintained with plausibility that what appears to be a partition 
of a trope into two or more others is actually just a division internal to a 
complex structure of tropes. And that the division necessarily terminates 
when one gets to the tropes themselves. In the above example, the 
whiteness of this sheet of paper would be a non-fundamental D-property 
(not a trope), to be conceived of as a complex organisation of simpler 
ontic units (ultimately, tropes). If this is the case, as one tears the sheet 
one obtains two (or more) white things, and yet no ‘ontological 
proliferation’ takes place but, rather, just a re-organization of the 
relations internal to the trope-structure that gave rise to the original 
sheet. Therefore, since basic tropes cannot be divided multiplied as pieces 
of paper can, no boundary problem arises for the really fundamental
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constituents of reality; whereas for the entities that are derivative on 
these the problem is not, in fact, a problem at all, but rather exactly what 
we should expect.143
Other objections to trope theory have to do with their identity 
conditions and ontological nature.
A criticism to the effect that trope theory appears unappealing in the 
light of the possibility of ‘swapping’ identical tropes was raised by 
Armstrong [1989; 131-132]. Since tropes are independent entities with 
primitive identity conditions, Armstrong claims, given two particulars a 
and b with the property P, as P-trope and b's P-trope (which, obviously 
enough, are exactly similar) could be swapped without this making any 
difference. Hence, trope ontology leaves room for certain ontological 
possibilities that appear ‘empty’ and should be consequently discarded. 
However, it is not clear to me why the scenario just described should 
represent a problem. If the charge of ‘emptiness’ is to be intended in the 
ontological sense that trope swaps cannot occur, it is false. So-called 
haecceitistic differences144, merely involving things’ identities, may or 
may not be accepted in one’s ontology. But they are not, by themselves, 
impossible.145
143 It is worth noticing that the distinction between tropes, D-properties and C-properties 
also allows one to dispose of another difficulty, raised by Levinson [1980]. Levinson 
distinguishes qualities, capable of being divided into parts that are also qualities of the 
same type (e.g., whiteness: a white thing can be divided into smaller white parts); and 
properties, that are instead indivisible (e.g., manhood). He claims (ignoring, by the way, the 
boundary problem) that only qualities can be tropes, for tropes are particularized attributes 
but a particularized, say, manhood is a man and not another manhood. This allegedly 
weakens the appeal of trope ontology. I suggest that properties such as ‘manhood’ are in 
effect C-properties, rooted in tropes and/or D-properties (that is, in Levinson’s terminology, 
in qualities), but not themselves to be expected to have all the features of tropes.
144 Already discussed in chapter 4.
145 Notice that the problem here is not that, as emphasised in the previous chapter with 
respect to bare particulars, one must acknowledge bare identities. Armstrong claims that 
the tropes’ primitive identities, although essentially connected with a ‘qualitative content’, 
determine possibilities that we should feel compelled to exclude.
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If the alleged problem is, instead, that the trope swap does not 
coincide with something ‘real’, this must be established on the basis of 
observation and/or science. At that level, the argument is either that a 
swap can never be observed, or that it in fact never obtains. As argued in 
chapter 4, that something is in principle incapable of determining a 
directly perceived empirical difference does not entail that that 
something is not real. Moreover, even assuming that trope exchanges do 
not in fact occur, the trope ontologist can perfectly take this as an 
empirical fact suggesting a constraint on the possibilities allowed for by 
his/her ontology. At any rate, it is surely not obvious that realism about 
universals -  with its claim that the swap is ruled out in principle by the 
numerical identity of the two instances of P - would represent a better 
option as Armstrong would have us believe.
It was also Armstrong who raised what is known as the ‘piling 
objection’. According to him, trope theory countenances the seemingly 
empty possibility that a particular contains two identical tropes. He 
claims that:
“It seems clear that the very same particular cannot 
instantiate a property more than once. To say that a is F and 
that a is F is simply to say that a is F. Given the Identity view 
of properties, this is immediately explicable. For a Particularist, 
however, an ordinary concrete particular is a collection of 
Stoutian particulars. Why should not this collection contain 
two Stoutian particulars which resemble exactly?” [1978; 86].
To this, I reply by reiterating the point made earlier146 as regards 
determinable and determinate properties. It is just a fact about properties, 
regardless of whether they are universals or not, that only one
146 See section 3 of chapter 4.
181
determinate for each determinable can be exemplified by a particular (or, 
bundled with other universal-instances, tied to other tropes or what have 
you). One who believes in universals can of course provide an 
explanation for this, and say that two instances of the same universals 
possessed by one particular (or, at any rate, bundled together) would be 
co-located and consequently be identical and count as only one instance. 
However, the trope theorist can perfectly well just stick to the 
determinate/determinable distinction. Especially in the light of the other 
difficulties affecting the bundle theory, it certainly does not seem to be 
the case that we are forced to follow Armstrong in endorsing such a 
controversial ontological view because of the piling objection.147
Another alleged difficulty regards the simplicity of tropes. Some 
authors (Mertz [1996], Moreland [1985], Hochberg [2004] and 
Armstrong [2005]) have argued that the trope nominalist is forced to 
claim that each trope has (at least) two aspects - one that makes it 
resemble other tropes (its nature), and another that makes it the abstract 
particular it is (its primitive particularity); and that this immediately 
makes the theory inconsistent, as an internal complexity is 
acknowledged in the entity that was instead presented as a basic simple 
‘building block’ of reality. Put in terms of truth-making, the same 
trope(s) can make logically independent propositions true such as “ a and 
b are exactly similar” and “a and b are numerically distinct”. The 
supposed difficulty is that since a single trope is the truth-maker for a 
number of sentences, the trope is likely to be a complex entity. To this, it 
can be replied that if one accepts (as, for one, Armstrong himself does in 
his paper) that truth-making theory rejects the idea of a 1-to-l
147 Also, it should not be ignored that the piling objection too should be supported by 
empirical evidence, which it in fact is not. At least for what I call tropes, it is by no means 
obvious that two of them cannot belong to the same particular. Simons [1994; 572] 
explicitly considers this possibility with respect to certain microphysical systems.
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correlation between truths and truth-makers, there is no need to see 
trope theory as weakened in any way by the fact that many things can be 
truthfully said of one single trope. For, if it is possible for a simple entity 
to be a truth-maker for a number of truths, then ontological arguments 
must be provided against the simplicity of tropes. However, in 
ontological terms, it is possible to claim that a trope surely has two 
‘aspects’, and perhaps even more if we consider the entirety of its 
metaphysical features. But all these aspects are num erically identical. 
that is, it is by just being the simple entity it is that a trope counts as one, 
is similar to other tropes in its nature, is distinct from other things, 
affects and interacts with other tropes, and so on. It is mistaken to take 
each of these aspects to be a distinct metaphysical component of the 
given trope, for they are distinguished numerically from each other 
merely by conceptual analysis. Tropes, that is, are ontologically simple 
units, provided with primitive thisness as a metaphysical feature which is 
not an addition to their ‘empirical content’.
Let us now move on to a different type of difficulties, having to do 
not with the ontological nature of tropes in themselves, but rather with 
the relations obtaining between them. Trope theory, we have seen, has it 
that tropes are all there is, and everything is constituted by sets of tropes. 
Williams claims that:
“We observe two fundamental ways in which tropes may 
be connected with one another: the way of location and the 
way of similarity” [1953; 7].
The similarity issue has already been dealt with. Here, it must only be 
explained in addition how the suggested account of similarity fits with 
the proposed distinction between tropes and derivative properties.
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Whenever similarity does not hold among basic tropes, I claim, facts of 
resemblance can be cashed out in terms of structural analogies between 
complexes of tropes. Taking again the example of colours, similarity with 
respect to colour amounts to equality in the way the surfaces of things 
reflect light; this, in turn, entails that two things have the same colour if 
they have identical (at any rate functionally) physical structures. The 
definition of such similarity of structures is likely to be achieved by 
appealing to sameness of constituents (i.e., ultimately, tropes) and to 
geometrical-topological features. This reasoning appears to be generally 
applicable. Hence, the claim is that the basic similarities are, as suggested 
earlier, those among the natures (causal powers) of tropes, and that 
resemblances between ‘higher-order’ properties can be reconstructed on 
the basis of such similarities.
I next look at Williams’ ‘way of location’. Can compresent tropes 
give rise to complex particulars? If so, how?
The alleged difficulties that arise when considering the nature of the 
compresence of tropes have to do with the sort of Russellian-Bradleian 
regresses already discussed, which ultimately go back to the 
Platonic/Arisotelian third man argument. Daly [1994; 258-260] considers 
the relation of compresence in the context of trope theory along these 
lines, and concludes that the trope ontologist who wants to avoid the 
regress becomes fatally involved in what he calls the infiltration o f 
instantiation. Suppose that, says Daly, in the spirit of trope nominalism 
one attempts to explain the compresence of two tropes by referring to 
tropes only. If one says that trope t  and trope u are compresent, one then 
needs to say that they are because of a third trope c that causes them to 
be so. But then one has to explain the relation between t  and c, and that 
between u and c, in turn. And if, as it seems sensible, one does not want
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to talk about compresence again, one must say that t  and u ‘instantiate’ c. 
The problem of explicating this notion of instantiation, though, seems to 
have the same structure as the initial problem. In particular, claims Daly, 
the fact that trope theory needs, after all, the instantiation relation makes 
its alleged greater appeal with respect to substratum ontologies (where 
instantiation is posited explicitly as a fundamental relation) disappear; 
and ultimately leads to the defeat of trope ontology, for substratum 
theorists can legitimately see instantiation as a primitive feature of 
substrata as an ontological category on their own, while trope theorists 
cannot.
My solution to this problem is of the ‘deflationary’ type. It consists in 
conceiving of compresence as an uncontroversial primitive, and 
following another route for explaining the constitution of complex 
particulars out of tropes. First of all, it seems to me that not only is it 
possible to avoid hypostatising the compresence relation, but plainly 
wrong to suppose that it must be hypostatised. Compresence, my 
contention is, is not a property or relation exemplified by certain tropes, 
and in virtue of which the latter are located at the same place, but rather 
just a fact about their existence that can be thought of as a C-property. 
More precisely, tropes are not compresent because they exemplify a 
certain (real) property; rather, they can be attributed such a property 
(conceptually) because they ‘exist together’ or ‘co-exist’. Facts of co­
existence, that is, are basic ontological facts that do not need a cause 
external to the compresent entities. Notice, moreover, that the claim that 
co-existence is all there is to compresence makes sense regardless of 
whether the tropes’ existing in such-and-such a way determines space­
time relations (as in relationism about space-time); or is set against the 
background of a pre-existing space-time ‘stage’ (as in substantivalism); or
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‘comes into existence’ together with space-time as an absolute and yet 
non-substantival structure (as in the structural understanding of space 
and time suggested, for example, by Auyang [1995] and [2000]). In all 
these cases, I contend, nothing more than the things’ existence is 
required in order for them to be (or fail to be) compresent.
The more pressing problem concerns the connection (if any) existing 
among the compresent tropes. Its consideration will allow us to evaluate 
the explanatory efficacy of trope theory with respect to the last 
explanandum  that was individuated for any ontological account of reality 
(the others being similarity and individuation): that is, the internal unity 
of complex particulars. Mere compresence does not appear to be 
sufficient for explaining what makes a complex particular out of certain 
tropes; namely, of what distinguishes full-blown ‘things’ from mere sets 
of tropes existing at the same place. As we have seen when discussing 
indistinguishable particles in quantum mechanics, this is far from being 
of merely philosophical interest. As a matter of fact, the present question 
may be interestingly put in terms of what distinguishes distinct but 
compresent individuals from each other: the mereological part-whole 
relation must be founded on something more than mere compresence if 
the possibility -  described by our best current physical theory - of two 
(or more) complex individuals existing at the same place is to be 
underwritten.
The need for some ‘unifying factor’ might be taken as suggesting that 
individual substrata are required. LaBossiere [1994; 364], for instance, 
argues that since in a one-category trope ontology all the work must be 
done by tropes, and a consistent nominalism cannot assume the existence 
of universal relations, the ‘gluing’ should naturally be performed by 
individual ‘binding tropes’. But, since the latter are just tropes like all the
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others, one is forced to acknowledge that the binding tropes should be 
bound to the tropes they bind by other binding tropes, and so on -  along 
by now familiar lines - ad infinitum . As mentioned in chapter 4, it can be 
argued that substrata -  i.e., bare particulars endowed with the power to 
attach to many tropes, bind them together and give them unity -  do not 
meet with the same problem. LaBossiere does in fact posit substrata as 
fundamental ‘unifiers’. He gives a justification of the positing of substrata 
in terms of a principle that he traces back to some Platonic passages (in 
the Sophist), according to which if something has a real power, then it is 
real. In the present case, since ties between tropes have certain causal 
consequences, they must be real. From the contention that -  on pain of 
an infinite regress - the only thing that can coherently be said to 
determine such ties is a substratum, LaBossiere then concludes that 
substrata must be real too.
This argument is invalid, though, and in fact indicates the correct 
strategy for the trope ontologist in connection to the present problem. 
Obviously, if we postulate a binder then it must be a real entity. But we 
can just postulate a bind, that is, a relation between things, as something 
actual without having to believe in a further entity that ‘does’ the 
binding. If, for example, John and Jack hug each other, we can say that 
they constituted a clear and tight relation, but by no means do we have 
to hypostatize the ‘hug-between-John-and-Jack’ as a third real entity. 
There is a difference between the case in which a relation holds and that 
in which it does not, but such a difference by no means automatically 
implies an ontological addition.
The relevant distinction that, in the light of this, can be invoked by 
the trope ontologist is that between internal and external relations -  a 
distinction that is indeed presented by some trope theorists exactly with
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a view to defusing the present objection regarding the need for 
something ‘holding tropes together’. Denkel, for example, argues as 
follows:
“For those who do not wish to maintain the existence of 
independent, but empirically inaccessible bonds, internal 
relations present themselves as ideal candidates for cohesive 
relations” [1997; 600].
Roughly speaking, while an external relation is distinct from its relata, 
and ‘adds something’ to them, an internal relation is essential to its 
bearers, in the sense that it is fully reducible to the way the latter exist at 
the moment of the holding of the relation, and expresses a fundamental 
mutual relationship among them. Having recourse to a relation of this 
type, obviously enough, allows one to account for the sort of dependence 
existing between tropes in the same complex particular without giving 
rise to infinite regresses or other problematic consequences.
Simons [1994] argues that we must understand the internal relations 
that are constitutive of complex particulars as Husserlian foundation 
relations. According to him, these serve
“to bind things into a unity without requiring any further 
glue” [1994; 559].
Husserl [1911-1917(1970)] maintained that an entity t  is founded on 
another entity s if s's existence is necessary for i s existence. And s and t 
are directly foundationally related if and only if each one is founded on 
the other. Tropes, Simons claims, can be such that given a collection of 
them, each one is foundationally related to every other in the collection 
and nothing else. Bundles of foundationally related tropes are called
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foundational systems by Simons, and he identifies these as the 
fundamental constituents of physical reality. Objects are just entities that 
can be partitioned into elements forming foundational systems.148
Simons’ proposal appears interesting, but it meets with a difficulty. 
To account for change, Simons proposes what he calls a ‘nuclear account’ 
[lb.; 567-569]. He takes nuclei of foundationally related tropes (in his 
terminology, ‘kernels’) to constitute the substratum to which peripheral 
layers of tropes become attached. While the nucleus is the essence of 
each individual bundle of tropes and does not change, Simons argues, 
peripheral tropes can be lost, added and replaced: Simons’ account thus 
satisfactorily explains the difference between essential and accidental 
properties, and the notion of change in the latter. However, as pointed 
out by Denkel [1997], it is unable to provide room for substantial change, 
that is, for the type of change that involves partial or total loss of an 
object’s essence. In Simons’ framework, this would require a change in 
the nucleus of foundationally related tropes constituting the ‘core’ of 
each individual. However, if every individual substance is constituted by 
a nucleus of mutually dependent (foundationally related) tropes and 
outer layers of non-essential tropes dependent on the nucleus, it follows 
that the identity of a substance is entirely dependent on all the tropes in 
the nucleus and exactly those. Consequently, any conceivable change of 
that entity can only concern the external tropes ‘added’ to the nucleus. In 
Denkel’s words:
“If the tropes in the outer layer depend for their existence 
upon each trope in the nucleus, the destruction of any of the 
latter should have exactly the same effect as destroying the
148 Of course, while in the example of the hug given above the obtaining of the relation can 
be explained by making reference to the internal structure of the relata, here one has a 
fundamental non-physical modal property.
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substratum of an object, thereby leaving its qualities without a 
support” [lb.; 601].
Denkel gives the example of (a part of) an animal becoming boxed 
mince. A more effective (and less gory) example might be the decay of a 
type of particle into one or more particles of other types, typically 
described by elementary particle physics. Denkel says that:
“These are situations in which the so-called kernel of the 
object changes (or is lost) without the peripheral layer of 
contingent properties being lost, and it is hard to understand 
how Simons’ theory, which endows essences with the 
function of a substratum, will permit such a thing” [lb.].
Denkel therefore replaces Simons’ foundation relation with a relation, 
which he calls a saturation relation, expressing a weaker sort of 
dependence. Simons’ (Husserl’s) foundation relations are such that they 
render certain specific tropes existentially dependent on each other. 
According to Denkel’s view, instead, compresent tropes constitute a 
complex particular provided with a definite identity only as determinates 
for certain determinables. That is, coexisting tropes ‘complete each 
other’s existence’, as it were, only insofar as they are tropes o f a certain 
kin d  (internally related in the required way, of course), and not because 
they are exactly those tropes. It follows that any change is permitted 
(does not affect, that is, the identity and unity of the particular in 
question throughout the change involving it) that can be accounted for 
in terms of the substitution of a trope with another trope which acts as 
determinate for the same determinable. For instance, given an actual 
bundle x  of tropes ABC saturating each other, x  can become a different 
bundle ABD even if C is part of x s  ‘core’, provided that C and D are
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determinates for the same determinable, and that ABD is an admissible 
particular in all worlds nomologically similar to the actual world.
We will see what the relevance of this with respect to actual physical 
possibilities is in the next chapter. What is important to stress for the 
time being is that the metaphysical relation of saturation expresses the 
fact that tropes belonging to different ‘families’ can be mutually 
dependent on each other and nothing else. It is physics that must be 
looked at in order to individuate what the different families of basic 
tropes actually are, and what mutual dependencies actually hold. On the 
other hand, it seems to me that the saturation relation should not be 
regarded as akin to the infamous ‘dormitive virtues’ and consequently 
entirely dispensable. For physics by itself only describes the fact that 
certain fundamental properties are invariably found together, and does 
not (cannot) account for the nature of the relationships connecting them 
into unitary complexes (we have already seen that mere compresence is 
not enough). To add to the physical description the claim that the 
properties in question are entities of a specific type that are existentially 
dependent on each other does not seem to be an empty claim; and to be, 
in fact, all that is needed here from the metaphysical point of view.149
4. Tropes: an Assessment
I have argued that trope theory can satisfactorily account for 
individuation, similarity and the dynamics according to which unitary
149 Of course, one may take the nature of the saturation relation to suggest the dispensability 
of metaphysical explanation (at least in this case), as nothing ‘tangible’ and informative 
seems to be pointed to. But once a metaphysical explanation is sought, the present claim of 
mutual dependence does not seem less explanatory than the claim that substrata are tied to 
their properties, or that there exist external compresence relations among properties. For, 
one may legitimately ask what the ‘actual’ connection between substrata, or compresence 
relations, and properties, or between ‘tied to’ relations and their relata, is.
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complex particulars arise out of simpler components; and that it can be 
rendered immune to the objections customarily made against it.
As regards the empiricist demand for a factual basis for every 
knowledge claim, tropes not only satisfy the request, but appear to be in 
a privileged position. Since they are particular qualities, they are always 
(in principle if not in practice) directly knowable. And once one sees 
them as endowed with primitive thisness, it can be maintained in a 
trope-theoretic perspective that, by being acquainted with the things’ 
properties, one is ipso facto acquainted with their individuality.
This, of course, leads to an immediate rejection of PII. To use Adams’ 
terms, in a trope ontology suchnesses and thisnesses get identified; but 
this must be understood in the sense that they are distinct aspects of the 
same ontological simples, not that the latter gets reduced to the former. It 
follows that individuality is not the result of a sum of suchnesses, and 
that numerically distinct but qualitatively identical tropes can exist, and 
the same holds for complex particulars. This allows us to make sense of 
the intuition that everything is made out of properties while denying the 
legitimacy of the further step taken by the followers of Leibniz and 
Quine, that of reducing identities to qualities.
On the other hand, trope ontology also avoids talk of bare identities 
and the related problems, discussed in the section about substrata. In 
particular, we have seen that distinguishing bare particulars from their 
properties appears to entail a commitment to strong haecceitism as the 
thesis that things can be the same in possible worlds in which they do 
not have any property that they possess in the actual world. While not in 
itself inconsistent, this view might be regarded as unappealing. Trope 
theory avoids it, as it does not make sense to speak of a trope being the 
same in another possible world in which it does not have the same
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empirical content. And, once again, the same is also true for complex 
particulars: since complex particulars owe their identities to the tropes 
composing them, strong haecceitism is not true for them either, for an 
individual losing all its properties (i.e., its tropes) would lose its own 
identity too (in fact, it would vanish altogether).150
Trope ontology, in actual fact, appears to lead not to the complete 
rejection of haecceitism, but rather to the endorsement of the sort of 
moderate haecceitism  defended by Adams [1979]. Adams claims that it is 
reasonable to believe that
“thisnesses and transworld identities are primitive but 
logically connected with suchnesses” [1979; 25-26].
Trope theory allows one to make room for such a connection, and so 
embrace haecceitism in its moderate variant, because, as explained, it is 
essentially the claim that the things’ (fundamental) suchnesses are also 
the loci of the things’ identities.
Relatedly, another problem with bare particulars (that they appear in 
principle immune to change and destruction because property-less) also 
disappears. For tropes being the basic constituents of reality and having 
an essential qualitative content, they are the subjects and means of every 
change that occurs in the world.
Once the discussion of resemblance nominalism and the ontological 
commitments it requires is also taken into account, it appears fair to
150 The question remains of when a complex particular ceases to be that particular when it 
progressively loses its component tropes. This, however, appears to be largely a matter of 
convention. At any rate, as I will argue in detail in the next chapter, I contend that for the 
basic elements of physical reality, all their tropes (identified with their intrinsic, state- 
independent properties) are essential for their identity, in the sense that any change 
affecting their tropes is a substantial change.
193
claim that trope ontology is explanatory efficacious, simple, and also 
more economical and less committal than the existing alternatives.
Moving from this to a consideration of physical reality, it is obvious 
where the advantages of embracing trope ontology He. First, no problem 
arises with putative many-particle systems turning out to be composed of 
indiscernibles. This is because individuality is given regardless of the 
things’ indiscemibility. Consequently, one does not need to subscribe to 
the thesis that things can be weakly discernible in order to account for 
the quantum domain (at least parts of it) in terms of individuals. Nor is it 
necessary to re-describe the things that violate PII as ‘non-individuals’.151
Conclusions
In the present chapter, a version of trope ontology (that is, a one- 
category ontology of so-called abstract particulars) has been argued for 
and defended against traditional criticisms. The version of trope theory 
that has been endorsed avoids the problems individuated in the course of 
the thesis and those traditionally raised against trope ontologies; and also 
satisfies sensible empiricist criteria. As a consequence, it represents a 
plausible way of fleshing out the intuition underlying the Scotus-Kant- 
Adams view of individuality as fundamental and irreducible to 
qualitative facts. Having suggested a classification of types of properties, 
and an ontological account of the way tropes constitute complex entities, 
it is now time to deal with the last important task left open in this thesis. 
Namely, that of assessing whether a trope-theoretic account of the basic
151 One may object that it is in fact impossible to make sense of non-individuality within 
trope ontology. If this is regarded as a potential problem, however, the trope theorist can 
say that not all tropes have both determinate self-identity and numerical distinctness from 
all other things. Although this modification is by no means negligible, it would not entail 
that one must abandon the theory altogether.
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elements of physical reality along the lines suggested in this chapter can 
in fact be given. This means to identify those actual entities that we can 
regard as tropes properly understood; and to assess whether they truly 
are concrete and autonomous entities that can be conceived of as the 
basic constituents of everything else in the world. The allegedly ultimate 
constituents of reality are, obviously enough, those studied by 
contemporary physics. As a consequence, it is now necessary to examine 
whether these, as they appear in our best description of them, can be 
conceived of as tropes in the precise sense that has been defined here. If 
so, a reconstruction of the way in which the fundamental tropes 
constitute the whole of reality must then be suggested. All this will be 
done in the next, concluding chapter.
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Chapter 6  
A Trope-Based Reconstruction o f the 
Quantum World
In this chapter, I apply trope theory in the version outlined earlier to 
the quantum domain with a view to dealing with the third and last 
(alleged) difficulty for the supporter of primitive thisness identified in 
chapter 4: namely, that s/he cannot coherently account for reality as it is 
described by our best theories in the terms of his/her ontology. The 
essential elements of reality (as tropes) are identified with the state- 
independent properties of elementary particles as described by the so- 
called Standard Model. It is argued that these (and certain additional 
emergent properties) constitute all the existing entities and determine all 
their qualities. State-dependent properties, which become relevant at the 
level of the many-particle systems described by quantum statistics 
(traditionally taken to clash with an understanding of particles as 
individuals), are considered in detail.
1. Fundamental Tropes
While the literature on tropes is by now sizeable, very few authors 
have attempted to substantiate the claim that the basic constituents of 
reality are tropes by indicating actual physical entities capable of playing 
this role.
In attempting to answer, in the light of his own ontology of abstract 
particulars, the question of what the essential components of reality are,
196
Campbell [1990; Ch. 6] suggests taking physical fields as the basic tropes. 
He considers this option independently appealing because in harmony 
with the developments of physical science. But he also takes it to 
represent a useful hypothesis in the context of trope theory because it 
makes it possible to deal with certain problems such an ontological view 
is usually taken to meet with. Campbell says:
“Taking our clue from space-time [...], we now propose 
that all the basic tropes are partless and edgeless in the ways 
that space is, and that they change only in space-time’s 
innocent way. All basic tropes are space-filling fields, each one 
of them distributes some quantity, in perhaps varying 
intensities, across all of space-time” [lb.; 146].
In particular, Campbell takes it that there exists a field for each one of 
the basic forces in nature plus one matter field and one space-time field. 
And he supposes that the varying intensities of the fields and their 
combinations give rise to reality. According to him, this allows us to deal 
with the abovementioned boundary problem  [lb.; esp. 136-141], 
consisting of the fact that tropes -  despite their being taken to be 
fundamental constituents -  appear to be divisible into other tropes of the 
same type. The problem is readily solved within his proposal, he argues, 
because field-tropes as he envisages them are basic and indivisible. The 
problem of explaining the compresence of tropes and their constituting 
the same entity, explains Campbell, is also solved, because each field is 
endless and necessarily compresent with space-time at all points. The 
compresence of field-parts becomes therefore an internal relation and, as 
such, does not require an explanation. This proposal is surely interesting 
but, nevertheless, faces some problems.
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First, it is simply not true that a field must be compresent with the 
whole of space-time: already in classical field theory there exists the 
possibility for fields not to be present at certain points of space-time. But 
suppose this problem is overcome, for instance by postulating that the 
basic fields are indeed extended across the entirety of space-time but 
have (or may have) intensity zero at some points. The true difficulty 
regards whether Campbell’s field tropes can truly be regarded as tropes.
Campbell speaks of extended fields with varying intensities at various 
points of space (which is indeed the canonical formulation of physical 
fields). But is this what the trope ontologist wants? One could go as far as 
to suggest that extended entities with varying ‘intensities’ cannot be 
tropes. This could be justified on the basis of the fact, for example, that 
the different intensities of the same field must be similar or dissimilar to 
some extent and these (dis)similarities should be explained in the terms 
of the ontology being put forward: namely, in terms of resembling tropes. 
If this is correct, it entails that fields are not tropes but only complex 
trope-structures. At the very least, it is possible to claim that there appear 
to exist elements within Campbell’s fields which are simpler than the 
fields but equally capable of qualifying as basic tropes.152
Similar criticisms can be formulated against Von Wachter [2000], 
whose proposal has perhaps different motivations and fine-grained 
features, but generally goes along lines very similar to Campbell’s. Von 
Wachter starts from the consideration that common sense properties do 
not have definite boundaries and, instead, constitute a continuum. On
152 Campbell himself appears uncertain in this respect, for example when he claims that the 
fields he postulates change in the space-time’s ‘innocent’ (?) way, and that ‘perhaps’ they 
have varying intensities. It is clear that both these ‘softening’ terms are in fact meaningless, 
and that either something changes or not, and either something has varying intensities or 
not. But if, as acknowledged by Campbell, fields do change and have varying intensities 
(Campbell speaks of quasi-causal transmission of field-quantities across the field [lb.; 148]), 
this seems to prevent one from taking them as fundamental entities.
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the basis of this, he postulates basic unitary and ubiquitous fields on 
which all those things that we take to be properties are derivative.153 
Again, the internal complexity of the field tropes, this time together with 
the explicit talk of properties as subdivisions of these, again appears to 
suggest a tension between the basic intuition of trope ontology (that is, 
that certain particulars are the basic constituents of everything and, as 
such, must be simple) and the claim that the fundamental fields are 
extended tropes. Von Wachter’s claim that the field intensities are 
determinates and the fields determinables further strengthens the feeling 
that what is really basic is something simpler than the entire field. How 
can a determ inate be a fundamental component of reality in its 
actuality?
Given the above, it seems advisable to follow an alternative route, 
first suggested by Simons [1994]. According to Simons, we should look 
for basic tropes at the level of fundamental particles. Fundamental 
particles, he says, are entities with kernels constituted by
“a number of nuclear or essential properties like rest mass, 
charge, and quantum of spin [...and outer layers of...] 
contingent properties, e.g. their relative position, kinetic 
energy, momentum, direction of spin (all at a time) and so on”
[lb.; 570].
It is these properties, described by physical theory, that according to 
Simons we should regard as tropes. Simons’ position is indeed attractive 
and - 1 believe -  goes some way in the right direction, especially because 
it posits as basic tropes elements that indeed appear as fundamental and 
simple, and are so described by our best science. However, it too remains 
insufficient. The basic reason for this claim is that Simons overtly
153 In particular, Von Wachter argues that all properties correspond to either constant field 
intensities or to changes in these intensities, or to integrals over field intensities.
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acknowledges his perplexity as to how exactly to deal with quantum 
properties (in particular, as regards the fact that the basic properties of 
particles are described via probabilities, and allow for superposition [lb.; 
573-574]), and warily leaves the definition of the fundamental tropes 
vague.154
What can be done to improve on Simons’ proposal? In what follows, I 
offer a suggestion.
The best description of the basic constituents of reality and their 
interactions available nowadays is the so-called Standard Model. It was 
first developed in the early 1970s to account for three of the four known 
fundamental interactions among elementary particles (with the 
exception of gravity, which is still not treated adequately by 
microphysics). To date, it has had an impressive series of experimental 
confirmations. In particular, it successfully predicted the existence of a 
number of particles and approximately the exact values of certain 
physical quantities.155
According to the Standard Model, the fundamental particles are 12 
fermions constituting matter and 12 bosons mediating forces. Fermions 
can be either quarks (distinguished into six types, or ‘flavours’) or leptons
154 Also, although less importantly, Simons’ account of indistinguishable bosons seems 
unconvincing from a trope-theoretic perspective. He suggests that in the case of many- 
particle systems of identical bosons “[p]erhaps what happens is that two or more trope 
packages, when they get into proximity, expire [...] in favor of a single trope package 
whose properties are not really, but only apparently inherited from their predecessors” [lb.; 
573]. However, it is unclear why the trope theorist should subscribe to such a view, 
especially in the form according to which the new ‘package’ is composed of distinct tropes 
from those of its components. Simons appears here not to fully appreciate the fact that one 
of the advantages of trope theory (in particular, with respect to the bundle theory with its 
commitment to the Identity of the Indiscemibles) is exactly that it allows one to avoid 
certain ontological conclusions that are often drawn about the identity of things on 
empirical grounds.
155 On the other hand, the Standard Model does have shortcomings: it has a high number of 
free parameters that cannot be calculated independently o f empirical observation; it 
conflicts with the cosmological hypothesis of the Big Bang in certain respects 
(matter/antimatter ratio, initial cosmic inflation); and it predicts the existence of a particle 
(the Higgs boson) which has not been observed yet.
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(six more flavours). Bosons comprise photons, W+, W ' and Z° gauge 
bosons, and eight gluons. Each of these particles carries charges 
determining the precise nature of its interactions with others. In addition 
to fermions and bosons, there exist antiparticles; namely, particles 
identical to each fermion but with opposite charges (each boson-type 
constitutes instead its own antiparticle, except for the W+ and W" bosons, 
which are each other’s antiparticle).156
Each quark has mass, any of three ‘colour’ charges (red, green or blue) 
enabling it to take part in strong interactions (that is, to constitute 
protons and neutrons) and electric charge, which makes them subject to 
electromagnetic interactions as well. Leptons also have mass, but not 
colour charge, and so they do not take part in strong interactions. They 
do however experience the weak force and (if electrically charged) the 
electromagnetic force. W+, W ' and Z° gauge bosons have mass and 
electric charge, and mediate the weak nuclear interactions. Gluons are 
mass-less and electrically neutral, but carry colour charge, in virtue of 
which they interact among themselves and bind quarks together into 
protons and neutrons.157 Lastly, photons, the particles making up all 
forms of light and responsible for electromagnetic phenomena, do not 
seem to have any of these properties - nor any other property. However, 
each photon possesses energy, and this entails that it can in fact be 
attributed relativistic mass. True, the latter is distinct from the masses of
156 Note, however, that neutrinos only have mass, and so cannot be distinguished from the 
corresponding antiparticles on the basis of this criterion. While it is possible to say that 
neutrinos have left-handed and antineutrinos right-handed chirality (that is, component of 
spin along the direction of motion, left-handed if negative and right-handed if positive), 
some suggest that they are the same family of particles, much like in the case of electrically 
neutral bosons. Neutrinos and antineutrinos are sometimes referred as a whole as ‘Majorana 
particles’.
157 In particular, they can be thought of as having both colour and anti-colour (the property 
of the antiparticles of quarks corresponding to the quarks’ colour), and their number is 
directly derivable from the mathematical structure of the theory of strong interactions, 
quantum chromodynamics.
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the other types of particles, which are invariant masses, and is essentially 
the same as the total energy of the system. Nevertheless, the difference is 
one of ‘form’ rather than ‘substance’: as is well-known, according to 
relativity theory energy and mass are two ‘aspects’ of the same thing. 
Hence, I take it that tropes belonging to the same ‘family’ can be 
attributed to photons and to the other particles as their ‘masses’ (broadly 
understood).
In addition to these particles, there may be others. The Higgs boson is 
predicted to exist by the Standard Model, but has not been 
experimentally detected so far. It is, in fact, described as a spin-less and 
electrically neutral massive particle essential in explaining the actual 
masses of the other particles and, therefore, the dynamics of physical 
interactions. The graviton has also been conjecturally added to the 
Standard Model (as a particle with zero mass, zero electric charge and 
spin 2) in order to account for the mediation of gravity; but without 
success, due to theoretical problems consisting of the fact that infinities 
emerge in the formalism at high energies.158
Are there any other properties to be considered? Certain properties 
normally associated with particles - for instance, momentum (explicitly 
mentioned, as we have seen, by Simons) - are in fact excluded from the 
Standard Model. The reason is that they are state-dependent properties 
not essential for the constitution of particles. In fact, properties such as 
position and momentum are not ontologically ‘concrete’, in the sense 
that they do not count as material constituents of particles, and just 
describe the particles’ dynamic behaviour. On the other hand, all
158 Gravitation is said to be ‘non-renormalizable’. This led some to adopt string theory, in 
which gravitons are states of strings rather than particles. Of course, like Higgs bosons, 
gravitons have not been found experimentally. The real problem with them in this respect is, 
however, that gravity is the weakest force and, because of this, given our current 
technology there is not even hope of detecting the graviton any time soon.
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particles are commonly said -  on the basis of the Standard Model itself - 
to possess spin as an intrinsic property. Fermions have an absolute 
magnitude of spin of Vi, while bosons have spin 1. However, the actual 
spin (in one of three possible directions) for each particle can assume one 
of two values (±V2 or ±1) and, consequently, only the absolute spin 
magnitude is fixed for each particle type. This is what Simons has in 
mind when he distinguishes ‘quantum of spin’ and ‘direction of spin’, and 
takes the former as an essential property and the latter as a contingent 
property (see above). However, it seems to me incorrect to talk of two 
properties here, for there is only one spin observable (along each 
direction) for each quantum particle; but also unconvincing to take 
absolute spin as an essential property, as the latter is just an abstraction 
from the actual spin values of particles. For this reason, I keep spin out of 
the range of the essential properties of particles, and limit the latter to 
the particles’ ‘fully state-independent’ properties. One might object that 
spin is in fact an essential property of particles, as it determines the 
‘behaviour’ of the particle as a particle of a specific kind via the spin- 
statistics link. But the latter connection can in fact be questioned. 
Hilbom and Yuca [2002], for example, consider the theoretical possibility 
of small violations of the Symmetrization Postulate and the spin-statistics 
link as suggesting that the statistical behaviour of particles (as captured 
by the Indistinguishability Postulate) should be regarded as a formal 
feature of the state function describing systems of many particles rather 
than as essentially encoded in the individual particles. In general, spin 
does not seem to be a well-defined, intrinsic, essential property of an 
individual elementary particle in the same way as, say, its mass. Hence, I 
will keep excluding it from the domain of the basic constituents of reality 
in what follows.
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In the light of the above, I suggest that the level o f the fundamental 
components o f reality consists o f a set o f colour tropes, a set o f mass 
tropes and a set o f electric charge tropes, to be defined in  detail on the 
basis o f the em pirically detected properties o f elem entary particles. These 
properties are summarised in the table below (notice that masses are 
calculated by coupling left-handed and right-handed particles. Also, for 
neutrinos, the masses are not specifiable with certainty: they are known 
to be non-zero because of neutrino oscillation, the phenomenon that a 
neutrino created of a certain type (flavour) can be detected to be of 
another type at a later time. In general, the measures indicated are 
deduced from those of more complex particles; and this is inevitable in 
the case of quarks, which are always confined into composites because of 
the fact that (due to the self-interacting nature of gluons) it would take 
an infinite amount of energy to split them apart).159
159 For a detailed treatment of the Standard Model, see Kane [1987], Nachtmann [1990] or 
Novaes [2000]. In the table, the unit measure of mass is the MeV, the mega-electronvolt, 
where the electronvolt is equal to the amount of kinetic energy gained by a single unbound 
electron when it passes through an electrostatic potential difference of one volt in vacuum. 
In other words, it is equal to one volt (1 volt=l joule per coulomb) times the charge of a 
single electron. Of course, the unit measure of electric charge corresponds to the charge of 
an electron.
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Particle Type (Flavour) Mass Electric Charge Colour
Up/Antiup Quark 1.5 to 4 MeV, 
probably 
around 3 MeV
+/-2Z3 R, G or B/ AntiR, 
AntiG or AntiB
Down/Antidown Quark 4 to 8 MeV, 
probably 
around 6 MeV
7+1/3 R, G or B/ AntiR, 
AntiG or AntiB
Strange/An tistrange Quark 80 to 130 MeV, 
probably 
around 100 
MeV
7+1/3 R, G or B/ AntiR, 
AntiG or AntiB
Charm/Anfirharm Quark 1150 to 1350 
MeV, probably 
around 1300 
MeV
+/-2/3 R, G or B/ AntiR, 
AntiG or AntiB
Bottom/Antibottom Quark 4100 to 4400 
MeV
7+1/3 R, G or B/ AntiR, 
AntiG or AntiB
Top/Antitop Quark 171400 ±2100 
MeV
+/-2/3 R, G or B/ AntiR, 
AntiG or AntiB
Electron/Positron 0.511 MeV 7+1 -
Muon/Antimuon 105.7 MeV -/+1 -
Tau Lepton/Antititau 1777 MeV 7+1 -
Electron Neutrino/ Electron 
Antineutrino
<0.0000022
MeV
- -
Muon neutrino/Muon 
Antineutrino
<0.17 MeV - -
Tau Neutrino/Tau 
Antineutrino
<5.5 MeV - -
Photon Energy E=cp 
(speed of light 
times 
momentum)
W /W + Boson 0.0804 MeV -/+1 -
Z° Boson 0.0912 MeV - -
Gluons Combinations of R, G 
and B and AntiR, 
AntiG and AntiB
Higgs Boson >0.112 MeV - -
The elementary particles and their state-independent properties according to the Standard Model
Taking the properties summarized in the table as the basic tropes, 
the constitution of fundamental particles out of tropes is readily 
reconstructed .160 The connection between the tropes w ithin elementary
160 To this purpose, one might find it congenial to employ a formal framework such as, for 
example, that suggested in Mormann [1995], or that put forward by Fuhrmann [1991]. 
Mormann argues that trope ontology can be implemented via what is known as sheaf 
theory: a sheaf is a geometrical space in which a function can be defined mapping 
particulars in one space onto particulars onto another space according to specific constraints. 
Mormann describes how it is possible to take the former space as the space of tropes, and 
the latter as the space of actual entities (in our case, these would be particles). And to 
explain universals away on the basis o f formal features of the sheaf (universals correspond
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particles can be conceived of as a relation of saturation in the sense 
defined in the previous chapter. Physical necessity legislates how actual 
tropes (as determinates of the determinables of electric charge, mass and 
colour charge) saturate each other in our world (and in worlds 
sufficiently nomologically similar to it); and sets the constraints that they 
obey when doing so (for example, that only the particles with the 
smallest masses fail to exhibit a charge, or that every charge trope needs 
to be saturated by a mass trope).
So, for example, a trope of electric charge 0.511 MeV (more 
precisely, one whose causal power as regards electromagnetic interaction 
coincides in our ‘classifications’ with the magnitude 0.511 MeV) can 
coexist with a +1 charge trope. The individual resulting from the 
reciprocal saturation of the charge trope and the mass trope in question is 
a positron. The same applies m utatis mutandis for the other elementary 
particles.
As tropes build up fundamental particles, structures of progressively 
more complex particulars can in turn be constituted. For instance, 
suppose an appropriate mass trope, a +2/3 electric charge trope and a red 
colour trope compose an up quark a; and similarly (of course, with 
different tropes) for two down quarks b and c. These quarks are among 
the fundamental elements at the next level of entity constitution (I use 
‘entity constitution’ as a technical definition indicating the composition 
of complex entities out of more basic ones). They determine, in particular, 
the formation of a neutron. The latter is colour-less and electrically
to ‘global sections’, that is, roughly, mappings of similar tropes onto similar individuals). 
Fuhrmann, instead, conceives of trope structures as semilattices (algebraic structures 
consisting of a set of entities and a binary operation applying to them that obeys 
associativity, commutativity and idempotency). He defines an operation of composition, 
allegedly allowing one to account for the constitution of actual individuals out of abstract 
particulars, and for the laws of nature (which Fuhrmann sees as expressing the necessary 
coexistence of certain tropes).
206
neutral, and has a mass which is the result of the stun of the masses of the 
constituent quarks increased by the energy involved in the bond among 
the latter. The tropes, however, remain the same, i.e., those of the 
original quarks: the properties of the neutron are, that is, just D- 
properties produced by trope composition.
Families of electrons, protons and neutrons are the basic 
constituents at the following level, that of the chemical elements. For 
instance, 79 electrons, 79 protons and 118 neutrons give rise to an atom 
of stable gold. And many such atoms determine molecules and bigger 
pieces of gold. The properties of the latter, such as those that we express 
via the predicates ‘melts at a temperature of 1064.18 C , or ‘is a good 
conductor of heat’ are, once again, D-properties determined by the way 
in which the initial tropes are structured together.
It is easy to see that the same ‘dynamics’ can be invoked at each 
level of higher complexity.
As regards substantial change, discussed in the previous chapter, it 
is worth briefly describing it in terms of tropes at the basic level of entity 
constitution, that of elementary particles. It is possible, for instance, for a 
neutron to decay into a proton plus an electron and an electron 
antineutrino. This transformation can be described as one of the down 
quarks in the neutron having its electric charge -1/3 trope replaced by 
one -2/3 trope, and its mass trope of 6 MeV replaced by a mass trope of 3 
MeV161, so becoming an up quark. The details can again be accounted for 
in terms of physical necessity: for example, one can say that a
161 One might suggest instead that there are basic tropes corresponding to ‘basic units’ of 
the relevant properties, and that all the others are in fact composed out of these. In this case, 
one would not have a replacement, but rather a loss of three ‘units’ on the part of the initial 
mass-complex. This might be the case but, on the other hand, there is no evidence in favour 
of this hypothesis. On the other hand, this would be significant with respect to Armstrong’s 
‘piling objection’, considered in the previous chapter. At any rate, these are details about 
the ‘truly fundamental’ tropes that are irrelevant for the present discussion, as they do not 
affect the proposal being formulated.
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‘replacement’ of electric charge tropes of the type described above 
determines the production of a particle with electric charge equal to the 
difference between the initial and final charges, and of a neutral 
antiparticle. Indeed, neutron decays of the sort described (called neutron 
p-decays) have an electron and an electron antineutrino as by-products. 
The masses of these can be connected to the difference in mass between 
the neutron and the proton (in particular, between the down and up 
quark) and changes in internal bonds.162
The foregoing discussion makes it (hopefully) clear that tropes as 
intended here are indeed concrete, in the sense that they are material 
constituents of physical reality; and that they are autonomous entities, in 
the sense that they are not existentially dependent on entities belonging 
to other categories (even though they can be so dependent on other 
tropes in the sense that, at least in some cases, certain tropes only exist 
together with other tropes in bundles of mutually saturated tropes). The 
important issue left open in the previous chapter is thus eventually 
solved: it is possible consistently to describe reality in terms of tropes and 
nothing else.
It is worth emphasising that nothing in the suggested picture relies 
on an assumption of physicalist reductionism. Physics plays an essential 
role in identifying the fundamental properties of material things, and is 
consequently indispensable in defining one’s ontology. However, no 
denial of the possibility of genuinely non-physical properties is implied 
at any point. In general, trope theory leaves room for non-supervenient 
properties, and these can be properties of any kind. If a property other 
than the fundamental state-independent properties of elementary 
particles which is not derivative on these turns out to be likely to exist
162 In addition, the transformation is mediated by a W  boson.
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according to science, one just needs to posit, at the relevant level of 
entity constitution, one or more non-reducible (types of) properties that 
‘get added’ to the complex particulars existing at that level as further 
basic tropes.
Going back for a moment to the discussion of quantum mechanics 
in chapter 3, for example, consider spin correlations in entangled systems 
as genuinely non-supervenient on properties of the entangled particles. 
Such correlations can be regarded as tropes that count as ‘ontological 
additions’ at the level of elementary particles. In this perspective, 
particles are built out of tropes (their state-independent properties). Then, 
systems of particles (can) arise in which particles so constituted 
additionally exhibit spin correlations in the sense of having an additional 
concrete constituent literally ‘attached’ to them.
This consideration leads us to a more general discussion of state- 
dependent properties and quantum statistics.
2. State-D ependent Properties and Quantum Statistics
Claiming that particles are individuals in virtue of the primitive 
thisness of the tropes coinciding with their state-independent properties, 
I argued, allows us to take quantum particles as individuals in spite of the 
possibility of their indiscernibility.
However, the question arises at this point of what treatment is to be 
given, in the context of trope ontology and of an interpretation of 
quantum particles as individuals, of state-dependent properties. This is 
connected to specific problems that arise for the view that quantum 
entities are individuals with respect to quantum statistics.
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Indeed, when the state-dependent properties of systems of many 
particles are considered from the perspective of the ‘arrangements’ 
available to such systems, and of the probabilities of each one of these 
arrangements being actualised, the resulting statistics has undeniably 
peculiar features. In actual fact, the claim that since quantum particles 
obey a non-classical statistics they should be considered as non­
individuals can be found as early as Bom ([1926], [1943]) and 
Schrodinger [1952] and is generally regarded as quite plausible. It is 
therefore certainly necessary to defend the idea that particles are 
individuals from the threat represented by the peculiar statistics holding 
in quantum mechanics.
I first summarize the sort of statistics obeyed by classical and 
quantum particles.163
Statistics as it is applied to systems of many particles is of course 
primarily connected to statistical mechanics as the study of the motions 
of particles in space and of the ways in which these particles occupy 
energy states.
In CM, Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics (MB) holds. According to it, the 
number nj of material particles in energy state j -  given energy states in 
thermal equilibrium - is given by164
In the case of bosons, Bose-Einstein statistics (BE) applies. It has it 
that
npgj/e^y^-l
In the case of fermions, instead, one has
163 For details, see for instance Reif [1965] and Park [1992].
164 In the equation, gj the number of microstates with energy &j (the energy of state j), k is 
the Boltzmann constant (relating temperature to energy), T is temperature and fi is the 
chemical potential (roughly speaking, a measure of the particles’ tendency to diffuse).
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nj=gj/e^r^)/kT+ l
The latter expresses so-called Fermi-Dirac statistics (FD).
Generalizing to all observables, and focusing on the number of 
possible arrangements rather than on the number of particles in a given 
state, one has three different ways of counting the number of a priori 
equiprobable ways in which particles can occupy available states with 
respect to any of their observables.
Suppose one has N particles distributed over M possible single­
particle microstates. In classical mechanics (with distinguishable 
particles)165, the number of possible distributions W  is 
W=MN
This is not true in the case of quantum particles, for which a smaller 
number of arrangements is available. For bosons, one has
W=(N+M-1)!/N!(M-1)!
In the case of fermions, EP applies and further reduces the number of 
possible states, that becomes equal to
W=M!/N!(M-N)!
On the basis of these equations, one can calculate the probability for a 
specific configuration being realized. This is given by
Prob(s)=T/W
with 5  being the arrangement in question, and T the number of ways 
in which s can be realized (obviously, to be calculated via the type of 
statistics appropriate for the type of entities being dealt with).
The difference among the three statistics can be described by using 
simple examples such as the following: classically one has four possible 
arrangements for every macrostate composed of two individuals to each
165 Whether and, if so, with what ontological import indistinguishability can be traced in 
CM is an open question that it is not necessary to delve into here.
211
one of which two states are available -  and equiprobable - and each 
arrangement (since it can only be realized in one way) has probability Va; 
in quantum mechanics, instead, there are only either three such 
arrangements (for bosons) or one (for fermions) -  and the probabilities 
are 1/3 and 1, respectively.
The key difference is that permutations of qualitatively identical 
particles lead to statistically distinct configurations in the classical but 
not in the quantum case. In particular, classical systems can be in non- 
sym m etric states (that is, states in which individuals have definite but 
different values separately, and so permutations do make a difference), 
while quantum systems cannot. Instead, given the nature of quantum 
reality, entangled states (which are also (anti-)symmetric) are available to 
quantum systems, while they are not a possibility in CM. Using the 
customary notation, and considering again a two-particle system and a 
(generic) two-valued observable, the available possibilities can be 
represented as follows (with xand  ^representing the available values for 
the observable, and the subscripts indicating the -  alleged - particle 
identities):
C1-C4 are the states available in CM, Q1-Q3 those available in QM 
(in particular, Ql, Q2 and Q3 - with a negative sign - are accessible states 
for bosons, while only Q3 - with a positive sign - is a possible state for 
fermions).
(C3)
(C4)
(03)
(Cl-Ql)
(C2-Q2)
1 /V2 (| x> i \y>2± | y> 11 x>i)
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Why exactly is the fact that non-symmetric states are not an option 
in QM supposed to count as evidence of the particles’ non-individuality? 
Because, the argument goes, given a set of identical particles in the same 
system, it is impossible for a specific one of them to have a certain value 
for an observable, and for another specific one to have a different value 
for that observable, as would be required for a non-symmetric state to 
obtain, because these particles sim ply do no t have determinate identities 
allowing for such property-attributions.
Indeed, quantum statistics does find an immediate explanation if it is 
regarded as applying to non-individual entities. For, clearly, particle 
permutations cannot possibly make a difference when one counts 
possible arrangements if there are no particle identities to be exchanged. 
What can be said from the point of view of particles as individuals?
It is customary to look for an explanation of quantum statistics from 
the perspective according to which particles are individuals by making 
reference to restrictions on the states available to physical systems. That 
is, by assuming the existence of constraints on what particles in many- 
particle systems ‘can do’, rather than suggesting their non-individuality. 
Quantum systems, on this construal, are said never to be found in non- 
symmetric states166 just because this is a fundamental feature of the 
microscopic world; and one that has nothing to do with the particles’ 
individuality. This line is taken, for example, by Huggett [1995] and by 
French and Krause [2006].
Redhead and Teller ([1991] and [1992]) emphasise a potential 
difficulty for this approach. One can certainly assume the alleged state- 
accessibility restrictions as primitive and non-explicable. But it is simply
166 One must be careful to stress that only completely non-symmetric states are to be 
excluded, while states other than the usual bosonic and fermionic ones are allowed by the 
theory.
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not possible to make such an assumption and keep all the rest unchanged, 
because this would contradict an essential requirement. Namely, that 
when some meaningful part of a theory does not seem to represent 
anything, one should try to further elaborate on the theory and its 
applications, and eventually find the real-world counterpart of the bit of 
formalism apparently devoid of content. Otherwise, the problem would 
arise that the theory describes something that neither is actual nor can 
ever be actualised: using Redhead’s terminology, one would have surplus 
structure that cannot be hoped to be convertible into something 
informative and provided with content.
In the present case, though, non-symmetric states can plausibly be 
said not to correspond to actual physical situations: not only are they 
never experienced; nature would be entirely different if they were 
realized, and so one can exclude them in principle. Therefore, the 
description of non-symmetric states in the theory does indeed seem to 
represent an in principle useless surplus structure that one had better get 
rid of.
The only way to do so, Redhead and Teller argue, is by opting for a 
formalism without ‘particle labels’. The obvious candidate for performing 
such a change is the Fock space formalism of quantum field theory (QFT), 
where, roughly speaking, only information about ‘how many’ entities are 
in a certain state is conveyed, and not about ‘which entity is what’. 
W ithin this approach, however, one appears compelled to dispense not 
only with the labels, but with what they express at the ontological level 
too: namely, the particles’ primitive numerical identity. Therefore, 
Redhead and Teller seem to suggest, the mere presence in the theory of 
states which are physically meaningful and yet never actualised (nor
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actualisable) is sufficient to take the statistical behaviour of quantum 
particles as pointing to their non-individuality.
French and Krause [2006; 193-197] argue that Redhead and Teller’s 
argument is not convincing because there is a tension between the 
heuristic role of surplus structure and the use of it as a methodological 
rule having an effect on one’s ontological beliefs. In more detail, French 
and Krause emphasise that recent work in physics has made it clear that a 
complete description of the world may require more than the canonical 
(anti)symmetric representations; and that, in connection to this, the 
richness of the formalism has indeed played an important role in the 
exploration of the actual world. As a consequence, French and Krause 
deny that the claim that there are primitive restrictions on state- 
accessibility in the quantum domain is inherently problematic, and 
contend that the assumption of specific initial conditions together with 
the impossibility of states of a given symmetry evolving into states of a 
different symmetry is sufficient for explaining the statistical evidence.
It seems to me that French and Krause are right in allowing for some 
degree of flexibility with respect to the interpretation of the formalism. 
On the other hand, however, it appears to be a fact that, while types of 
quantum systems other than (anti)symmetric ones could exist, non- 
symmetric states seem to be ruled out in principle. And it is the latter 
that Redhead and Teller focus their attention on. Moreover, one may 
legitimately regard the postulation of primitive restrictions and non- 
further-specified claims concerning initial conditions and constraints on 
the evolution of physical systems as not completely satisfactory. So, it 
seems, we are in an impasse.
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Is an alternative explanation, not departing from the idea that 
particles are individuals, but also avoiding the mere postulation of 
restrictions on the accessible states possible?
My answer is affirmative.167 The idea that will be articulated in the 
rest of the paper is that those who want to defend the position according 
to which quantum particles are individuals must make a precise 
ontological claim: they must argue that particles in quantum many- 
particle systems never possess their state-dependent properties as 
intrinsic, and that such properties are, instead, always emergent 
properties o f the whole.168
In particular, given any many-particle quantum system, they must 
regard the following as being the case. The total system possesses actual 
values for its  state-dependent properties. The component particles, 
though, are only related to each other at the level of their dispositions to 
have specific values for those properties upon measurement. These 
dispositions, crucially, are not possessed by the particles and are instead
167 Other proposals have been put forward which, however, for a reason or another do not 
seem to deliver what they claim. See, in particular, Huggett’s ([1995], [1997] and [1999]) 
denial that haecceitism must be taken as a necessary manifestation of individuality, and the 
replies in Teller [2001] and Gordon ([2002] and [2003]). And Belousek’s [2000] attempt to 
put the fundamental postulate of statistical mechanics -  attributing equal a priori 
probabilities to each possible state -  into question, and the response in Teller and Redhead 
[2000]. Indeed, if individuality is not reducible to qualities, then some form of haecceitism 
must be accepted; and an assumption of equal a priori probabilities is in fact sensible in the 
majority of cases. Saunders [2006a] also contains an explanation of quantum statistics. He, 
however, develops his argument on the basis of an assumption of indistinguishability 
extended to classical particles which I do not want to commit myself to here.
168 One may point to a potential inconsistency here. When discussing Saunders’ proposal 
concerning fermions and weak discemibility, I argued that there exists a degree of 
underdetermination as regards the ontological interpretation of entangled states. Here, 
instead, I am putting forward a view which is clearly a form of property holism, with 
separate individuals and emergent relations holding among them. I take it, however, that the 
positive arguments provided in the previous chapter and in the preceding sections of this 
chapter provide sufficient reasons for endorsing property holism. If particles are individuals 
thanks to their unique state-independent properties, it seems to me, they should be regarded 
as individuals independently of the systems they enter into. That is, while it is possible to 
claim - along the lines of ontological holism - that quantum particles are individuals unless 
they partake in systems of many identical particles (in which case, as we have seen is 
suggested by Simons, they give rise to a single, new ‘trope package’), I consider a view 
according to which particles remain individuals all along more attractive from the 
perspective of identity and individuality as primitives.
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‘encoded’ in emergent relations holding between them. In a nutshell, the 
total system exhibits both actual properties and what one may call 
‘ emergent dispositional relations.
That the statistics is a description of the latter is a natural thing to 
claim: statistics can be generally intended as a description of possible 
outcomes of measurements (broadly understood), and it is a widely 
shared opinion that in quantum mechanics the latter do not uncover 
already possessed properties but rather determine, in some sense, the 
possession of actual properties. Here, in particular, I endorse the claim 
that measurements actualise certain propensities by making emergent 
dispositional relations ‘evolve into’ monadic actual (in philosophical 
vocabulary, ‘categorical’ as opposed to ‘dispositional’) properties of their 
relata.
The philosophical literature on emergence is large169, but for present 
purposes it suffices to take an emergent property to be a property P with 
the following characteristics:
i) P is the property of a whole constituted of simpler 
components;
ii) If P is a property of the whole composed by parts a and b, P is 
not reducible to the separate properties of a and b, but has 
instead - partly or entirely - ‘new content’.
Emergence can thus be regarded here as the denial of mereological 
supervenience for properties. For a traditional example, think of the 
property of ‘being in mental state x . For mind-body dualists, this 
property is an emergent property of the physical wholes that we call 
‘persons’. Such a property has the two features above: i) it is attributed to 
a person as a whole, and a person is an entity with simpler component
169 For a recent collection of essays on the subject, see Clayton and Davies [2006].
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parts; ii) the contents of one’s mental states are not reducible to the 
properties of one’s physical parts.170
For emergent relations, the following also holds:
iii) An emergent relation R is an emergent n-adic property of the 
whole composed of n  parts which has parts xi, xi, ..., Xn as its 
relata.
So defined, R is a property exhibited by a whole (call it S) which is 
about the components of S (as R’s relata) but is not reducible to their 
properties.
In addition, crucially, assume that R’s ‘content’ does not include 
reference to the identities of its relata either. To illustrate this with a 
useful example, think about two fair coins: of course, since these are 
classical objects a property of the whole such as, for instance, ‘one heads 
and one tails’ is always reducible to two monadic intrinsic properties 
(‘heads’ and ‘tails’) possessed by the coins separately. As a consequence, 
the property of the whole does in fact say which coin is what, and thus 
includes a reference to specific identities. But if it were possible to have 
the ‘one heads and one tails’ property of the two-coin system w ithout 
having separate properties for the two coins (perhaps because, one could 
imagine, the former only describes the outcome of a future coin toss), 
then the property of the whole would be an emergent property that 
would not say anything about any specific coin.171 Note that, in  this latter
170 In what follows, obviously enough, only physical components, wholes and properties 
will be considered.
171 It seems, on the other hand, that emergent relations are not necessarily independent in 
their ‘qualitative content’ of the identities of their relata. For instance, to stick to the coin 
example, one may have a relation saying that coin 1 will be heads and coin 2 will be tails, 
even though at the time in which the relation holds the coins possess neither a heads or tails 
value nor a disposition to have one in the future. Alternatively, one may have two coins 
with well-defined properties, but also additional content in the relation holding between 
them. For instance, in the form ‘coin 1 heads, coin 2 tails and total mass increased by 0.5 
MeV with respect to the sum of the coins’ separate masses’. Notice, incidentally, the role 
played by time-asymmetry in defining these relations.
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case, sw itching the coins would no t give rise to a new  total state. 
whatever happens to the coins’ identities, it is the case that one (without 
any specification as to which one) will be heads and the other tails. Still, 
it makes perfect sense to regard the coins as individuals.
This, it is claimed here, is exactly what happens in the case of 
quantum many-particle systems. For these systems, one only has 
information about the particles in the form (assuming again two-particle 
and two-value systems) ‘1 has the same value as 2 for property P, namely, 
x , ‘1 has the same value as 2 for property P, namely, y  or ‘1 has opposite 
value to 2 for property P \172 According to the present proposal, all these 
qualitative descriptions, including the first two, correspond to emergent 
relations of the sort just illustrated. And here too, as for the strange coins 
above, the descriptions can be taken to be descriptions of individuals.
The idea that all statistically relevant properties of quantum systems 
are emergent relations is not as ‘exotic’ as it may seem at first: it 
essentially consists of an extension to other quantum states o f certain 
w idely shared views regarding entangled states. It is commonly claimed 
that quantum entanglement consists of some form of non-separability, 
coinciding with the existence of emergent properties that belong to the 
entire system and not to the system’s component particles. Teller [1989] 
designates as particularism  the view that the world is composed of 
individuals possessing non-relational properties, and relations among 
which supervene on their non-relational properties. He claims that the 
differences between classical and quantum mechanics are due to the fact 
that particularism is true of the entities dealt with at the level of the 
former, but not of those described by the latter. In the quantum domain,
172 For simplicity, the properties are expressed as if  they were categorical and not 
dispositional here (and below). Strictly speaking, one finds properties such as ‘ 1 and 2 will 
(be measured to) have the same value for property P, namely, x’ etc.
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Teller argues, one must endorse relational holism, that is, the view that 
certain properties of the total system are emergent relations entirely 
independent of the properties of the system’s component parts. In 
particular, Teller considers as a reason to embrace relational holism the 
failure of outcome-independence in the case of the experimental 
confirmations of the violation of Bell’s inequalities. Relational holism, he 
holds, allows one to dispense with a tacit assumption of ‘ontological 
locality of values’, and consequently renders quantum mechanics 
compatible with relativity (see Teller [1989; 214-215]).173
It can be seen that entangled states, once interpreted from the 
viewpoint of Teller’s relational holism, exhibit emergent relations of the 
type described above. Consider the singlet state of spin of two fermions. 
There is a property (the total spin) of a composite system reducible to the 
properties of the system’s parts, which are not in any specific state with 
respect to their state-dependent properties. The total spin property, 
however, coincides with a relation describing the future spin-outcomes 
for the separate fermions in a precise way (as opposite). This latter 
relation is independent of the fermions’ identities, as it does not depict 
either of them as being in a specific state, nor conveys information as to 
which fermion will have which value for spin.174
Teller’s perspective can, therefore, be taken as the starting point here. 
The crucial addition to it - anticipated above - can be formulated as the
173 The idea is that non-locality is avoided in a relational holist context because, according 
to the latter, in EPR-like settings one does not have a causal relation between two space­
like separated events; rather, one has a causal influence on a single entity (the emergent 
relation), which then ‘propagates’ to others (its relata) via a causally continuous process 
(which is immediate in time but also transmitted through a physical continuum -  the 
relation itself - rather than at-a-distance).
174 There certainly is much to ask about the suggested ‘coincidence’ between the property 
of the whole and the relation between the (future) properties of the components. I am 
assuming here that there exist two distinct properties, one actual and the other dispositional, 
but perhaps one may put forward a stronger claim of identity and see the two as different 
‘aspects’ o f the same property? In any event, nothing hinges on this in the rest of the paper.
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suggestion that there is no reason for saying that the particularist 
perspective, which is agreed to fail for entangled systems, is valid for 
non-entangled ones. Indeed, the extension being proposed consists of 
the claim that quantum relational holism concerns no t only entangled 
but also non-entangled system s’, and that, as a consequence, the 
independence of the entire system’s properties (as emergent relations) of 
the identities of its components (as individuals) generalises to all 
properties and states.175
Eventually getting to the problem being discussed, it can be 
maintained that the above is all that is needed in order to provide an 
account of quantum statistics in the context of an ontology of individuals.
First of all, the perspective just envisaged entails that for all many- 
particle systems and state-dependent properties particle exchanges do not 
give rise to new arrangements (i.e., the identities of the particles are not 
statistically relevant) not because particles are not individuals and 
consequently do not have well-defined identities. Rather, because the 
particles’ identities do no t p lay any role in  the determination o f the states 
that are described by the statistics, which are always states that exhibit 
emergent dispositional relations understood in the precise sense specified 
in this paper. As in the case of our two imaginary coins, switching the 
identities of the relata does not affect the qualitative content of the 
relation that characterises a many-particle quantum system.
A closely related consequence is that one should not expect ‘quantum 
analogues’ of classical states such as C4 (that is, non-symmetric quantum 
states) to exist, because these would require a property-structure 
different from the one that -  it is being claimed -  is exhibited by 
quantum systems. That is, they would require individual particles that
175 Also, but less importantly, the dispositional element emphasised here is not given the 
same relevance in Teller’s work.
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possess well-defined values for their observables separately from  each 
other, which is exactly what is ruled out in the present framework.
Another way to see this point is the following. If relational holism is 
true of all quantum many-particle systems, it means that the 
correspondence between states Cl and C2 on the one hand and states Q1 
and Q2 on the other is only an appearance due to the formalism 
employed. While the former two effectively are states in which each 
particle is in a determinate state (that is, possesses a value for the 
property under consideration as intrinsic), the latter two are instead 
states in which there is an emergent relation but no determinate states 
for the relata, exactly in the same way as in the states described by Q3 
and Q4. This reading of the situation makes entangled states look 
immediately much more ‘natural’ than non-symmetric ones in the 
quantum case: for, if Q1 and Q2 were states in which each specific 
particle possesses a specific property, then Q3 and Q4 would be ‘farther 
removed’, as it were, from them than states analogous to C3 and C4, and 
so there would indeed be a reason to expect the latter to be realized. But 
if one has instead only emergent relations, then states exhibiting 
relations attributing equal values to their relata are unsurprisingly 
‘complemented’ by states describing ‘opposite value’ relations, i.e., by 
entangled states. As a matter of fact, other kinds of states are necessarily 
excluded.176
What has just been conjectured can hold for all systems, 
independently of the number of their individual components. To see this, 
one just needs to conceive of the right emergent relations. For instance, 
considering three particles and two states, one has (N+M-1)!/N!(M-1)! 
possible states, namely 4. These are readily described by two ‘same value’
176 Recall the question about non-symmetric states asked in section 1, and the relative 
footnote regarding the ‘tacit assumption’ of intrinsic properties for the separate particles.
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relations of the sort already encountered, plus two ‘different values’ 
relations: ‘two particles have the same value for property P, namely, x, 
and one particle has the other value, y  for property P’; and ‘two particles 
have the same value for property P, namely, y, and one particle has the 
other value, x, for property P’.177
In fact, if one thinks about it, one can see that the explanation178 of 
quantum statistics suggested here m ust be deemed satisfactory if an 
account based on non-individuality is. Because the former differs from 
the latter only with respect to ‘where identity is taken out of the picture’, 
so to speak: property-type rather than property-bearers.
In the light of the preceding discussion, questions regarding the 
‘mysterious non-classicality’ of quantum statistics eventually turn out to 
be less problematic for the supporter of individuality than commonly 
thought. The specific identities of the separate individual particles, it is 
possible to claim, are simply irrelevant for the determination of any of 
the states that the statistics describes, due to the peculiar property- 
structure exhibited by quantum entities in such states.179
Let us now consider some possible reactions, and add a few remarks.
i) One may dislike an ontology according to which non-supervenient 
relations invariably emerge in quantum many-particle systems out of 
particles that possess separate actual (or, ‘categorical’) properties when 
they do not belong to the same system. In reply to this sentiment, the 
following remark can be formulated (again). The fact of emergence being
177 Again, this neglects the dispositional element for simplicity. Here, the essential fact is 
that there are only two possible ways for three particles not to have all the same value for a 
two-valued observable if the relevant information is entirely encoded in emergent 
(dispositional) relations in the sense assumed here.
178 It is important to emphasise that here we have an ontological explanation of why there 
are state-accessibility restrictions that apply to the particles as individuals, not (anymore) an 
a priori denial of the possibility of certain states being actualised.
179 Notice that such a property-structure might demand in turn an explanation. But this does 
not involve the particles’ identities and, therefore, it does not have to do with (non- 
)individuality any longer. See point i) in the next section.
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pointed at is something peculiar about the quantum domain in general, 
and the present proposal simply extends to other systems claims that are 
already widely accepted for certain physical composites (i.e., entangled 
systems) under any interpretation o f the theory. If an explanation must 
be sought at all, it must regard the nature of entanglement rather than 
(or at least before) the present suggestion concerning quantum statistics.
ii) The results (mentioned in chapter 3) showing that quantum 
correlations cannot be regarded as real and local properties of composite 
systems on pain of violating Bell’s inequalities for pairs of correlated pairs 
of particles180 may be taken to prevent one from understanding quantum 
correlations in the way suggested here. However, it seems to me that to 
describe correlations as dispositions rather than actual properties allows 
one to draw the needed distinction. If an objective local property of a 
system is one that cannot change in response to what is done to another 
system which is not interacting with the first, and correlations do in fact 
change in this way, then one just needs to discard the assumption of 
‘objectivity and locality’ for dispositions. After all, of course the authors 
presenting the mentioned impossibility results do not want to deny the 
existence of correlations altogether, which are undoubtedly real181; thus, 
perhaps regarding these correlations as dispositions is the way to go in 
order to make sense of both quantum holism and the violation of Bell’s 
inequalities by more complex systems.182
180 Cabello [1999], Jordan [1999] and Seevinck [2006], in particular, aim to refute 
Mermin’s (see, for instance, his [1999]) suggestion that quantum mechanics is only about 
correlations, and correlations -  to be intended as realistically as possible - are all there is to 
quantum systems.
181 In fact, they stress the fundamental role of correlations in the context of quantum 
information.
182 To answer someone not happy with this, I think, I would have to retreat to the claim that 
in quantum many-particle systems state-dependent properties are not possessed by 
individual particles as their monadic properties, but only by the whole systems as 
correlations o f some sort among their parts; and, as a consequence, quantum statistics is 
exclusively concerned with correlations, whatever the ontological nature o f the latter may
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iii) One might insist on the presence of in principle meaningless 
surplus structure in the formalism of quantum mechanics. This response 
could in that case be given: it can equally be maintained that classical 
mechanics is inadequate as a description of the objects in its domain 
because it is possible to describe the latter entities as entangled but 
entangled states are never realised in the classical world. In general, 
given any physical theory and its formalism, it appears always possible to 
‘cook up’ some form of surplus structure. In fact, it seems correct to claim 
that what counts as surplus structure is not immediately determined and 
ontological presuppositions are fundamental for interpreting the theory. 
This is essentially the reason why it is contended here that the 
ontological explanation provided in this paper succeeds where talk of 
inexplicable state-accessibility restrictions failed.183
iv) It could be maintained that the picture delineated in this paper 
essentially amounts to an endorsement of Bohmian mechanics: the 
attribution of state-dependent properties to the ‘whole system’, that is, 
could be regarded as basically the same as the attribution of them to a 
‘guiding wave’. There might be something to this criticism, in the sense 
that the basic idea is in some way inspired by the De Broglie-Bohm view 
and by the thought that there may be a clear-cut ontological difference 
between types of quantum properties.184 But of course, the important 
difference exists that no assumption has been made here about
be. The basic idea would anyway be preserved which I consider sufficient for explaining 
quantum statistics in an individual-based setting.
183 It is interesting to notice that Huggett [1995] makes the same claim about surplus 
structure (using the example of the description in the ‘language’ of classical mechanics of a 
body moving faster than the speed of light) but by way of conclusion of a paper that 
attempts to deflate the relevance of metaphysics entirely.
184 As is well-known, Bohmian mechanics takes the particles’ state-independent properties 
and their positions as essential to the particles themselves, while it attributes all the state- 
dependent properties to a wave component, ‘guiding’ the particles in space. The exact 
position occupied by the particles with respect to the wave determines their behaviour 
including, crucially, the outcomes of measurements of state-dependent properties.
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uniqueness of positions and initial particle distribution in agreement 
with |^ |2, which are two distinguishing features of Bohmian mechanics. 
Also, crucially, unlike in Bohmian mechanics the notion of collapse is 
retained in the present framework. Therefore, the analogy is only 
superficial.
A closely related objection could be that the suggested proposal aims 
to achieve something which is already obtained by endorsing Bohmian 
mechanics, and consequently turns out to be superfluous. This criticism, 
however, can easily turned on its head: the suggested picture of quantum 
reality, one could argue, achieves some of the allegedly important results 
of Bohmian mechanics (possibility to describe particles as (quasi- 
)classical objects, reconstruction of the statistics within an ontology of 
individuals) without departing from what many see as the correct theory 
of the quantum world and the correct interpretation of it (namely, the 
so-called ‘orthodox’ interpretation of quantum mechanics based on Von 
Neumann’s mathematical formalism and on the notion of collapse of the 
wave-function). True, if one is happy with Bohmian mechanics, one will 
presumably find no reason to embrace the perspective defined in this 
paper. But the present work is primarily directed to those who are, to the 
contrary, not particularly fascinated by Bohm’s theory and would rather 
stick to standard quantum mechanics (perhaps, provided  that the latter 
could be shown to be consistently interpretable in terms of individuals).
v) A more important thing to say regards a consequence of the 
present proposal for the interpretation of quantum mechanics. Usually, as 
we have seen in chapter 3, the Eigenstate-Eigenvalue Link is employed 
when interpreting the quantum formalism. It licenses inferences such as 
the following:
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[Prob(particle xhas property P with value v)=l]=>[(Particle x  actually 
has property P with value v)]
However, it was denied earlier that in states such as, for instance, Q1 
one has two particles each actually possessing a specific value for the 
given observable as an intrinsic property: the consequent in the above 
conditional must thus be deemed false. But in such states, the component 
particles have probability 1 of being detected as having that property (as 
they are in an eigenstate for that observable): the antecedent is true. 
Therefore, EEL seems to be made invalid by the present proposal.
The response to this is that, according to the ontological hypothesis 
that was put forward in this paper, one must indeed make an amendment 
to EEL, and regard it as only applying to the total system. According to 
this interpretation, each separate particle in a many-particle system can 
be seen as possessing a property as intrinsic only after measurement 
(when the system will be split into distinct sub-systems), even if it has 
probability 1 of possessing that property before being measured. Before 
measurement, it is maintained, such a probability only follows from the 
description of a disposition of the entire system and cannot therefore be 
regarded as corresponding to an actual property that can be attributed to 
the specific particle. This modification to the link - which is at any rate 
not an integral part of quantum theory and is modified or even 
abandoned also in other contexts such as, for instance, modal 
interpretations of quantum mechanics -  should appear acceptable. 
Especially so once one realizes that, although essential from the 
perspective of one’s ontological interpretation of quantum theory, such a 
modification does not make any difference in  practice, we can still 
attribute separate properties to the particles that compose a non­
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entangled state before measurement exactly because we know from the 
quantum probabilities that upon measurement they will necessarily 
possess such properties. Since measurement is the only  way to check 
whether a given quantum particle has a certain (state-dependent) 
property, to ask whether the particle already has the detected properties 
before measurement is simply otiose, and no empirical difference can 
possibly emerge between the two scenarios (i.e., with dispositions 
encoded in emergent relations and with intrinsic properties -  be they 
dispositional or categorical -  respectively).
Conclusions
Looking at the description of the elementary particles provided by 
the Standard Model permitted the individuation of the tropes making up 
the whole of reality (of course, on the assumption that our current 
knowledge of physical reality is an at least approximately correct 
representation of reality). These have been identified with the 
elementary particles’ essential state-independent properties. That is, with 
their mass, charge and colour.185 As for state-dependent properties and 
the peculiarities of quantum statistics, they have been accounted for by 
emphasising that these peculiarities only emerge before measurement; 
and by taking all state-dependent properties of identical particles in the 
same system before measurement as emergent relations. This allowed for 
a reconstruction of quantum statistics as involving entities which are 
full-blown individuals, although with peculiarly non-classical properties.
185 It must be bome in mind that not all particles have all these properties.
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Appendix: Statistics and State-Dependent Properties in  O ther 
Interpretations o f the Quantum Domain
As in chapter 3, I assumed the standard interpretation of QM in this 
chapter. And as in chapter 3, here too it might be useful briefly to 
consider how what has been said would need to be modified within the 
context of other interpretations.
In Bohmian mechanics, no particular treatment needs to be given of 
state-dependent properties, as these are properties of the wavefunction, 
and the corresponding probabilities are purely epistemic.186 As for the 
statistics, the predictions of Bohmian mechanics agree with those of 
quantum mechanics because of a quantum equilibrium hypothesis 
according to which particle configurations are random with a 
distribution that coincides with the probability density of finding a 
system in a given configuration according to the standard quantum 
formalism. This might appear ad hoc; but is certainly effective. And it is 
particularly significant in the present context, because it allows one to 
reconstruct quantum statistics on the basis of an explicitly classical 
ontology. Bohmian mechanics can indeed be said to reduce quantum 
statistics to the quantum analogue of statistical mechanics for classical 
mechanics.
As regards modal interpretations, generally speaking these reduce the 
non-classicality of quantum statistics to an ignorance-based approach to 
what can be conceived of as an essentially classical domain. Arguments
186 It is true, on the other hand, that property-attributions in Bohmian mechanics become 
contextual. They violate, that is, the assumption “that measurements of an observable must 
yield the same value independently of what other measurements may be made 
simultaneously” (Bell [1987; 9]). This poses some difficulties for the interpretation of the * 
theory, but is certainly consistent with the idea that particles are individuals.
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and proofs in support of this claim are provided by Van Fraassen [1991; 
327-335].
Lastly, the ensemble, or statistical, interpretation has clear 
consequences on one’s understanding of properties of many-particle 
systems. The wavefimction, according to such a view, must be taken as 
an abstract statistical function, only applicable to the statistics of repeated 
preparation procedures, in a way analogous to what occurs in classical 
statistical mechanics. Within this interpretation, it can perfectly be 
claimed that before the measurement the system was in the measured 
state, and that the observed statistical behaviour does not mirror any 
deep-seated ontological fact but, instead, just describes the specific 
behaviour of ensembles of systems of large numbers of (possibly wholly 
individual) particles.187
187 In this connection, it is interesting to notice that arguments exist to the effect that 
quantum statistics can be reproduced by operating on systems of entirely classical particles. 
See Gottesman [2005].
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Conclusions and Outlook
In this thesis, a specific case study, having to do with the 
metaphysical nature of individuality and the ontological interpretation of 
the fundamental constituents of reality as they are described by quantum 
mechanics, has been shown to be an exemplar of the two-way 
interaction between philosophy and the natural sciences. Relevant 
results have been obtained both in metaphysics (plausibility of the view 
of individuality as primitive thisness; appeal of trope theory and 
moderate haecceitism) and in physics (orthodox quantum mechanics as 
interpretable from an ontologically ‘conservative’ perspective, with 
particles as (quasi-)classical individuals).
In relation to the metaphysical side of the arguments presented, it is 
worth emphasising that the recourse to the notion of primitiveness must 
not be understood as a ‘cheap way out’ of the crucial difficulties. First, 
while issues such as individuality and resemblance have indeed been in 
the end presented as facts that require (and allow) no further explanation 
beyond the ostensive reference to the things’ nature and existence, this 
conclusion has been reached via a detailed conceptual analysis, and 
argued to constitute the best conjecture in view of the evidence and the 
problems at hand. Secondly, all philosophical explanations must end at 
some point, and are inevitably rooted in something that is presented as 
primitive (for instance, the multiple instantiability of universals within 
the bundle theory -  why should this be accepted as a primitive 
metaphysical posit?); consequently, the present account only differs from 
others with respect to what it takes as a fundamental fact.
As regards the thesis’ ‘results’, while some definite answers, or at least 
suggestions, have been formulated, some other topics and areas present
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themselves as natural candidates for further research. The connection 
between primitive thisness and linguistic notions of direct reference and 
rigid designation, or between trope ontology and truth-making theory; 
or the possibility of extending certain results so as to include a 
consideration of identity in time, for instance, may be worth exploring.188
However, it is my conviction that, before moving beyond the domain 
discussed here, it is necessary to have an even closer look at the physics. 
As shown in chapter 3, orthodox quantum theory and Bohmian 
mechanics, although empirically equivalent, have radically different 
ontological consequences. This suffices to show that a careful 
comparative evaluation of all the existing alternatives is essential in order 
to have a clear idea of what can (or should) be said at the level of 
ontology in view of (non-relativistic) quantum mechanics broadly 
understood.
Once the study of non-relativistic quantum mechanics is so 
completed, it will then be possible to move on to different types of 
physical theories. For instance, it is a possibility that the conclusions and
188 It is interesting to notice the potential relevance of the discussion in this thesis for the 
topic of scientific realism. Worrall [1989] argued that, by distinguishing the intrinsic nature 
of things and the structure of their relationships with each other, the realist becomes capable 
of identifying the sort of cumulativity in the history of science that s/he needs in order to 
substantiate his/her claims. What persists across theory change, Worrall argues, is the 
structure of things, mirrored by that formal structure that theories substituting each other in 
the development of science turn out to share. This position came to be known as epistemic 
structural realism (ESR). Other authors (in particular, Ladyman [1998]) endorse ontic 
structural realism (OSR), the position according to which not only is structure what is 
preserved across theory-changes; the grounds also exist for formulating a radical 
metaphysical thesis to the effect that reality is entirely made out of structures. One 
fundamental reason for which OSR is regarded as compelling by its proponents is the 
alleged complete underdetermination between individuality and non-individuality in 
quantum mechanics. The results of this work are therefore clearly relevant to the debate 
over structural realism. On the one hand, they could be taken to support the OSRist’s claim 
of underdetermination, by providing further reasons to opt for individuality in spite of the 
well-established general opinion going in the direction of non-individuality. On the other 
hand, the ESRist (and the opponents of OSR in general) may insist that, since individuality 
is, so to speak, the default option supported by intuition and commonsense, insofar as it can 
be shown that existing arguments for non-individuality are not as compelling as they are 
commonly taken to be, individuality comes out as a winner. Further study of these issues 
may give interesting results.
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proposals formulated in this thesis, explicitly set against the background 
of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, do not carry over (at least not in 
an unqualified form) to the domain of other, more advanced, theories 
that are possibly more reliable as ‘true descriptions’ of reality. Some 
authors, for instance, take quantum field theory to require (or at least 
strongly suggest) an ontology of non-individuals.189 Even supposing that 
this is not the case, and that quantum field theory simply mirrors the 
issues arising at the level of canonical quantum mechanics, additional 
results appear at the relativistic level that it is certainly important to look 
at in some detail from the present perspective, aiming to do metaphysics 
in a scientifically-informed way.
Relativistic quantum field theory gives rise, in particular, to:
1) No-go theorems on the localizability of particles, according to 
which it is impossible to describe particles as localized in finite 
regions of space-time, for doing so would violate basic 
relativistic postulates such as the impossibility of superluminal 
speed (see Malament [1996] and Halvorson and Clifton [2002]);
2) The Reeh-Schlieder theorem (Reeh and Schlieder [1961], see 
also Redhead [1995]), which asserts that local measurements 
never permit us to distinguish a state with no particles 
(‘vacuum state’) from any /2-particle state;
3) The fact that expectation values for certain quantities do not 
vanish for the vacuum state, so that energy is not zero and
189 For the first explicit formulation of the idea that the basic constituents of quantum fields 
are non-individual quanta, see Teller [1983]. Other suggestions depart more radically from 
the ‘thing-with-qualities’ paradigm. To mention a few: event ontologies (Auyang [1995] 
and Bartels [1999]), occurrent-/process-based ontologies (Stapp [1979] and Seibt [2002]), 
and factored ontologies (Simons [2002]). But see the notion of ‘ephemeral’ suggested by 
Redhead [1983]. Ephemerals, Redhead claims, are full-blown individuals that only exist in 
between creation- and annihilation-events.
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there are physical ‘happenings’ even when no particles are 
there;
4) The fact that the prediction of the so-called ‘Unruh effect’, 
namely, that a uniformly accelerated observer in a vacuum 
will detect a ‘thermal bath’ of particles (the so-called ‘Rindler 
quanta’) - so that a change in the frame of reference causes a 
change in the number of particles - has been experimentally 
‘verified’.
Without entering in the details of these arguments, it can be said that 
they appear prima facie to represent a threat for the concept of an 
individual particle. It is therefore interesting to see whether the features 
that they put into doubt (e.g., localizability, constant number, 
independence of frames of reference, absence in vacuum) should in effect 
be dispensed with; and whether the modifications one may consequently 
be required to make in one’s ontology compromise the project of 
developing trope theory along the lines suggested in the second part of 
the thesis.
For the time being, at any rate, it appears fair to claim that the 
approach to questions of identity and individuality, and to metaphysics 
and science in general, endorsed in this work has a number of interesting 
consequences and relevant potential applications. The future appears 
promising for the development of the study of at least some of those 
questions that He at the boundary between traditional metaphysics and 
the most advanced empirical study of the world around us.
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